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ABSTRACT
The first two chapters of this thesis analyze the response of blood donors to several
features of the blood market in Portugal. The first provides estimates of the blood supply
elasticity using changes in a benefit scheme for regular blood donors. In Portugal, starting
from 2003, the government strictly enforced the collection of medical user fees, but with
regular donors receiving a waiver. Using within-county variations in the value of the
benefit, measured as the user fee for a visit to the Emergency Department, I find that
the benefit increases the number of donations, both unconditionally and conditional on
the number of blood drives. I estimate a one euro increase in the user fee to increase
blood donations by 1.8%, on average. I also estimate a negative elasticity of blood drives
with respect to the user fees. This indicates that benefits and blood drives are substitutes
in eliciting blood donations. The second chapter analyzes how waiting to donate blood
affects donor retention. I use a panel of new blood donors, in Portugal, between 2008 and
2012. I find that higher waiting times make it less likely for first-time donors to donate
again, controlling for donor and donation site-specific variables. A 10-minute increase
in waiting time until triage results in a 0.6% decrease in donor retention, on average.
vi
Donors in the upper tail of the waiting time distribution are driving the effect. New
donors at blood drives react more negatively than new donors at blood donor centers.
The third chapter (joint with Matteo Galizzi and Raffaele Miniaci) reports experimental
evidence on risk preferences measures, from two waves of a representative sample of the
UK Household Longitudinal Survey. The subjects responded to three tests: two incentive-
compatible lottery tests and a survey test measuring self-reported willingness to take risk.
We find significant but low correlations between the responses to the three tests across
time. Furthermore, we find that at least two thirds of the subjects made inconsistent
choices across lottery tests, when controlling for individual-specific levels of background
income. Finally, we find mixed evidence concerning the external validity of these tests.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Estimating the Blood Supply
Elasticity: Evidence from a Large
Scale Benefit Scheme
1.1 Introduction
Blood is a prominent repugnant good. Similarly to kidneys, livers, and uterus, setting
a price for blood is generally seen as inappropriate.1 For example, the law creating the
Portuguese Blood Institute states
It is consecrated in this Law that blood will be provided for free from the moment
of blood collection until blood transfusion to a patient in need. As a product of
the human body, invaluable for both donors and other human beings, it should
be banned from any form of market transaction.
In practice, policymakers have explicitly refrained from giving monetary incentives.2
1Roth (2007) defines repugnance as a particular form of distaste for certain kinds of transactions. The
author points out its role as a market constraint, and provides a number of examples of such transactions.
Slavery, usury, and body parts are examples of goods or services commonly treated as non-marketable.
2The history of the Market for Blood is well documented in Slonim et al. (2014). In developed countries,
as well as most of the developing world, cash payments for blood are illegal due to ethical and safety
concerns.
2Market imbalances follow from the absence of a market-clearing mechanism. Blood short-
ages, defined as the supply of blood being below what is necessary for three days, are
frequent.(Lacetera et al., 2012) Excess supply is not unusual, particularly in face of major
events such as natural disasters, accidents or terrorist attacks.3
Nonetheless, blood donors are sometimes given indirect incentives (e.g. badges, t-
shirts, cups) to attract them to blood donation. Lacetera et al. (2013) and Slonim et al.
(2014) summarize the evidence, so far, regarding the effect of these extrinsic incentives:
small stakes non monetary gifts increase blood donation.
In Portugal, a very important indirect incentive is the waiver of user fees for emergency
rooms (ED) and other hospital and primary care services. Starting from 2003, the govern-
ment strictly enforced the collection of user fees when using the National Health Service
(NHS). However, regular blood donors are waived these user fees.4 I study the effect of
these benefit changes on the blood market. In other words, regular blood donors experi-
enced a potential benefit from donation, and this benefit can be quantified. Furthermore,
from 2012, emergency care no longer qualified for the user-fee waiver.
In this paper, I estimate blood supply elasticity with respect to the size of the user
fee waiver. Learning about this parameter is key if we want to design policies that in-
centivize people to donate (either permanently, or in response to demand shocks). The
benefit scheme under analysis has three particularly relevant features. First, it has been
challenging to scale up to policy-making level or even run experiments with large samples
3Blood has a 45-day shelf life. Moreover, storage has to follow strict safety guidelines, limiting available
capacity. To make matters worse, a donor is suspended from donation at least for 90 or 120 days, respec-
tively for men and women. A peak in the supply of blood can then be followed by a period of draught and
supply shortages.
4See Law 48/90 (Government, 1990), replaced by Law 27/2002 (Government, 2002) and by Law
113/2011 (Government, 2011).
3of blood donors, due to difficulties in coordinating with blood collection services.(Goette
et al., 2010) In our study, we analyze the change in behavior of all potential donors as-
signed to the Lisbon Center of the PBI, which covers roughly half the country, resulting
from a redefinition of the overall reward system for blood donations. Second, we are able
to explore the role of an increase in the benefits for blood donations as well as its partial
termination.5 Third, and perhaps more importantly, the benefit is only active for regular
blood donors. This serves a twofold purpose: one the one hand, to reward donors for their
continued service to society6, and on the other hand, to foster regular blood donation.7
In fact, it’s not even obvious that the elasticity is positive: some argue that in the
context of blood donations and other charitable giving, extrinsic incentives crowd out
intrinsic ones. For blood markets, this concern was raised in the seminal work by Titmuss
(1971). The author claims that, when agents are altruistic, providing rewards may backfire
and decrease their willingness to participate in the market.8 Mellstrom and Johannesson
(2008) revisit Titmuss’ work, contributing to this debate with experimental evidence of the
negative effect of cash transfers on women’s willingness to donate. However, the results
from Lacetera et al. (2012, 2013); Slonim et al. (2014) point in the opposite direction, with
a positive impact of incentives on donations. The study by Niessen-Ruenzi et al. (2016)
confirms these results, for direct cash payments in the south of Germany. Moreover,
Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) show that donors apparently do not exhibit pure
5The removal of incentives has been highlighted by Gneezy et al. (2011) as one of the main challenges
in studying how incentives impact prosocial behavior.
6According to informal sources at the Portuguese Blood Institute, as well as the Law Decree defining
the benefit.
7“An adequate and reliable supply of safe blood can be assured by a stable base of regular, voluntary,
unpaid blood donors. These donors are also the safest group of donors as the prevalence of blood borne
infections is lowest among this group. World Health Assembly resolution (WHA63.12) urges all Member
States to develop national blood systems based on voluntary unpaid donation and work towards the goal
of self-sufficiency”.(WHO, 2015)
8See also Benabou and Tirole (2006), who identify image concerns as the main driver behind this effect.
4altruism, based on a sample of Australian Red Cross blood donors.
I also study the elasticity of donations with respect to the number of blood drives.
Blood drives are a different policy tool that blood collection agencies can use to generate
more supply of blood. In practice, they give the organization more control over the
available supply of blood. They are similar to sales for blood donors, with lower transport
cost, while providing a potentially higher social image benefit, when compared to donations
at blood donor centers.9
In order to estimate blood supply elasticity, I use county-level variation over time in
the value of user fees and estimate the model as a difference-in-difference linear regression.
The blood donations data come from a panel of the 241,605 potential blood donors
enrolled in the Lisbon center of the PBI between 2003 and 2012. I analyze a total of
906,139 attempted blood donations. This dataset is unique in its ability to identify donors
throughout the period, its large sample size, health data, and detailed information about
blood drives.10
I estimate two types of blood supply elasticity. First, the unconditional elasticity,
which tells us how the overall volume of blood donated to changes in the value of the user
fee. It incorporates the response of the blood collection system to variation in the supply
of blood. Second, the elasticity conditional on the number of blood drives, measuring the
response of blood donors to the benefit, holding constant the cost of donation.
9Blood donor centers provide continuous demand opportunities at designated hospitals/Portuguese
Blood Institute buildings. Regular blood drives take place with a set frequency at some onsite location
(e.g., school, church, hall). There are also irregular blood drives. The first two provide a steady stream of
blood supply. The third type can be thought of as peak load supply, typically activated when there is a
blood shortage. They can also occur at other points in time, as a mechanism to attract new donors.
10The dataset regarding user charges was built based on legislation, Health Care Delivery Reports and
Reports and Accounts from a number of institutions within the National Health Service. These include the
Central Administration of Health Care Services (ACSS), Sub-regional Health Administrations, Regional
Health Administrations, Hospital Groups and Primary Care Center Groups, between 2003 and 2012.
5However, the number of blood drives and blood donation are determined endogenously,
downward biasing the estimates. I address this problem by instrumenting for blood drives.
First, for each county, over the entire sample period, I calculate the proportion of drives
that happened over weekends. Second, for each county and for each month, I calculate
the total number of public holidays and weekend days. The instrument is the product of
these two constructed variables, and is included in the differences-in-differences estimation.
Furthermore, I estimate the elasticity of blood drives with respect to the user fee in a first-
stage regression.
A 1e increase in user fees increases blood donations by 1.2%, according to our estimates
for unconditional blood supply elasticity. When conditioning on the number of blood
drives, the estimate is 1.8%. Moreover, the number of blood drives decreases as user fees
increase. User fees and blood drives are substitutes in promoting donations. Changes in
user fees affect returning donors most, as expected due to the design of the benefit scheme.
User fees have a stronger effect on donations at blood drives than at donation centers.
Finally, men respond more to the benefit, and young donors do not respond to the value
of user fees.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the Portuguese blood
market. Section 1.3 presents the data and Section 1.4 the empirical strategy. Elasticity
estimates and robustness checks are the subject of Section 1.5. Section 1.6 discusses the
results and provides a cost benefit analysis of the user fee waiver. Section 1.7 concludes.
61.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Blood donation in Portugal
The Portuguese market for blood donation is organized by a 100% voluntary whole blood
central planner, the Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute (PBI), a Government
funded Agency within the Ministry of Health. The PBI is in charge of the collection, safety
and delivery of blood to all health care institutions in the country. Since its creation,
in 1990, any form of commercialization of blood is strictly forbidden, to the extent that
hospitals are not charged for the blood they use when delivering health care.(Government,
1990)
Blood delivery and safety is a threefold challenge. Firstly, blood is an intermediate
perishable good with a high depreciation rate, resulting in a 45-day shelf life. Secondly,
the only way to produce blood is to extract it from living human beings who are willing
to donate. Finally, demand and supply are largely unforeseeable, which gives rise to
imbalances, both shortages and excess supply.
Therefore, a major task of the PBI is to make sure there are enough blood donation
attempts so that enough blood is collected, but not so much at the same time that it
will have to be destroyed. At the same time, the PBI has efficiency concerns and aims to
minimize the cost per unit of harvested blood.11
The PBI has traditionally resorted to two main instruments to minimize imbalances
and recruit blood donors: the organization of blood drives, and the waiver of user fees for
visits to the National Health Service, which I define as the benefit.
11This has been one of the main objectives of PBI, according to their Annual Activity Report (namely
2010-2012, available at http://www.ipst.pt/index.php/ipst-ip/instrumentos-gestao/pra).
71.2.2 Blood drives
Blood drives play a key role in preventing and/or solving market imbalances. In practice,
blood drives provide incentives by decreasing the cost and increasing the benefit of blood
donation. In fact, due to social image concerns and other intrinsic motivation elements,
they increase blood donors utility. Moreover, blood drives expose potential blood donors
to the possibility of donating blood at a lower transport cost and higher visibility, which
is believed to be important for prosocial behavior. The alternative to blood drives is to
donate at a blood donor center, where there is much higher flexibility in the schedule, but
also potentially higher transport cost and lower social visibility.
Blood drives can be organized directly by the Portuguese Blood and Transplantation
Institute (PBI), or requested by either an individual or an association. Furthermore, the
drives can take place at the PBI mobile blood collection truck or at some facility. These
will typically be large buildings such as schools, office buildings, town halls, churches, etc.
1.2.3 User fees for visits to the National Health System
User fees, or user charges, are a type of healthcare copayment. Health care in Portugal is
mainly provided by the tax-funded National Health System (NHS). Since the early 1990’s,
the Government legislates the values of user charges to be paid by every patient treated
in the NHS, either inpatient or outpatient care. The copayments, capped at 1/3 of the
total value of the procedure, are supposedly updated every year.
User fees, or user charges, are a type of healthcare copayment. Health care in Portugal
is mainly provided by the tax-funded National Health System (NHS). Since the early
1990’s, the Government legislates the values of user charges to be paid by every patient
8treated in the NHS, either inpatient or outpatient care. The copayments, capped at 1/3
of the total value of the procedure, can be updated every year.
User fees aim at preventing excessive demand for health care, while safeguarding access
for those in need. They are particularly relevant for emergency care.12 Due to equity
concerns, since they were first defined, chronic patients, children, unemployed and other
groups of population were waived these user charges. Regular blood donors and firefighters
are the only non-underprivileged groups to receive this benefit.
Until the Fall of 2003, user charges were a controversial issue, subject to lengthy polit-
ical debate. At that moment, new legislation approved overruled all previous legislation
regarding these copayments, establishing new rules and amounts to be paid.
In April 2004, the Ministry of Health defined eligibility requirements to receive the
waiver of user fees when visiting the NHS. Blood donors were required to have donated
at least twice over the last 365 days. The blood donor card was defined as sufficient
proof of eligibility.13 In January 2012, the waiver was restricted to non urgent care.14
For blood donors this meant an increase in the copayment due for a visit to the ED. It
should be noted that the policy change was motivated by a financial crisis. At the time,
the government was forced to increase revenue and cut spending. User fees were one of
the tools, together with a generalized tax increase, as part of a bailout plan.
The Emergency Care Network Reform
In 2008, the Ministry of Health announced the restructuring of the Emergency Care Net-
work. As a result, each Emergency Departments (ED) was assigned one of three levels
12See Barros (2012) for details on the role of user charges in the financing of the Portuguese NHS.
13Before 2004, donors would have to request a document signed by the Portuguese Blood Institute
representative.
14Cfr. Law-Decree 113/2011 (Government, 2011)
9- Basic (SUB), Surgical (SUMC) and Multipurpose (SUP). Furthermore, as of February
of 2009, the user fee was no longer computed based on the type of hospital/primary care
center patients attended, but on the type of ED available at the location.
The reform aimed to achieve better coordination and coverage in the provision of
emergency care to the population. Since the National Health Service is centrally organized,
i.e., there is no market defining where to place emergency care units, an emergency care
network was designed, composed of the three levels of care defined above. The main
optimization variable of the network, created by experts in health geography, was traveling
time. Within this network, any patient would be at a short driving distance from the most
basic level of care, at least.
To achieve the newly created network configuration, some hospitals saw their ED
upgraded to provide a higher level of care and a set of primary care centers were integrated
in the network as SUB. On the other hand, there was a set of hospitals and primary care
centers with downgraded emergency services. The role out of these changes generates
variation in the value of the benefit, within county, over time. For example, the upgrade
of a Primary Care Center to SUB represents an increase in the county user charge, or the
corresponding benefit for regular blood donors.
1.3 Descriptive statistics
The data come from a panel of the 241,605 potential blood donors enrolled in the Lisbon
center of the PBI between 2003 and 2012. I analyze a total of 906,139 attempted blood
donations. The panel includes information regarding health (weight, height, blood pres-
sure, hemoglobin, lab test results), the donation (site, staff, blood drive, waiting times)
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and socio-demographic variables (age, occupation, town).15
1.3.1 Trends in blood donation and blood drives
The number of attempted donations has increased since 2003, with a peak in 2009 at
around 85000 donations. Of those, less than 75% end up in approved blood collections,
i.e., blood that can actually be used in the production of health care. (Figure 1·1 a). Blood
Donor Centers welcome around 20,000 potential donors each year. In 2012, this number
decreased to levels similar to 2003. (Figure 1·1 b) We observe a decreasing trend since
2008, which was further deepened in 2012, following the discontinuation of the subsidy.
Also in Figure 1·1, we can see that the number of donations at blood drives grew until
2009. There was a decrease in the number of donations at blood drives in 2011, followed
by a recovery in 2012.
Many potential donors are permanently denied donation, or at least postponed or
suspended. Safety concerns regarding both donors’ and patients’ health are at the root of
these decisions. To be able to donate blood, the donor has to be approved at a strict clinical
triage process which includes a number of questions regarding lifestyle, risky behaviors,
traveling, etc. Notice that in general this makes it harder to donate, particularly for
younger people. The proportion of people who are suspended from donation is as high
as 20%. (Figure 1·2) A concern from providing incentives for blood donation is the risk
of an increase in the rejection rate. Although the number of suspended donors has not
decreased, we don’t observe any substantial increase in the number of eliminated donors,
looking at raw data.
15The dataset regarding user charges was built based on legislation, Health Care Delivery Reports and
Reports and Accounts from a number of institutions within the National Health Service. These include the
Central Administration of Health Care Services (ACSS), Sub-regional Health Administrations, Regional
Health Administrations, Hospital Groups and Primary Care Center Groups, between 2003 and 2012.
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The data includes information about all drives organized by the Lisbon Center of the
PBI. The area of influence is shown in Figure 1·3(a) , including the regions of Alentejo
(Beja, Evora and Portalegre districts) and Algarve (Faro district), as well as the two
districts surrounding Lisbon (the capital), Santarem and Setubal. Most blood drives
occur in these three districts, the most densely populated ones. Figure 1·3(b) shows the
distribution of the population by county, the unit of our analysis, at the 2011 Census.16 In
the analysis, I normalized donations or drives per count/month, dividing them by 10,000
inhabitants.
The number of blood drives varies greatly by district, as we can see from Figure 1·4.
In 2012, there were more than 1500 blood drives in the Lisbon district, almost 5 per day,
a large increase compared to the previous years. The number of drives stayed mostly
constant over time in the other districts.
1.3.2 User fees
User fees increased steadily between 2003 and 2012, in nominal terms.(Figure 1·5) The
smaller adjustments reflected adjustments to inflation rate. The minimum amount paid
per visit ranged from 2e in 2003 for a visit to a Primary Care Emergency Appointment to
20e due for a visit to a Multipurpose Emergency Department in 2012. The copayments
doubled in 2012. For example, a primary care emergency appointment increased from
4.5e to 10e, in January 1, 2012. Regular blood donors face an even higher price increase,
since previously they didn’t have to pay.
As we can see in the picture, until February 2009, the user fee was determined by
the type of health care facility (Central Hospital, District Hospital, District Level One
16A district is a set of counties. Source: National Statistical Institute, 2012, available at http://www.
pordata.pt.
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Hospital or Primary Care Center). From then on, it was based on the type of Emergency
Department available at the healthcare unit. This change was a consequence of a more
fundamental policy reform and generated important variation in the value of the benefit
for regular blood donors.
1.3.3 Cross-district variation in blood donations and blood drives
In order to measure the effect of the user fees waiver, I analyze within county variation
in the value of these fees. Portugal is divided into 18 districts, which further divide into
counties. The organization of the provision of health care services within the Ministry
of Health follows these geographical divisions. For example, there is at least one Pri-
mary Care Center per county and in many cases there will be exactly one. Furthermore,
networks of care and referral patterns are organized within districts. Therefore, the Emer-
gency Care Network also takes into account these geographical groups. Since I am able to
identify in the data each donor’s county of residence, that allows me to uniquely identify
each donor’s local user fee.
We follow all counties (the cross sectional component) over time (a monthly time series)
and we measure the number of donations made by people who live in that county, as well
as the number of blood drives hosted in that county.
The number of blood donations by county/month, per 10,000 inhabitants, our depen-
dent variable, increased between 2003 and 2010. In Figure 1·6 we see the evolution of the
average of this variable, between 2003 and 2012, by district. Lisboa and Santarem have
the highest average of donations per 10,000 inhabitants, per month, between 20 and 25
donations over most of our sample. Beja and Setubal have between 10 and 15 monthly
donations per 10,000 inhabitants. The remaining districts have the lowest donation rates,
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below 10 and even 5 donations per 10,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, the distribution
of the number of blood donations became more spread out over time (σ2003 = 17.43,
σ2012 = 21.14), but there is a core group of counties that remain in the upper quartile
of the distribution throughout the whole period, mostly in the districts of Lisboa and
Santarem.
When we look at the average number of blood drives per month, per 10,000 inhabitants,
we find a similar geographical pattern, with one exception.(1·7) Beja, a district with a
relatively high number of donations per 10,000 inhabitants, has fewer drives, compared to
the other districts. There were 1.2 drives (σ = 4.50) and 57.43 (σ = 129.53) donations per
county/month, on average.17 The first quartile of distribution does not host blood drives.
Only in the 4th quartile of the distribution do we find counties with an average of more
than one blood drive per month. There is variation across counties and within counties
in the distribution of blood drives. The mean decreased in 2012, to 0.18 drives per 10,000
inhabitants.
1.3.4 User fees and blood donations
Furthermore, we measure the maximum possible value of the user fee to be paid in that
county,
The main explanatory variable, maximum user fee, is equal to the highest baseline
user fee in county i in month t, which depends on the type of Emergency Department
available.18
17We measure the number of drives per county as the number of blood drives that happened in county
i in month t. Notice that blood donations per county/month are donations made by residents of county i,
not necessarily in the same county.
18Notice that the value of the user fee that I am using is the one a patient has to pay for the visit.
Additional fees may be charged for diagnostic and treatment procedures. The total payment is caped at
50e. In any case, beforehand, the patient only knows with certainty that she has to pay this baseline user
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The value of the user fee is defined as the ED benefit available in the county. The
amount due first depended on the type of Hospital or Primary Care Center being visited.
From February 2009 on, it was based on the type of Emergency Department the patient
went to. In the cross-sectional dimension, we measure what type of Emergency care is
available in each county and compute the corresponding user fee. We then do the same
for all months in our analysis. The opening or closure of Emergency Departments give
rise to time-series variation in the user fee. Given the nature of the policy change, changes
in the Emergency Care Network are exogenous to the number of blood donations in the
county.
In Figure 1·8 we see that the direction of the relationship between the average number
of donations and the value of the user charge is quite unclear. The number of Blood
Drives shows a negative relationship with the benefit.(Figure 1·9) When looking at specific
counties, we sometimes observe an increase in the number of donations coincides with the
increase in the value of the user charge. It also seems to be the case that, in some counties,
there is a sharp drop in donations when the waiver is removed. This drop is steeper in
the other centers of the PBI (Porto and Coimbra), not included in this study. In Lisbon,
in contrast, the removal of the benefit coincides with an increase in the number of blood
drives. That is to say, there was a transfer of blood drives from the periphery to the
capital.
fee. This can be thought of as buying insurance. The minimum value saved is this user fee, which varies
across healthcare units, and the maximum is 50e. To build this variable I used a number of different
sources, which include the Statistics of Health Care Provided of the Ministry of Health, Annual Reports
and Accounts of Regional and Local Health Services.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
The model to estimate the unconditional blood supply elasticity is given by
donationsi,t = β0 + β1benefiti,t + γi + δt + i,t (1.1)
where i is the county and t is the month. The number of donations is normalized by the
population of the county (times 10000).
The coefficient β1 measures blood supply elasticity, taking into account the response
by the Portuguese Blood Institute to shifts in supply and in the organization of blood
drives, using within-county variation over time. This coefficients tells us the overall effect
of the value of the user fee on blood donations.
We are also interested in estimating the conditional blood supply elasticity, given by
donationsi,t = β0 + β1benefiti,t + β2drivesi,t + γi + δt + i,t (1.2)
where i is the county and t is the month.
In this case, β1 measures blood supply elasticity, controlling for the number of blood
drives held in county i at month t. That is to say, holding constant the cost of donation,
it measures the supply response to changes in the value of user fees. This allows us to
isolate the response of individual blood donors to the incentive, and separate it from the
market’s response.
However, this raises a different problem. Clearly, the number of blood drives is en-
dogenous. There will be more blood drives in places where the Portuguese Blood Institute
expects more people to show up to donate. The estimate for β1 will be downward biased,
given the negative relationship between blood drives and user charges (see Figure 1·9 and
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Section 1.5.2).
I use an instrumental variable based on whether a blood drive is held on a weekend or
on a weekday, one of the main characteristics of blood drives. The instrument is defined
as
IV : Weekendit = # Weekend Daysit ×
1
T
T∑
t=1
# weekend blood drivesit
# blood drivesit
, (1.3)
where i is the county, t is the month, and T = 120, the total number of months in our
sample. The two components of the instrument are the number of weekend or holiday
days in a given county/month, and the average proportion of drives held on weekends, for
county i.
The number of weekend days in a county/month vary, on average, between 8.5 and
11.5 days (Figure 1·10), across counties, between 2003 and 2012. To build this variable,
in addition to weekends, I included local county holidays, as long as they didn’t fall on a
weekend.
Focusing on the second component of the instrument, we can see that there are more
drives on weekends than on weekdays.(Figure 1·11) In Figure 1·12 we can see that there
is a systematic relationship between weekend drives and the type of blood drive location.
The same holds true for weekend drives and geographical location, as shown, for example,
in Figure 1·13, for the counties in Lisbon’s district. One clear picture emerges from these
figures and that is the relevance of the type of day of the week in the number of blood
drives.
When estimating the conditional blood supply elasticity, we will use the variation in
IV : Weekends to identify the effect of the number of blood drives on blood donations,
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conditional on county and month fixed effects, which absorb the variation due to county
specific characteristics.
The main concern regarding the validity of the instrument would be the exclusion
restriction. This condition requires the number of blood donations per 10,000 inhabitants
to be uncorrelated with IV:Weekend.
First, notice two reasons as to why the decision to hold blood drives, even if correlated
with the number of potential blood donations, differs from the decision to donate. The first
has to do with regularity of donations. A donor faces medical constraints that determine
when he can donate. For instance, there is a minimum interval between donations, three
months for men and 4 months for women. There are also clinical reasons behind the
rejection or deferral of a potential donor for a period of time, such as traveling to a
tropical country or due to blood test results. The second reason is the how the central
planner organizes blood drives, which are planned ahead to try to minimize imbalances
and the cost per unit of blood harvested. The higher the demand for blood, the higher
the number of blood drives, but as much as possible as a result of careful forecasting of
stocks and planning ahead. Some of these blood drives will occur on weekends, and some
on weekdays. As for a donor’s decision, even if he has a higher propensity to donate on
weekends, the decision is likely to be made between donating today, Wednesday, or over
the weekend, taking into account blood donor center and blood drives availability and
costs.
In practice, the threat to identification comes from counties that have a particular char-
acteristic that makes people donate more/less on weekends, and that determines whether
there is a blood drive there on a weekend or not. It is possible that the number of weekend
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days in itself be somewhat correlated with the number of donations per 10,000 inhabitants.
Given that we are using within-county variation in the estimation, this problem does not
undermine the results.
1.5 Results
Throughout the analysis I estimate blood supply response to user fees using two sets of
models, one in levels and one calculating the semi-elasticity of donations with respect
to the user fees. The dependent variable is highly skewed to the left.(Figure 1·14) To
estimate the semi-elasticity, I have transformed the dependent variable, donations per
10,000 inhabitants, using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (arsinh, or IHS)19:
IHS donationsit = ln
(
donationsit +
√
donations2 + 1
)
.
Therefore, the coefficient β1 is the average change in blood donations resulting from
a one euro increase in the benefit, measured in either donations per 10,000 inhabitants
(levels) or as the growth rate (IHS).
1.5.1 Unconditional elasticity
The estimates for Eq 1.1 are presented in Table 1.1. The left hand side shows the results in
levels. A one euro increase in the benefit increases donations by 0.12 donations per 10,000
(Column (2)), when controlling for both county and month fixed effects. This is about
1% of the mean of the dependent variable, however, it is imprecisely estimated. The point
estimate is slightly lower, 0.097, when we control for district-specific trends (Column (3)).
The estimates on the right-hand side can be interpreted as the percent increase in
19One advantage of the IHS is its domain, the real line.
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donations resulting from a one euro increase in the benefit. Donations increase by 1.2%
(Column (2)), conditional on county and month fixed effects. The effect is higher when we
control for district-specific trends. The remaining columns test for different specifications
for county/month fixed effects.20
1.5.2 Conditional elasticity
We now turn to the estimation of Eq. 1.2, using both OLS and 2SLS. First, we will study
the impact of the instrumental variable and of the user fee on the number of blood drives,
the endogenous variable.
The first stage regression is given by
drivesi,t = β0 + β1benefiti,t + β2IV:Weekendi,t + γi + δt + i,t (1.4)
where i is the county and t is the month and the number of drives is normalized (per
10,000 inhabitants).
The estimation results are shown in Table 1.2. The number of blood drives decreases
with the benefit and increases with the instrument. A one standard-deviation increase in
the instrument generates 25.8% more blood drives. On the other hand, a one standard
deviation increase in ED benefit leads to a 2% drop in the number of blood drives, on
average. These results are based on Column (2), which uses the instrument in levels. The
instrument has a large mass at zero, due to counties that have zero weekend drives. I
20I estimated a series of models using alternative specifications, for both the unconditional and the
conditional model. Log-transforming the dependent variable is sensitive to the value of the constant added
to avoid log(0). I have also estimated a two-part model, to see whether there were two separate processes
generating the data, one for the zeroes, i.e., whether or not to participate in the market, and one for the
actual choice of quantity. The results go in line with what we estimated previously, but they don’t fit the
data particularly well. Finally, the number of blood donations could be thought of as an example of count
data. The estimates from poisson and negative binomial estimation do not seem to describe the actual
data generating process. Results are available upon request.
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estimate Column (3) to take into account this nonlinearity in the regressor.
The results from the second stage estimation of Equation (1.2) are shown in Table 1.3.
All specifications include county and calendar month fixed effects. The point estimate for
the effect of the benefit on blood drives more than doubles once we condition on blood
drives (Columns (1)-(2)). The 2SLS estimate is even higher (Columns (3)-(4)). The results
are similar for both specifications of the instrument. When the user fee increases one euro,
we estimate a 1.8% increase in donations per 10,000 inhabitants, on average (Column (3),
right hand side). The model is well identified (Weak Identification F-statistic of 207.4).
1.5.3 Robustness checks and extensions
The set of results shown in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 aims at analyzing whether the results are
driven by a particular set of observations, for unconditional and conditional elasticity,
respectively.
We first estimate blood supply elasticity restricting the sample to the years before 2012,
before the user fee waiver was removed. The point estimate for the unconditional semi-
elasticity of donations per 10,000 inhabitants with respect to the benefit is practically the
same, a 1.1% growth in donations. However, excluding 2012 has an impact in the estimate.
The semi-elasticity with respect to the benefit is much smaller when we condition on blood
drives.
Lisbon, the capital’s district, has more donations per capita than the other districts.
It also has a higher density of blood drives and blood donor centers. Excluding donations
in Lisbon yields a slightly higher elasticity than the one found before, around 1.7% (Table
1.4). Counties in the periphery respond more to changes in the benefit, in the uncondi-
tional model. However, the point estimate for is exactly the same if we exclude Lisbon
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from the analysis when estimating the conditional elasticity (Table 1.5, Column (1)-(2)).
Blood supply response mechanism
In Table 1.6 we find unconditional semi-elasticity estimates for a set of donor subgroups.
Looking at different donor subgroups gives us a deeper insight into the mechanism driving
blood supply’s response to change in the user fee. All models include county and month
fixed effects. In Table 1.7 we replicate the analysis done in Table 1.6, this time for the
conditional elasticity estimates.
Extensive versus intensive margin Providing small stakes incentives should increase
blood donation.(Lacetera et al., 2013; Slonim et al., 2014) We now ask the question as to
whether incentives affect the extensive margin, i.e., are new donors attracted to donation
because there is a subsidy involved? According to these results (0.0026, Column (2) of
Table 1.6), the effect of the subsidy is much smaller for new donors, which would indicate
that most of the effect is in fact on the intensive margin, and not in the extensive. Notice
that the incentive scheme is designed to benefit regular blood donors. These estimates
are telling us that those donors who were already willing to donate, donate more because
of the benefit. In other words, new donors are not attracted to donation because of the
benefit, but once they are donors, they might stay more because of the user fee waiver.
This is confirmed by the conditional elasticity estimates. The benefit has a small and
imprecisely estimated impact on the number of new donors (0.4%, Table 1.7, Column
(3)).
Socio-Demographic Differences We further investigate whether men and women re-
spond similarly to the benefit. Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) find evidence of higher
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crowding out for women. In this case, donations by men are significantly more respon-
sive to the benefit (Columns (4)-(5)). Finally, I analyze the semi-elasticity of different age
groups. There could be differences in demand for health care services between younger and
older age groups. I find that the younger donor group (Column (1) of Panel B, Age< 25)
do not respond to the benefit. The remaining age groups are statistically equivalent and
have the same semi-elasticity as the full sample.
Men respond more to the benefit, also when we condition on the cost of donation (Table
1.7 Columns (4)-(5)). A one euro increase in the subsidy leads to 0.31 more donations per
10,000 inhabitants, at the mean of the dependent variable. Once again we verify that the
youngest age group does not react to the incentive, even conditional on blood drives, and
the other age groups are statistically equivalent.
1.6 Discussion
We have studied blood supply elasticity with respect to changes in the value of the user
fee. At this point, we focus on a particular aspect, the removal of the waiver for ED user
fees. The estimates change significantly when we restrict the sample to the years before
2012, at which point the benefit was removed. In Table 1.8 we study the semi-elasticity
estimates when we restrict the sample to 2011 and 2012. At this point, most of the changes
in the benefit were its removal in the beginning of 2012. The unconditional estimates are
very similar to the ones in Table 1.1. However, two-stage least squares estimates yield a
higher semi-elasticity, 2.1%, on average (Column (2) and (4)).
Therefore, the behavioral response of donors was stronger when the waiver was re-
moved. The blood market compensated for this change by decreasing the cost of donation
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to donors, increasing the number of blood drives, which leads to an overall lower uncon-
ditional elasticity of blood supply.
From a policymaker point of view, we would like to now how the removal of the waiver
would that translate into additional revenue for the National Health System.
According to the Ministry of Health, on average a person will go to the Emergency
Department every two years. We can take the number of donors with blood collections in
2011 as the potential number of regular blood donors, eligible for the benefit in 2012. That
amounts to 35000 donors. Of those, half would go to the hospital in 2012. On average, the
(baseline) user fee would be 10e. Therefore, the NHS would be able to raise a minimum
of 175,000e, on average, by removing the ED waiver.
Moreover, the removal of the benefit has another advantage for ED. Around 40% of
ED visits are marked as green or below, measured by the Manchester Triage System. In
practice, this means that 40% of the people that visit the ED should be going to a less
urgent level of care. This creates congestion problems in ED. If the user does not have to
pay the user fee, the likelihood of making an unnecessary ED visit is even higher.
These are the benefits of removing the user fee waiver. On the cost side, we have a
potential increase in the cost per blood unit. This happens because the central planner
has to compensate for the decrease in the number of blood donations with an increase
in blood drives. This has a direct impact in labor costs, since the demand for health
care professional staff (nurses, physicians and lab technicians) increases. The Portuguese
Blood Institute has a set number of staff on payroll, and resorts to per diem professionals
when the PBI’s staff is not enough to staff the necessary blood drives. Therefore, a higher
number of blood drives increases the number of per diem workers. Furthermore, many of
24
these additional drives will happen on weekends and after work hours, which means they
are paid at a higher wage rate.
The PBI reports large increases in staff overtime remuneration, in its 2012 Annual
Activity Report. Namely, there was a 29.03% increase in overtime payroll expenditure.
In order to staff a blood drive, at least a physician and a nurse are needed. The 400%
increase in physician’s overtime compensation (25.89% increase for nurse’s), from 38,666e
to 193,817e, reflects the increase in the cost per unit of blood.
In practice, more blood drives also implies less efficient blood drives. By less efficient
the Portuguese Blood Institute means drives with a higher cost per unit of blood harvested.
This could be due to the increase in cost, and to a lower number of donors per drive. In
2011, the is unit cost os 172.73e. Unfortunately this data for 2012 is not available, so we
can’t confirm that there was an increase in costs and decrease in efficiency.
It is therefore unclear whether the removal of the waiver was cost effective or not.
However, it is clear that changing the benefit scheme for blood donors had an impact
in the blood donation market that goes beyond individuals’ decision of becoming blood
donors.
1.7 Conclusion
We analyzed the impact of a benefit used by the Portuguese Blood and Transplantation
Institute to foster blood donations. We estimated the semi-elasticity of blood donations
with respect to user fees. To do so, we used changes in the Emergency Care Network to
establish causality using a differences-in-differences approach. Furthermore, we estimated
both the unconditional elasticity, which captures overall response of the market, and the
25
conditional elasticity, which holds constant the number of blood drives. This amounts to
fixing a measure of the cost of donation to the blood donor. We dealt with the problem
raised by the endogeneity of the number of blood drives, using an instrument based on
the number of weekend days and the proportion of blood drives on weekends.
We find that the benefit for regular blood donors increases the number of blood dona-
tions. A one euro increase in the subsidy leads 1.8% more donations per 10000 inhabitants,
conditional on the number of blood drives. The unconditional effect is smaller. Younger
donors do not react to the waiver of user fees. The benefit does not attract new donors,
instead it fosters repeated donation.
The discontinuation of the benefit lead to a predicted decrease in donations of around
18%, on average, since the average value of the user fee in 2012 was 10e. This had to be
compensated by a large increase in the number of blood drives, with an increase in the
cost per harvested unit.
On the other hand, this change in the incentives could lead to savings of at least
175,000e per year for the National Health Service. It is feasible to think of a scenario in
which these savings lead to a bigger investment in blood drives., or in the optimization
of the system to minimize imbalances. Given the results in this study, blood drives could
effectively substitute for the decrease in donations resulting from the discontinuation of
monetary incentives, particularly as a mechanism to solve market imbalances. It might
not be worth it, in the end, to subsidize blood donations, particularly if the subsidy ends
up being temporary. However, the efficiency cost of additional blood drives has to be
taken into account.
Nonetheless, further analysis has to be done. We have treated all agents as neoclassical,
26
without any assumptions regarding behavioral reasons driving behavior. This paper deals
with the supply and demand of blood donations. Counties which have higher net benefits of
donations are shown to have a higher volume of donations. In future work, we will explore
individual-level data to answer the question of how incentives for repeated donation affect
the behavior of donors. Specifically, we are interested in analyzing which donors respond
to deadlines in the incentive and how that affects their donation behavior.
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Figure 1·2: Blood donations by triage outcomes, 2003-2012
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·4: Blood drives by district, 2003-2012
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·6: Average County/Month Blood Donations by 10,000 inhabi-
tants, by district, 2003-2012
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·7: Average County/Month Blood Drives by 10,000 inhabitants,
by district, 2003-2012
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·8: User charges and Donations
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·9: User charges and Blood Drives
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·10: Average Number of Week/Holiday Days per Month, by
County
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·11: Weekend vs Weekday Blood Drives, 2003/2012
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·12: Blood Drives - Weekend vs Weekday
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·13: Blood Drives - Weekend vs Weekday, Lisbon District, by
County
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Figure 1·14: Distribution of Donations per 10,000 inhabitants
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Notes about geographical characterization of the data There were two sources
of geographical information. I was able to identify the town, county and district of the
residence of each donor. These data were constructed based on the 4-digit zip code and
the name of the town in the zip code in the database. With this information I was
able to define the relevant user charge for each donor. Furthermore, I built a similar set
of geographical location variables for each blood drive. If its code name was the name
of a town, it was assigned the corresponding town-county-district identifiers. Another
example would be the name “Boy Scouts of Azambuja” (fictional name), where I know
that Azambuja is a county in the Lisbon District, which allows to identify geographical
location variables. Using this procedure, I identified the location of more than 90% of the
blood drives. As for donations at Blood Donor Centers, I assume they are done at the
closest center to the donor’s county of residence.
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Chapter 2
Don’t stop me now: the impact of
waiting times on blood donations
2.1 Introduction
Research on donation behavior has mainly focused on benefits, namely incentive schemes.
However, recent research has highlighted the importance of analyzing the effects of costs
to prosocial behavior. Specifically, Gneezy et al. (2012) have shown that the costliness of
initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent
future behaviors. This is crucial for blood donation.
In this paper I analyze the impact of waiting to donate blood on donor retention. Blood
donation is an ideal setting to study how costs affect prosocial behavior. The behavior
itself is costly, so we know we are dealing with donors that are willing to incur costs to
perform an altruistic action. What we don’t know is whether they react negatively to
additional costs, or if they completely absorb whatever costs the system imposes on them.
I focus on the time cost of donation. When an individual tries to donate blood, he has
to go through a number of steps. Upon arrival, he queues for registration. After filling
out a minimal amount of paperwork, he then has to wait in line until the clinical triage,
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consisting of his health history and a mini physical, where he learns whether or not he
will be able to donate that day. The next step is either leaving, if denied the opportunity
to donate, or waiting some more, until the actual blood collection takes place, if approved
for donation. The collection typically lasts 10 to 15 minutes and is followed by a recovery
period of another 15 minutes, after which the donor is discharged.
The time dimension is very important in many volunteering situations, and it is the
main cost, other than money, that donors can incur, in general. Moreover, time has been
shown to be preferred as a means of donation.(Brown et al., 2013) This goes in line with
the findings regarding to the role of social image and motivation by Benabou and Tirole
(2006) and Ariely et al. (2009), as opposed to monetary incentives.
The aim of this study is to understand how time costs affect blood donor retention.
We focus on a sample of new donors, i.e., people that have never tried to donate blood
before. That is the first time blood donors are confronted with the clinical triage process
and, if approved for donation, the blood collection itself.
Therefore, after the first donation, the donors form expectations regarding the costs
and benefits of donation. Among those is the time cost. In our analysis we are going to
explore the distinction between time until triage, which includes learning wether or not the
potential donor will be approved for donation, and time between triage and blood collection
(time until collection), after the donor has already acquires information regarding their
type, i.e., whether they will become a blood donor or not.
The dataset includes all new donors enrolled in the Lisbon center of the Portuguese
Blood Institute, between January 2008 and December 2012 (N=61189). It contains infor-
mation regarding health (triage and lab test results), the donation (site, staff, blood drive,
52
waiting times) and sociodemographic variables. I am able to study the behavior of donors
at all blood donor centers and all drives held in the region, over the sample period. More-
over, the triage outcomes allow me to study how waiting times affect differently potential
donors that are accepted or denied the possibility to donate blood.
I find that higher waiting times make it less likely for first-time donors to donate again,
controlling for both donor and donation site-specific variables. An increase of 10 minutes
in time spent (until triage) results in a decrease in the probability of donor retention of
0.6 percentage points. The effect is highly nonlinear, with the most affected donors being
the ones in the upper quartile of the distribution. For approved donors, time until triage
is more relevant than the time spent waiting for the actual blood collection, after being
cleared for donation.
Furthermore, new donors at blood drives react more negatively to waiting times than
new donors at blood donor centers. This seems to indicate that the latter are more willing
to incur the costs of donation, not only the time cost but also the transportation cost to
a blood donor center.
The paper by Craig et al. (2015) has also approached the topic of how waiting times
affect the return of donors and donor satisfaction. They use a sample of 776 donors from
4 blood donor centers in Australia and are able to observe whether that donor returned
to donate over the following four years. They find that their donors respond to higher
waiting times by withdrawing from donation. My study benefits from following over time
the full population of donors, which includes more than 60,000 individuals from several
regions of the Country, donating at both blood drives and blood donor centers, so that
we can focus on new donors only. The richness of details regarding the time clock of the
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donation, type of blood drive and triage outcomes allows us to study in detail the behavior
of different types of individuals, namely the role of the labor-leisure trade-off in prosocial
behavior.
Although there is scarce evidence in the economic literature in what concerns the costs
of blood donation, there is an extensive literature on the effect of incentives. Following
the seminal paper by Titmuss (1971) on this issue of intrinsic motivation of blood donors,
several authors have studied the effects of incentives for blood donations. The article by
Slonim et al. (2014) reviews the literature on the effect of incentives for blood donations.
Lacetera et al. (2012) analyze the effects of changing incentives for blood donation. In
a field experiment, they test whether individuals respond differently to different types of
incentives, anticipated or not. The study is made at the level of the blood drive, with a
relatively small sample of donors, in which it is not possible to track individuals decisions.
A specific type of non-monetary incentive - free cholesterol tests - was found to to have
a non-significant effect on blood donation.(Goette et al., 2009) As for pure versus impure
altruism, two types of intrinsic motivation, Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) find no
evidence of pure altruism amongst a sample of Australian blood donors.
In sum, a number of different incentive schemes have been designed to deal with these
problems and increase the volume of donations. In general, it seems to be the case that
giving incentives for blood donation, in field experiments and using retrospective analysis,
leads to an increase in donations. The article by Lacetera et al. (2013), makes the case
for the need to give economic incentives to increase blood donations.
The chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 presents the data on blood donors
and blood drives. The main results are shown in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses these
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results and additional aspects regarding time trade offs. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Blood Donations
In order to estimate the effect of time to donate on donor retention I resort to a dataset
that includes all attempted blood donations within the Lisbon Center of the Portuguese
Blood Institute, which covers roughly half of the population and area of the country.
I restrict our sample of blood donors to new potential blood donors, i.e., individuals
that registered at a blood donor center or a blood drive within the geographical scope of
the Lisbon Center of the PBI.
In the last two columns of Table 2.1 we can see that slightly less than half of the new
donors are men. New donors are predominantly younger, with more than 50% aged below
35 years. More than 65% of these potential donors are approved for donation and have
their blood collected. In our sample, we observe 41.3% of all new potential donors return
to try to donate blood. The sample characteristics don’t change if we restrict the analysis
to 2011-12, except for the rate of return, as we would expect since the data is truncated in
December 2012.1 This is important due to data availability constraints. The full sample
includes information regarding how time of registration and the time at which clinical
triage started. For years 2011 and 2012, the time at which blood collection started is also
available, for donors approved in clinical triage. I will use this later on in the estimation
of a set of models. In this Section I verify that the main characteristics of the sample do
not vary significantly if we restrict our sample to 2011/2012.
We are also interested in the characteristics of the blood drives in which these new
1Future work includes estimating duration models, where we can specifically address censoring problem
in the data, modeling time until second donation.
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donors enroll. (Table 2.2) On average, there are 34 new donors per blood drive. About
70% of these new donors are approved for donation. In the counties in which there are
blood drives, there are 24 drives per month, on average. As for the staff involved in the
blood drive, on average there will be one person at registration, 1.2 at triage and 2 at
blood collection. The largest drive registered 4 triage staff members and 8 staff members
collecting blood.2
The main variable of interest is the time a donor has to spend waiting for clinical
triage. If the donor is approved for donation, he will then have to wait to have her blood
collected. On average, a potential donor will wait for 15 minutes until triage, at a blood
drive, and for 31 minutes until the blood collection starts.3
In Figure 2·1a we can see the density of time until triage, measured in minutes. The
blue line includes all donations, and the red line restricts the sample to 2011-12, with
minimal differences. It is a heavily right skewed distribution, with 50% of the donors
having to wait less than 13 minutes and an average wait of about 15 minutes.
I next compare waiting time until clinical triage with waiting time until blood collec-
tion. (Figure 2·1b). Once again we observe a left skewed distribution. The median donor
waits for 23 minutes, from the moment he starts the triage process until blood collection
starts. On average, the wait is about 30 minutes.
In Table 2.3 we can see the distribution of blood drives and donor characteristics
across districts, based on where the donation takes place. The largest volume of new
donors comes from Lisbon, the capital, followed by the two adjacent districts, Santarem
and Setubal. By looking at the same set of variables as before, we do not observe striking
2Data regarding staff members is only available for 2011 and 2012.
3I have dropped from the sample the top 1% of observed waiting time until triage and blood collection.
That meant waiting times of more than 127 minutes in the former and 150 minutes in the latter.
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differences in the age distribution of donors, as well as in the sex ratio. Approval rates
are also similar. Santarem has the highest return rate in this sample, since almost 50% of
its 6677 new donors returned to donate blood within the study period.
As for blood drives, we observe larger differences, particularly in what concerns time
spent donating blood. Waiting times until triage are higher in Portalegre (25 minutes, on
average) and lowest in Lisboa (14 minutes, on average). Some districts seem to attract
more new donors, which can be due to a lower frequency of blood drives. The volume of
staff members does not seem to differ by much across districts.
2.3 The Effect of Waiting Times on Donor Retention
We aim to estimate the effect of the time spent in trying to donate blood on new donor
retention. The relationship is described in Eq. 2.1.
Prob(retain new donor)ijk = β0 + β1Time spentijk + γj + Γ
′Xi + Λ′Dk + ijk (2.1)
where i stands for individual, j for county and k for blood donation site. Besides time
spent to donate blood, I include Xi, a vector of new donor characteristics, γj , county
dummies for where the donation takes place, and Dk, a vector of blood donation site
characteristics. The time coefficient is omitted for sake of clarity.
I estimate a linear probability model including a set of control variables specific to
the donor, such as age group, sex and marital status. I also take into account whether
the first donation was approved or not. In Dk I include donation-site specific variables
such as being a blood drive (vs blood donor center) and being a weekend donation. In
all estimation results, standard errors are clustered at the county of blood drive level. By
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controlling for these observables, we ensure that the effect is not driven by donors with
a high propensity to donate also choosing the time of day in which the expected waiting
time is lower.
Waiting for Clinical Triage
The first set of results is presented in Table 2.4. Ultimately, total time donating blood
is the relevant variable of interest. It is worthwhile noting that many potential donors
who do not reach the blood collection stage, still return in the future to try to donate
blood at a different time. The main variable of interest is then Time to triage, which
measures the number of minutes that went by between registration and the beginning of
the clinical triage process. This process involves a short survey, a questionnaire by the
staff member and any other paperwork deemed necessary. We have normalized the value
of this variable, which is now measured in 10-minute intervals.
In Column (1) we measure the simple correlation between the time that goes by be-
tween registration and clinical triage. If a new donor has to wait 10 minutes more, the
likelihood that he will try to donate blood again decreases by 0.4 percentage points, which
is about 10% of the mean probability of retaining a new donor. The correlation is smaller
and imprecisely estimated if we restrict the sample to the last two years of the sample.
We then added two types of control variables, donor and donation specific. (Column
(2)) We control for donors’ age group, sex and marital status. We can see that donors
whose donation was approved are 21% more likely to return to donation. Donors that
enroll on a weekend are also more likely to donate again. However, if the first donation is
done at a blood drive, then the new donor is 13% less likely to try to return. Notice that
the effect of waiting to triage is now larger, over 0.6 percentage points.
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The effects remain constant when we condition on the county where the donation
takes place, as well as with a time trend. Conditional on donating in a specific county
in a particular month, the likelihood of returning to donation decreases by 0.7%. Once
again, the effect is smaller and more imprecisely estimated if we restrict the sample to
the last two years of the analysis. We run this model to ensure the comparability of the
results estimated in the following Section, since we will then have to restrict the sample
to 2011-2012.
Waiting for Blood Collection
As mentioned before, there are several stages in the process of an actual blood collection.
Thus far we have been focusing on the effect of waiting until clinical triage. That is the
point at which the donor learns whether or not she will be able to donate blood that
day. In practice, if she is denied the donation, she gets some potential utility benefit from
having tried to donate, but the experience is mainly a costly one - in terms of time and
in terms of not being able to donate.
If the donor is approved for blood collection, a new set of costs and benefits arise. On
the one hand, this donor will derive the full benefit from contributing to the cause, with
all the self and social image benefits attached to it. On the other hand, the donor will
actually have to incur in extra costs. The first one is the cost of having his blood collected,
which for many people is not negligible. The donor may experience fatigue, nausea and
malaise following blood donation. Their activity is also limited for the rest of the day,
since the donor is recommended to avoid intense physical exercise. The other cost is the
time cost, again waiting until blood collection and then the actual collection and recovery
period.
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In Table 2.5 we show the results of estimating
Prob(retain new donor)ijk = β0 + β1Time spent from triage to blood collectionijk (2.2)
β2Time spent until triageijk + γj + Γ
′Xi + Λ′Dk + ijk.
where i stands for individual, j for county and k for blood donation site.
I include a similar set of controls as in the previous estimation. The sample included
in this estimation is restricted to 2011-2012, due to data availability on the time of blood
collection. The sample consists of donors that achieve the blood collection stage in their
first donation (N=12596).
The most salient result is that spending time for blood collection increases the likeli-
hood of a second donation, conditional on the time spent until triage started. It is precisely
this time until triage that has a negative impact. An increase of 10 minutes in waiting for
triage leads to a 0.6 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of donor retention, which
is not negligible compared to the 31.2% average donor retention, in this sample.(Column
(5)) If we are correct about the direction the bias in the estimation, this would be an
upper bound estimate of the impact of waiting to donate blood. Finally, it is worthwhile
noting that these are the donors that one would like to retain the most, the ones that were
actually able to proceed all the way until blood collection. The positive effect of the time
spent in the second stage is so strong that when we include total time as the regressor,
with the same set of variables and controls, the coefficient is still positive (Column (7)).
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2.4 Discussion
So far we have seen that time matters. If we are interested in fostering repeated blood
donation, the time cost of donation is an important variable to take into account. At
this point, I focus on the mechanisms leading to that result, focusing on the time spent
between registration and clinical triage.
First, I address the problem of how long is waiting too long. Even if the average waiting
time between registration and clinical triage is 15 minutes, the distribution is skewed to
the right. In Table 2.6 we estimate the Eq. 2.1, but instead of using waiting time, we
divide blood donors into quartiles of waiting time.
Not surprisingly, the estimates seem to indicate that the most responsive donors are
those at the upper quartile of the waiting time distribution. Donors that had to wait
the least and the longest are less likely to return to donate than donors who waited
in the second quartile (-0.021 percentage points, 5% of the mean of the retention rate,
Column (1)). In Column (2)-(4) I have included the same set of control variables in the
analysis as before. When controlling for individual specific characteristics, the waiting
time affects mostly the probability of return on the top quartile. The same holds true
when we add county fixed effects, with the effect being a decrease of 2.4 percentage points
in the likelihood of returning to donate.
Second, I focus on the opportunity cost of time. The time spent donating blood could
be spent either working or enjoying leisure time. The higher the opportunity cost, the
higher the cost of waiting. We would expect that to have an impact on donor retention,
unless donors have a very strong preference for donating blood, so much so that they are
willing to absorb any time cost.
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The fact that donors that donate on weekends have a significantly higher probability
of return (Table 2.4) indicates that people who donate during their leisure time are more
likely to donate again.
I take the analysis one step further in Table 2.7. I divide the sample into donations at
different times - weekend, weekday outside of working hours and weekdays, between 9 and
5 pm. Donors at weekends are less likely to return if their waiting time is higher (Column
(2)). Similarly, in Column (3) we can see that people who enroll to register on weekdays but
outside of regular working hours (Outside 9 to 5) are less likely to donate again for higher
waiting times. However, the time spent donating has a small (and imprecisely estimated)
negative impact on retention for donors who enroll between 9 and 5pm (Column (4)).
Time until second donation A different approach would be to ask if the time spent
in the first donation influences how long it will take for the donor to try and donate blood
again. In Figure 2·2 we see the distribution of the time until the second donation, by new
donors. There are two clear peaks, around 180 and 365 days, and then a smaller one close
to 600 days. These peaks are not due to gender differences.4
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The goal of this study is to understand how the time cost affects blood donor retention.
We estimated how the time spent at the different stages of the donation process affects
donor retention, i.e., the probability that a donor will return and try to donate blood
again.
We find that higher waiting times make it less likely for first-time donors to donate
4In Portugal, men can donate every three months while women can donate every four months. Such
constraints are common are related to donor safety.
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again, controlling for both donor and donation site-specific variables, the most affected
donors being the ones in the upper quartile of the distribution. For approved donors, time
until triage is more relevant than the time spent waiting for the actual blood collection,
after being cleared for donation.
We also analyze different types of time trade offs that blood donors can face. Donation
on weekends has a higher retention rate, controlling for a set of donor and blood-drive
specific characteristics. Donating during work hours makes it more likely to return, as
long as it is not done at the donor’s workplace. Waiting time has, however, a negative
impact on donations on weekends and weekdays outside working hours.
There are a number of unanswered questions at this point. The first one is what
explains waiting times, which opens the door to addressing potential endogeneity problems
in the estimation. A preliminary analysis shows that the number of staff members at the
different stages of the donation process significantly affects waiting times. Similarly, the
number of people trying to donate that day also has an impact on waiting times, as we
would expect. Secondly, I would like to understand whether donors switch donation site
in response to higher waiting times. Finally, I want to study how waiting times affect
subsequent donations, beyond the second. This will be addressed in future research, as
well as the impact of waiting times on the time lapse between donations.
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Table 2.4: Effect of Waiting Time until Triage on Donor Retention
Dependent Variable ==1
if New Donor Returns to Donate, 2008-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time to triage -0.0044 -0.0062 -0.0063 -0.0066
(0.0019)* (0.0017)** (0.0016)** (0.0016)**
Approved 0.21 0.21 0.21
(0.0056)** (0.0054)** (0.0050)**
==1 if Blood Drive -0.13 -0.14 -0.13
(0.0095)** (0.0089)** (0.0091)**
==1 if Weekend 0.083 0.062 0.065
(0.021)** (0.021)** (0.021)**
Controls x x x
County x x
Time x
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.413
Observations 61189 61189 61189 61189
R2 0.000 0.057 0.068 0.133
Notes - Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard error clustered at county of drive level.
Columns (2)-(4) include age group, sex and marital status as control variables.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Waiting Time until Triage on Donor Retention - Week-
end vs Weekday donations, and by time of Day
Dependent Variable ==1 if New Donor Returns to Donate
All Weekend Weekday
Outside 9 to 5 9 to 5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.473 0.474 0.387 0.387
Time to Triage -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.003)* (0.001)
Approved 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.21
(0.006)** (0.010)** (0.016)** (0.005)**
Blood Drive -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.14
(0.009)** (0.024)** (0.020)** (0.009)**
Observations 62520 18845 4944 38731
R2 0.139 0.178 0.138 0.125
Notes - Significance levels: † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%. Standard error clustered at county of drive level.
Regressions include age group, sex, marital status, approved, and blood drive as control variables, as well as a
monthly time trend and county of drive dummy variables.
71
Figure 2·2: Distribution of time between first and second donation, in days
Source - Author’s compilation based on Portuguese Blood and Transplantation Institute data.
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Chapter 3
Temporal stability, cross validity,
and external validity of risk
preferences measures:
Experimental evidence from a UK
representative survey (with
Matteo M. Galizzi and Raffaele
Miniaci)
3.1 Introduction
This study takes a systematic look at the stability and validity of different risk preferences
measures using a representative sample of respondents within the UK Household Longitu-
dinal Survey (UKHLS), also known as Understanding Society, the world-largest household
panel survey.
The stability of risk preferences can be assessed at two main levels: over time (temporal
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stability), and at a given point in time across different methods (cross validity).1 Besides
cross validity, the validity of different risk preferences measures can also be assessed in
terms of external validity, that is, by looking at the extent to which they associate with,
and are able to predict, a range of field behaviors. We investigate the issue of stability
and validity of risk preferences measures along the three above directions.
In particular, we conduct an artefactual field experiment (in the sense of Harrison
and List (2004) with a UK representative sample of respondents within the Innovation
Panel (IP) of the UKHLS. In IP Wave 6 (IP6) we randomly selected a sub-sample of 661
respondents and we measured their risk preferences using two experimental methods with
real monetary rewards: the multiple price list (MPL) binary-lotteries method by Holt and
Laury (Holt et al., 2002) (HL), and the multiple-lotteries method originally proposed by
Binswanger (Binswanger, 1980, 1981), and then developed by Eckel and Grossman (Eckel
and Grossman, 2002) (EG). We also use the survey questions proposed by Dohmen et al.
(2011) - that have been incorporated in the German Socio-Economic Panel survey (SOEP)
and in other representative surveys across the world (Becker et al., 2015; Falk et al., 2016;
Vieider et al., 2015a,b; Josef et al., 2016; Rieger et al., 2014) - to measure the respondents’
self-reported risk attitudes in general (SOEP-G), in financial matters (SOEP-F), and in
health matters (SOEP-H).2
We first compare within-subject responses to the EG, HL, and SOEP measures of
risk preferences. We then structurally estimate respondents’ risk preferences under Ex-
1A related, but conceptually distinct, question relates to the issue of stability of risk preferences across
different life domains (domain-specificity: see, for instance, Hanoch et al. (2006); Barseghyan et al. (2011);
Einav et al. (2012). A recent summary of the literature looking at the domain-specificity of risk preferences
can be found in Galizzi et al. (2016b).
2In the experimental module, we also elicited respondents’ time preferences using incentive-compatible
tests. The structural joint estimation of a range of risk and time preferences models (including non-EUT
and non-constant discounting models) for our panel of respondents is the focus of Galizzi et al. (2016a).
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pected Utility Theory (EUT) and assuming a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function using the data from the HL and the EG tasks, both separately and jointly.
The structural estimations of risk preferences are conducted using Maximum Likelihood
methods, and calculating individual-specific levels of daily background income from linked
survey data on household income. This allows us to systematically look at the cross va-
lidity of the three measures of risk preferences, accounting for the fact that respondents in
a representative sample like ours can integrate experimental monetary prizes within het-
erogeneous individual-specific levels of background income, in contrast with conventional
student pools where background income is relatively homogeneous.
Moreover, we repeat the EG, HL, and SOEP measures of risk preferences for the same
sample of respondents in two subsequent waves of the survey, at a distance of one year
from one interview to the other: for 413 of the IP6 respondents (62.48%), in fact, we are
able to link responses to the same risk preferences measures in IP Wave 7 (IP7). This
allows us to directly look at the temporal stability of the three different measures of risk
preferences.
Finally, we link the EG, HL, and SOEP risk preferences measures to a broad range
of UKHLS data, focusing on health- and finance-related behaviors. This allows us to
systematically look at the external validity of the different measures of risk preferences.
Risk preferences are often considered a fundamental driver of individual behavior in a
broad array of contexts, including health, social care, education, migration, occupational
and self-employment choices, personal and household finance (Barsky et al., 1997; Bonin
et al., 2007; Andersen et al., 2008a; Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Guiso and Paiella, 2008;
Bucciol and Miniaci, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2010; Dohmen et al., 2011; Barasinska et al.,
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2012; Bellemare and Shearer, 2013; Sutter et al., 2013; Fouarge et al., 2014).
Despite such a prominent attention to risk preferences, no study to date has jointly
investigated all the three validity aspects of different risk preferences measures using a
nationally representative sample of survey respondents. When looking at the temporal
stability and cross validity issues in representative samples it is important to account for
the fact that the ranges of CRRA values implied by the choices in the EG and HL tasks
- as well as the parameters of risk aversion returned by the structural estimations of the
experimental data - necessarily depend on how the experimental prizes are integrated
into individual-specific levels of background income (Andersen et al., 2008b, 2014; Galizzi
et al., 2016a).
Accounting for such an integration in the cross validity and temporal stability anal-
ysis is thus crucial when working with representative samples of the population that are
typically characterized by wide heterogeneity in their levels of income and of other socio-
economic conditions, in contrast with conventional student pools where background in-
come is relatively homogeneous and is usually assumed to be zero.
Moreover, considering a nationally representative sample of survey respondents allows
us to link responses to risk preferences measures not only to directly recorded household
income, but also to a broad range of UKHLS variables on household and individual char-
acteristics. This, in turn, allows us to look at the external validity issue in a systematic
way. This opportunity is usually precluded in conventional lab experiments with student
samples, that usually collect a very limited range of background variables.
Furthermore, looking jointly at all the three issues of temporal stability, cross validity,
and external validity of different risk preferences measures allows us to draw conclusions
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about the overall validity of each measure, a global assessment which would be missed by
looking at each aspect in isolation.
Our study is close in design and concept to Dave et al. (2010) and Loomes and Pogrebna
(2014) when looking at the cross validity aspect, and to Andersen et al. (2008a) and
Harrison et al. (2014) when looking at the temporal stability aspect. Our study is also close
to Crosetto and Filippin (2015), in the cross validity aspect, but using a within-subject
design. Section 3.2 reviews these studies, and the rest of the literature, in greater detail,
and discusses how our study builds on the existing body of evidence on each of the three
validity aspects. In a nutshell, our study contributes to the existing literature by looking
jointly at the three dimensions of temporal stability, cross validity, and external validity
of three risk preferences measures using a representative sample of survey respondents,
and explicitly accounting for individual-specific levels of background income.
We have three main findings. First, concerning temporal stability, we find significant
but low correlations of responses to the EG, HL, and SOEP tasks across the two waves:
the IP6-IP7 correlations between responses is 0.1731 for the EG task, 0.1882 and 0.1855
for the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes, respectively, and 0.257, 0.2483, and
0.2459 for the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively (all with p < 0.001).
Furthermore, when presented exactly the same EG, HL, and SOEP tasks in IP7, at most
one third of the respondents chose the same option they had chosen in the previous year.
Second, concerning cross validity, we find that there is generally high heterogeneity in
the individual responses to the three risk preferences measures. Moreover, we illustrate
that, for a representative sample of respondents like our pool of subjects, it is important
to explicitly account for the fact that different respondents integrate the EG and HL
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experimental prizes within different specific levels of background income. Because of
the heterogeneity of such an integration, the ranges of the CRRA parameter implied
by different choices in the EG and HL tasks do not necessarily overlap each other. In
a heterogeneous, representative sample like ours, this potentially hinders the scope for
direct comparison of individual responses across the EG and the HL tasks. Once the
heterogeneity in the individual levels of background income is accounted for, at least two
thirds of the respondents who act coherently in the IP6 HL task, make inconsistent choices
in cross validity terms, in the sense that the CRRA values implied by their responses to the
HL task are incompatible with the range of CRRA values implied by their own responses in
the EG task. Moreover, around one third of these subjects are inconsistent in cross validity
terms in the same HL task, in the sense that the CRRA values implied by their responses
to the HL questions with low monetary stakes are incompatible with the CRRA values
implied by their responses when the monetary stakes are high. Maximum Likelihood
structural estimations of risk preferences return an estimated CRRA coefficient that is
significantly and substantially higher in the EG task than in the HL task. Furthermore,
while the responses to the EG task are positively and highly significantly associated to
the SOEP-F question, there is little association between the SOEP measures and the HL
task.
Finally, we find mixed evidence concerning the external validity of the three risk pref-
erences measures, especially considering health behaviors. In particular, none of the three
risk preferences measures is associated to the respondents’ BMI or smoking status, and
there is no, or little, association between the EG and HL tasks and a broad range of other
health-related variables. The SOEP questions seem to associate with a few health behav-
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iors, as well as with several hypothetical risk-taking situations in the health and finance
domains measured by the DOSPERT test. On the other hand, both the EG and the HL
tasks are highly associated with the decision of having a privately funded pension.
Section 3.2 contains a brief discussion of the background evidence and related litera-
ture, while Section 3.3 provides a self-contained discussion of the theoretical model of risk
preferences that we structurally estimate using experimental data. Section 3.4 discusses in
detail the experimental design, setting, and tasks. Section 3.5 briefly discusses the econo-
metric approach, while Section 3.6 presents the results. Section 3.7 briefly concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Cross validity
Concerning the cross validity of risk preferences measures, the psychology and economics
literatures have developed a multitude of tests to measure risk preferences. In psychology,
for instance, risk attitudes are commonly measured using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART) (Lejuez et al. 2002) and the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) by
Blais and Weber (2006). In experimental and behavioral economics, besides the already
mentioned EG and HL methods, several other incentive-compatible methods have been
proposed to measure risk preferences (Cox and Harrison, 2008; Harrison and Rutstro¨m,
2008; Charness et al., 2013). Some examples are the Becker-DeGroot-Marschack mecha-
nism, the First Price Auction and the Second Price Auction methods (Cox, Smith, and
Walker, 1988; Harrison, 1990; Isaac and James (2000)); the Allocation Task (AT) (Loomes,
1991); the Charness-Gneezy-Potters investment game (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Char-
ness and Gneezy, 2010); and, more recently, the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto
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and Filippin, 2013).
Despite the multitude of methods to measure risk preferences in lab and field settings,
a relatively small number of studies have directly looked at how these different measures
correlate and map into each other, and the vast majority of the studies have considered
student samples which are (or are assumed to be) relatively homogeneous in terms of their
background income.
Table 3.1 summarizes the main features and findings of the existing studies that look
at the cross validity of different measures of risk preferences at one point in time. With
the exception of Dohmen et al. (2011) and Josef et al. (2016), no study has considered
representative samples of the population, and none to date has explicitly accounted for
the integration of experimental prizes into individual-specific levels of background income.
The state-of-the-art evidence is somewhat mixed and not conclusive. Anderson and
Mellor (2009), for instance, compare responses to the HL incentive-compatible test with
survey questions such as the ones contained in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
in the US, and find no stable association between the two measures. Dave et al. (2010)
compare responses across the EG and HL methods and find significantly higher risk aver-
sion in the HL than in the EG task. Reynaud and Couture (2012) compare responses to
the EG and the HL experimental tasks with hypothetical payments and to the DOSPERT
psychological test, and find no significant association. Deck et al. (2013) compare the HL
test with a different experimental task based on the “Deal or no deal” game show as well
as with a survey measure, and find inconsistent responses across the methods, with most
correlation coefficients being not statistically significant. Loomes and Pogrebna (2014)
compare responses to the AT, EG, and HL tasks and find no correlation between any
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of them. Further evidence of imperfectly mapping responses across different methods
to measure risk preferences has also been provided by Isaac and James (2000); Dulleck
et al. (2013), using a within-subject design, and by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) using a
between-subject design.
Three notable exceptions are the studies by Dohmen et al. (2011) who compare re-
sponses to MPL tests with different SOEP measures for risk attitudes in general, and in
six different domains (car driving, financial matters, recreational and leisure activities,
occupation, health matters, social activities), and find some significant associations, al-
though the fraction of variance explained is very low (around 6%); by Becker et al. (2015)
who compare SOEP measures with responses to MPL tests with real and hypothetical
rewards, and find significant correlations; and by Josef et al. (2016) who compare the
SOEP-G measure for risk attitude in general with responses to an incentive-compatible
MPL, and find small but significant correlation. As noticed above, Dohmen et al. (2011)
and Josef et al. (2016) are also the only studies to date conducted with representative
samples of the population, both in Germany.
3.2.2 Temporal stability
Concerning the temporal stability of risk preferences, the existing evidence on experimental
measures of risk preferences comes from studies with small, not representative samples
and/or with relatively short periods of time.3 Evidence from larger samples and/or over
3 For instance, 30 students at Harvard University over a period of 10 weeks in Mosteller and Nogee
(1951); 23 US farmers over a period of 2 years in Love and Robison (1984); 84 US businessmen over
a period of 1 year in Wehrung et al. (1984); 253 farmers in the Netherlands over a period of 1 year in
Smidts (1997); 31 students at University of South Carolina over a period of 6 months in Harrison, Johnson,
McInnes, and Rutstrm (2005); 69 students at UCL over a period of 3 months in Vlaev et al. (2009); 141
MBA students at IESE Business School over a period of 3 months in Baucells and Villasis (2012); 73
undergraduate students at University of Munster over a period of 1 month in Zeisberger et al. (2012); 53
graduate students at University of Maastricht over a period of 5-10 weeks in Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013).
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longer periods of time is available for survey measures of risk attitudes (e.g. Brunnermeier
and Nagel, 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2012; Guiso et al. (2013); Josef et al.
(2016). Recent reviews of the main studies exploring the issue of the temporal stability
of risk preferences can be found in Zeisberger et al. (2012), and Chuang and Schechter
(2015).
Three important exceptions are the artefactual field experiment by Andersen et al.
(2008b) who measure risk preferences for a representative sample of 253 Danes, and revisit
97 of them in four occasions, at a distance of up to 17 months after; the already mentioned
study by Josef et al. (2016) who look at test-retest correlations for the SOEP measures
in a large representative survey in Germany (around 11,000 subjects) over a period of up
to ten years, and find moderate to high correlations (in a range of 0.42-0.58); and the
longitudinal artefactual field experiment by Harrison et al. (2014) who measure risk (and
time) preferences for a representative sample of 413 Danes using the HL method and,
one year after, repeat the same HL measures for 182 of those same subjects. Once their
structural estimations make full corrections for sample selection and attrition, Harrison
et al. (2014) find evidence of temporal stability of risk preferences.
3.2.3 External validity
Concerning external validity, finally, a large number of previous studies have looked at the
associations between experimental measures for risk preferences and individual behaviors
in a variety of contexts, from health to finance, from job choices to environmental behavior.
A systematic review of this literature is beyond the scope of this study, but also on this
third aspect the evidence to date is somewhat mixed and not conclusive.
Consider, for instance, a risky health behavior which in the economics literature is
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usually assumed to be associated with risk preferences: smoking behavior. A recent
systematic summary of the literature on risk preferences and smoking behavior can be
found in Harrison et al. (2015). A close examination of the evidence to date reveals that
some studies find a significant association between smoking status and risk preferences
measures (Reynolds, 2006; Anderson and Mellor (2008)), although the effect is often
marginally significant, not robust to changes in the definition of smoker, or counterintuitive
(i.e. smokers being more risk averse) (Reynolds, Richards, Horn, and Karraker, 2004;
Reynolds, 2006). There is, however, an equal (or larger) number of studies that fail to
find significant association between risk preferences and smoking (Yi, Chase, and Bickel,
2007; Reynolds et al., 2007; Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrm, 2010; Mitchell (1999); Galizzi
and Miraldo (2012); Szrek et al. (2012); Harrison et al. (2015)). Similar mixed results are
common for other risky behaviors.
To date, no study has systematically compared head-to-head the external validity
of three different risk preferences measures against a comprehensive range of behaviors
measured by linked survey data.
3.3 Theory
3.3.1 Choice under risk
We assume that EUT holds for choices over risky options. We do not consider here the
question of whether EUT is the most accurate model for risk preferences. Rather, this
standard model of risk preferences can be viewed descriptively as a convenient statistics
to study the validity and stability of individual responses to different risk preferences
measures. Our data, in fact, allows us to estimate also non-EUT models of risk preferences
83
such as the Rank Dependent Utility model (Quiggin, 1982; Harless and Camerer, 1994;
Hey and Orme, 1994; Harrison et al., 2009; Bruhin et al., 2010; Wakker, 2010; Barberis,
2013; Balcombe and Fraser, 2015), a possibility that it is explored by Galizzi et al. (2016a).
Imagine that subjects use some utility function U(·) that is separable and station-
ary over time. In particular, following the literature in applied economics and empirical
household finance,4 we assume that subjects use a CRRA utility function
U(Mτ ,W ) =
(W +Mτ )
(1−r)
1− r (3.1)
for r 6= 1, where r is the CRRA coefficient, and W is the individual level of background
income within which the monetary prize M is integrated. for r = 1, U(Mτ ) = ln(Mτ )
can be assumed if needed. Within this CRRA functional form, r = 0 implies risk-neutral
choices, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r < 0 implies risk-seeking behavior.
3.4 Experiments
3.4.1 The UK Household Longitudinal Survey and the Innovation Panel
The artefactual field experiment was conducted in the UK using the UK Household Lon-
gitudinal Survey (UKHLS), also known as the Understanding Society panel survey, which
incorporates and extends the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The panel survey
is funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and is managed by
the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex.
Understanding Society is the largest multi-topic household panel survey in the world,
annually interviewing more than 40,000 respondents. Understanding Society has three
4See, for instance, Wolf and Pohlman (1983), Cicchetti and Dubin (1994), Holt et al. (2002), Cohen and
Einav (2007), Andersen et al. (2008b, 2014), Guiso and Paiella (2008), Barseghyan et al. (2011), Bucciol
and Miniaci (2011), Chiappori and Paiella (2011), Barseghyan et al. (2013).
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features that make it uniquely appealing for our purposes. First, it collects a broad range
of information on income and standard of living measures, social context and activities,
lifestyle, psychological attitudes and cognitive abilities, education, health and disability,
health- and environment-related behaviors, and financial behavior.
Second, it collects directly measured biomarkers such as height and weight, which allow
to complement self-reported health data.
Finally, it includes the Innovation Panel (IP), a sample of about 1,500 households
interviewed one year before the main sample of respondents. Whilst the sample and the
questionnaire content in the IP mirror the content for the larger survey, the IP is explicitly
designed “for experimental and methodological research relevant for longitudinal surveys”
(Jackle and Al Baghal, 2015).
The IP is similar to the main survey in having a stratified and geographically clus-
tered sample design (Lynn, 2009). It is a representative sample of England, Scotland, and
Wales, but, unlike the main Understanding Society survey, excludes Northern Ireland and
Scotland areas north of the Caledonian Canal. Post code sectors from the Postcode Ad-
dress File were used as primary sampling units (PSUs) and first stratified by Government
Office Region (GOR). Appendix A describes in greater detail the sampling design of the
IP.
3.4.2 Innovation Panel treatments and field procedures
Respondents within the Understanding Society IP routinely take part in randomized con-
trolled experiments. In IP5-7 the main experimental intervention focused on the use of web
interviewing, which has the potential of enhancing response rates and fieldwork efficiency
while at the same time reducing survey costs. A detailed description of the experiments
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conducted in IP5-7 as well as of the risk (and time) preferences experimental module
can be found in Galizzi et al. (2016a). Appendix A reports a brief description of the
main experimental intervention that randomly assigned households within PSUs to either
face-to-face (F2F) or web-mode (WEB) interview.
3.4.3 Allocation to the risk preferences module
In IP6 households in both the F2F and the WEB groups were randomly allocated to take
part into the experimental module on risk preferences independently from the interview
mode. In IP6 a total of n = 1, 087 households were initially randomly allocated to the
experimental module. They included members of the Wave 4 refreshment sample and
original sample members (OSMs) for which a longer longitudinal panel could be linked to
the risk preferences. Due to non-response to the survey, the final sample of households
eligible for the experimental module was n = 808. In line with the random allocation
of households to interview treatments, n = 528 of those were randomly allocated to the
WEB mode (65.3% of all eligible households), and n = 280 to the F2F group (34.7% of
all eligible households). In each household eligible for the experimental module, one adult
respondent in the household was then randomly selected using a Kish grid of enumerated
adults.
A total of 661 eligible respondents answered the risk preferences module in IP6. A
total of 468 eligible respondents answered the risk preferences module in IP7. A total
of 413 eligible respondents answered the risk preferences questions in both IP6 and IP7.
Appendix B describes the details of the allocation to the risk preferences module.
The implementation of the risk preferences experimental tests in IP6 was programmed
and piloted, in both response modes, in January 2013. In the same month, professional
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interviewers by the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) were selected and trained
for the fieldwork. The data collection of the experimental tests in IP6 took place between
February and July 2013. The data collection of the experimental tests in IP7 took place
between May and November 2014.
3.4.4 Experimental and survey questions on risk preferences in the UKHLS
Innovation Panel
In both the WEB and the F2F groups, UKHLS respondents in the experimental module
were presented a total of three tasks. The first task was to measure time preferences
and is fully described in Galizzi et al. (2016a). The second identified a-temporal risk
preferences using both the HL and the EG methods. The third task consisted of an ad
hoc questionnaire conducted in addition to the existing modules of the UKHLS, containing
the SOEP survey questions on risk attitudes, and other behavioral dimensions of interest.
Experimental design considerations
In designing the risk preferences questions (and more generally the experimental module)
a number of considerations and constraints were taken into account.
The most pressing constraint in designing the experimental module was the desire to
keep the overall burden of the experimental module to a minimum in order to minimize
respondents’ fatigue, non-response, and attrition. Given the available research budget, the
entire experimental module was allocated a maximum time slot of about fifteen minutes,
which substantially limited the number of questions that could be introduced. Given that
the estimation of the various time preferences models required relatively more data points,
questions were designed with the idea that about 20 binary choice questions were allocated
to risk preferences.
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The second overall design consideration was the importance of presenting the different
risk tradeoffs to subjects in a transparent and easily accessible way. This aspect is of
great importance in our representative sample of respondents, given their inherent het-
erogeneity in socio-demographic conditions, education levels, numeracy, cognitive skills,
and familiarity with similar tasks. We thus opted for the HL MPL test, the EG multiple
lotteries test, and the SOEP risk attitude measures which have been widely adopted in the
experimental and behavioral economics literature, and have been successfully employed
with general and representative samples of the population in Canada, Denmark, Germany,
the Netherlands, and Vietnam (Andersen et al., 2008b; Dave et al., 2010; Tanaka et al.,
2010; Dohmen et al., 2011; Von Gaudecker et al., 2011).
Risk preferences HL questions consisted of two subsequent blocks of binary choices, the
first block of 9 questions referring to relatively low monetary stakes, while the second block
of 9 questions presenting options with relatively high monetary outcomes. To maximize
clarity and transparency, in each block the list of binary choices was presented in an
ordered manner with the probability of the high prize increasing in 0.1 increments (see
more below).
A last question was introduced to measure risk preferences, using the EG multiple
options format (see more below). Subjects responded to these risk preferences after having
answered the time preferences questions.
To further encourage clarity and transparency of the procedure, and to ensure that
subjects understood the consequences of their choices, the risk preferences module started
with a preamble, which briefly describes the tasks, the aim of the experiment, and high-
lights that their possible gains were related to their actual choices (see the Appendix C
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for details).
The third overall design consideration revolved around the exact level of the monetary
stakes to be used in the incentive-compatible tests. Understanding Society respondents are
accustomed to fixed-fees incentives in the region of £10. In order to genuinely elicit risk
preferences for our heterogeneous set of respondents, we had to make monetary outcomes
salient.
For risk preferences, we faced a trade-off between the simultaneous needs of making the
monetary outcomes salient, and diversifying the range of monetary stakes in the attempt
to capture possible cases of individual risk preference depending on the absolute value
of the monetary stakes (for instance, being risk seeking for low amounts, but risk averse
for high amounts). Due to the binding time constraint, we opted for two MPL series of
HL questions with the following prize sets: [A1: 40 and 32; B1: 77 and 2], [A2: 100
and 40; B2: 180 and 2]. That is, a first series of 9 binary questions used relatively low
monetary stakes, with a safe lottery giving outcomes of £32-£40, and the other risky
lottery returning payments of £2-£77. A second series asked 9 binary questions with
relatively high monetary stakes, with a safe lottery giving out payments of £40-£100, and
the other risky lottery returning payments of £2-£180.
The multiple-options EG test was implemented in its original version with a somewhat
lower level of monetary stakes: the prize sets were [A1: 28; A2: 28], [B1: 24; B2: 36], [C1:
20; C2: 44], [D1: 16; D2: 52], [E1: 12, E2: 60], [F1: 2; F2: 70].
A fourth, related, overall design consideration concerned the choice of how to ad-
minister the experimental tests and to pay out the chosen options. Given the relatively
limited budget constraint, the use of salient monetary outcomes did not allow paying out
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all the experimental tests for all subjects. We thus resorted to what is standard practice
in experimental economics, of randomly selecting one of the experimental task for being
actually played for real, and for giving each subject one in ten chances to receive the
associated payment. Appendix B describes the randomization procedure. While there
are some recent studies challenging this view (Harrison et al., 2014), the current common
wisdom among experimental economists is that, although such a procedure transforms the
experimental tasks into a meta-lottery, it does not interfere with the genuine elicitation
of individual risk and time preferences.5
Another issue here was that the payment procedures used to play the experimental
tests should be familiar and credible to the respondents. Respondents to the Understand-
ing Society IP are accustomed to receive monetary incentives. Credibility of monetary
payments was thus not an issue. What respondents were relatively less familiar with was
the administration of randomized payments. Randomized payments were administered
by mean of an ad hoc computerized script, which visualizes the probability to be one of
the respondents to be paid, the random selection of one question which determines the
payoff function and, in case a lottery question has been selected, the random outcome of
the chosen lottery. The gains were paid in form of vouchers that could be redeemed both
online and at a large number of supermarkets and high street shops all over the UK.
A final overall design consideration related to the already discussed key issue of ac-
counting for the heterogeneity in the individual levels of background income in the inte-
gration of the EG and HL experimental prizes. Andersen et al. (2008b) assumed that the
experimental income from the risk preferences task is spent in one day, and set the level
5See for instance Starmer and Sugden (1991); Wilcox (1993); Bernasconi (1994); Beattie and Loomes
(1997); Cubitt et al. (1998); Harrison et al. (2007); Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008).
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of the daily background income for all respondents equal to the average daily per capita
consumption of private non-durable goods as based on the household expenditure survey
by Statistics Denmark.
Andersen et al. (2014) considered the effect of assuming different values of this back-
ground income, and showed that higher assumed values of background consumption in-
crease the value of the argument of the utility function, leading one to expect to observe
more risk-averse choices, and thus to infer more concave utility. The different levels of
background consumption by Andersen et al. (2008b, 2014) were therefore either assumed
or calculated on the base of the average population levels.
A major advantage of being able to link experimental tests for risk preferences to
UKHLS data is that we can directly access information about the household income and
therefore calculate individual-specific values of the background income W for each of the
respondents to the EG and HL experimental tasks.
The HL and EG tests in detail
In the HL task we used the following prize sets: [A1: 40 and 32; B1: 77 and 2], [A2:
100 and 40; B2: 180 and 2]. In both the F2F and the WEB mode, one single question
was presented at a time in a separate screen. Questions in the first block of 9 questions
with relatively low monetary stakes (low) were presented first, followed by questions in a
second block of 9 questions with relatively high monetary payments (high). Within each
block of questions, choices were presented in an ordered manner, with the probability of
the high prize increasing in 0.1 increments. Unlike Hey and Orme (1994) we did not use
any pie chart showing prizes and probabilities. The typical wording of the risk preferences
questions was as follows:
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Between Lottery A and Lottery B, which lottery do you prefer?
Options:
LOTTERY A: Winning £40 with a 1 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 1), and £32 with a
9 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 or 10)
LOTTERY B: Winning £77 with a 1 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 1), and £2 with a
9 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 or 10)
The EG task required the subjects choosing between 6 lotteries: A, B, C, D, E and F.
Each lottery gave a 50% chance of receiving a low cash payment and a 50% chance of a
high cash payment. The payments for the lotteries were: A: low = £28, high = £28; B:
low = £24, high = £36; C: low = £20, high = £44; D: low = £16, high = £52; E: low
= £12, high = £60; F: low = £2, high = £70. These choices were thus increasing in the
variance of the outcomes and in the risk they represented, with A being the safe choice (a
guaranteed payment of £28 and thus a variance of σ2A = 0) and F the highest-risk choice
(a variance of σ2F = 1156). To make a choice, a subject chooses one of out of the six
lotteries. This risk preferences measure thus increases with an individual’s appetite for
risk.
Questionnaire
The ad hoc questionnaire included survey questions on self-reported attitudes related to
risk preferences and other related behavioral attitudes of interest. We included a question
about self-reported attitude towards risk-taking (Dohmen et al., 2011), taking values from
1 (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks”) to 11 (“I am generally a person fully
prepared to take risks”) (the variable denoted as SOEP-G in what follows); a question
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about self-reported attitude towards risk-taking in health (Dohmen et al., 2011), taking
values from 1 (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks in health”) to 11 (“I
am generally a person fully prepared to take risks in health”) (SOEP-H); as well as a
question about self-reported attitude towards risk-taking in financial matters (Dohmen
et al., 2011), taking values from 1 (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks in
financial matters”) to 11 (“I am generally a person fully prepared to take risks in financial
matters”) (SOEP-F). We also included a question about self-reported optimism about the
future, taking value from 1 (“I have been feeling optimistic about the future none of the
time over the last 2 weeks”) to 5 (“I have been feeling optimistic about the future all of
the time over the last 2 weeks”) (Optimist).
In addition to these variables from the ad hoc questionnaire, in our analysis we use a
number of variables from the main IP survey. In the analysis reported here we use individ-
ual and household characteristics of the respondents such as: household per-capita income
(PCIncome); family size (FamSize); respondents’ age (Age), gender (Female), and marital
status (Married); dummy variables for whether the respondents are employees (Empl),
self-employees (SelfEmpl) or unemployed (Unempl); for whether they have achieved the
highest level of education (ALevel); for whether their self-assessed health is either poor
(PoorSAH) or excellent (ExcSAH); for whether they report to smoke (Smoker), regularly
drink alcohol at least once per week (Drinker), have been recently diagnosed with any
disease or medical conditions (Disease); for whether the respondents answer the survey
in the WEB mode (Web), or have participated into the previous wave of the survey, IP5
(LastWave).
We also use some wave-specific variables that were only available in either IP6 or IP7.
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For instance, in IP6 the height and weight of the respondents were measured, which allows
us to calculate the subjects’ body mass index (BMI). In IP6, moreover, there are dummy
variables for whether the subjects feel they are overweight (Overweight), whether they
engage in physical activity less often than once per week (NoSport), whether they ever
diet or try to lose weight (NoDiet), and whether they eat fast food at least one day in
a normal week (FastFood). In IP7, on the other hand, there are dummy variables for
whether the subjects are regular savers (RegularSaver), have a privately funded pension
(PrivatePension), or an employer co-funded pension scheme (EmployerPension).
In IP7 we have also included in the ad hoc questionnaire a simplified version of the
DOSPERT test for risk-taking in hypothetical domain-specific situations. The DOSPERT
questions ask respondents to self-report the likelihood that they will engage in a series of
specific activities or behaviors if they were to find themselves in those situations, using a
7-points Likert scale, taking value from 1 (“Extremely unlikely”) to 7 (“Extremely likely”).
In particular, to ensure comparability with the SOEP-F and the SOEP-H questions we
have introduced six finance-related and six health-related hypothetical questions. They
ask IP7 respondents what is the likelihood of: betting a day’s income at the horse race
(Bet: horses); investing 10% of their annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund
(Invest 10%: mutual fund); betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game (Bet:
poker game); investing 5% of their annual income in a very speculative stock (Invest 5%:
speculation); betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (Bet: sports);
investing 10% of their annual income in a new business venture (Invest 10%: business);
drinking heavily at a social function (Drink heavily: social); engaging in unprotected sex
(Unprotected sex); driving a car without wearing a seat belt (Drive w/o seatbelt); riding a
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motorcycle without a helmet (Motorcycle w/o helmet); sunbathing without sunscreen (No
sunscreen); and walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of the town (Walk home
alone unsafe). Some descriptive statistics for the main variables above in our sample are
reported in Section 3.6.1.
Metadata
Besides direct data from the experimental tests and the questionnaire, we also make use
of some metadata that are routinely collected for the UKHLS respondents. In particular,
in the estimations we use the response times that subjects took to respond to the risk
preferences questions in the different interview modes. Questions for risk preferences were
designed to be as similar as possible across the WEB and the F2F modes, with one single
question being presented at a time in a separate screen in both interview modes. We had
access to response times in terms of the seconds that respondents spent in each screen
to respond to the question presented there. Response times were rounded up to the
nearest second. For each question, we classify respondents in four categories according
to the quartiles in the distribution of their response times, with RT1 being the fastest
respondents to the question and RT4 the slowest respondents. As described in Sections
3.5 and 3.6, we use response times when looking at the Fechner errors in the structural
estimation of risk preferences.
3.5 Econometrics
We follow Andersen et al. (2008b, 2014) and directly estimate by maximum likelihood
(ML) a structural model of the latent choice process in which the core CRRA parameter
defining risk preferences is estimated. Further detail of the econometric approach can be
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found in Appendix E. We also run a series of ordered probit regressions to address the
cross validity and external validity issues.
3.5.1 Statistical correction for non-representative response
All descriptive statistics, ordered probit regressions, and ML structural estimations are
adjusted to account for non-representative response. The issue is related to the fact that,
although households in the IP were randomly assigned to the experimental module, the
original 808 respondents eligible for the risk and time preferences questions could not be
representative of the UK population. Therefore, in order to adjust for differential attrition
and non-response, and to generalize results to the UK population, we use sampling weights
in our estimations. The estimations also adjust standard errors at a PSU level.
3.6 Results
We first present some simple descriptive statistics for the respondents in our UK represen-
tative sample (3.6.1). We then describe the subjects’ responses to the EG, HL, and the
SOEP tasks in IP6, in IP7, and by comparing responses in IP6 and IP7 (3.6.2). We next
present some pairwise correlations among the responses, and between the responses to the
EG, HL, and SOEP tasks, and some other characteristics of the respondents from linked
survey data (3.6.3). We then discuss the key issue of the integration of the experimental
prizes in the individual-specific level of background income (3.6.4). We finally directly
deal with each of the three issues of temporal stability (3.6.5), cross validity (3.6.6), and
external validity (3.6.7) of the three risk preferences measures.
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3.6.1 Descriptive statistics
Using sampling weights, our sample of IP6 respondents is representative of the UK pop-
ulation. The main characteristics of our sample are reported in Table 3.2. The top half
of this Table reports the descriptive statistics of all the respondents who answered the
risk preferences questions in IP6, using and not using sampling weights. The bottom half
reports the descriptive statistics only for the respondents in IP6 who answered the risk
preferences questions in both IP6 and IP7, again using and not using sampling weights.
As it can be seen, 55% percent of all the IP6 respondents were female, and 46% were
married. The average age was 50 years old. On average, the respondents’ family had 2.44
members. About 39.6% of the respondents had at least an A-level education qualification.
The average level of gross household per capita monthly income was of £2,470. About
4% of respondents were unemployed. About half the subjects rated their own health as
excellent, while 20% of them rated it as poor. Around 35% of the subjects answered the
risk preferences questions via the WEB response mode.
The subjects who answered the risk preferences questions in both IP6 and IP7 had
substantially similar characteristics to the ones described above, with the main differences
being that, on average, they had higher monthly income (£2,989), were more likely to be
married (50%) or to have an A-level qualification (45%).
3.6.2 Responses
Responses in IP6
Before presenting the main descriptive statistics for the responses to the EG task, it is
worthwhile to notice that any subject risk neutral or risk averse should always prefer
lottery E to lottery F, regardless of her individual specific level of the per capita daily
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background income W . This is because, by construction, lottery E has the same expected
value of lottery F (equal to 36 in both cases) but smaller variance.
In IP6 our sample of respondents provided heterogeneous responses in the EG task.
More than a third of the 655 subjects who answered the EG task (n=230, 35.11% of the
respondents) chose lottery A, the certain gamble, in the EG task. The riskiest gamble,
lottery F, was chosen by 104 subjects, 15.88% of the total. A total of 120 and 84 respon-
dents chose lotteries C and D, respectively (18.32% and 12.82% of the total, respectively).
Lotteries B and E were chosen by 64 and 53 subjects, respectively (9.77% and 8.09%
respectively).
Analogously, before presenting the main descriptive statistics for the responses to the
HL risk preferences questions, we provide a more detailed description of the choices in the
HL task.
Table 3.3 shows that, for the low monetary stakes HL questions, the expected value
of lottery A is higher than the corresponding value for lottery B for the first four binary
choices, until the probability of the highest outcome is 0.4. From the fifth choice on,
lottery B has a higher expected value.
The two lotteries can also be compared in terms of their Sharpe ratios, the ratio
between the expected value and the standard deviation of the lottery payoff. Assuming
that the risk can be measured in terms of variance, the Sharpe ratio can be interpreted
intuitively as the expected monetary reward that the lottery provides per unit of risk, and
can be used here merely as summary statistics. The Sharpe ratio of lottery A is always
higher than the ratio of lottery B, which means that lottery A rewards risk relatively more
than lottery B. Lottery A, therefore, can still be attractive for the respondents even when
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its expected value is lower than lottery B’s one.
In the high monetary stakes HL questions the difference between lottery A and B in
terms of expected payoffs is larger than in the low stakes HL questions. In terms of Sharpe
ratios, however, the two lotteries are closer in their expected monetary rewards per unit
of risk in the high stakes HL questions than in the low stakes HL questions.
It is generally expected that respondents should be consistent with their choices. In
other words, once in the sequence of questions they have chosen option B, they should not
choose option A in any of the following questions, where the expected value of the lottery
B further increases, that is, they should not switch back to A.
A common finding in the lab and field experiments that do not force consistency in
individual responses, is that a conspicuous proportion of subjects make inconsistent se-
quences of binary choices in the sense that, after having chosen lottery B, they switch
back to lottery A. Crosetto and Filippin (2015) present a meta-analysis of the 30 pub-
lished experiments conducted using the HL method, involving 4,726 participants, mostly
university students. They show that, on average, about 16.3% of the experimental sub-
jects make inconsistent choices, with the proportion being higher in the few experiments
conducted with more general samples of the population. Responses in our sample are not
an exception to this general finding.
First, a total of 205 subjects out of 661 (31.01% of the sample) made at least one
inconsistent choice when answering HL questions, in the above sense of switching back to
lottery A in a sequence of binary choices. In particular, when answering HL questions with
low monetary stakes, 159 subjects out of 661 (24.05% of the sample) made inconsistent
choices. Slightly fewer subjects, 125 out of 661 (18.91%) behaved as switchers when an-
99
swering HL questions with high monetary stakes. There is a core group of 79 respondents,
who made at least one inconsistent choice in both the low and the high monetary stakes
HL questions. Table 3.4 reports the proportions of subjects for each number of switching
points in the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes in IP6 and IP7.
Second, one can look at the HL responses in terms of how many times in a sequence
of 9 choices (low and high monetary stakes), the respondents have chosen the safer lottery
A. For the subjects who do not switch back, the number of times they have chosen the
safer lottery is used to infer their risk attitudes: by looking at the point in the sequence
where the respondent switches from lottery A to lottery B, one can calculate the lower
and upper bounds of the underlying relative risk aversion parameter r under the CRRA
assumption. It is worthwhile to emphasize, however, that these ranges of CRRA values
are only valid for the subjects who do not switch back, given that in the case of the
inconsistent subjects it is impossible to establish such a conceptual mapping between the
number of safer choices and a range of CRRA values.
When looking at the sequence of HL choices of all subjects together, including the
inconsistent (Table 3.5, All subjects), it can be seen that about a fifth of the respondents
never chose the safe lottery A: 21.79% always chose lottery B with low monetary stakes,
while 20.12% always chose lottery B with high stakes. On the other hand, a roughly
equal proportion of subjects always chose the safer lottery A in all series of choice (17.55%
and 23.15% with low and high monetary stakes, respectively). A part from these two
polar choices, the distributions of responses to the HL tasks is uni-modal and roughly
symmetric, with the bulk of subjects choosing lottery A between three and six times in
the series of choices.
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The responses are more polarized when looking at the 453 subjects who never switched
back, thus excluding the 205 inconsistent respondents (Table 3.5, Consistent). Between a
fourth and a third of these respondents never chose the safer lottery A (29.36% and 25.39
with low and high monetary stakes, respectively).
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the responses to the EG and SOEP tasks, respectively.
Appendix F reports analogous information for the responses in IP7, and for the subsample
of subjects who participated to the risk preferences module in both IP6 and IP7.
3.6.3 Correlations
In preparation of our discussion on the cross validity of the three risk preferences measures
at an individual level, we present the aggregate figures for pairwise correlations between
EG, HL, and SOEP measures. EG responses are naturally ordered from 1 (lottery A, the
safe lottery) to 6 (lottery F, the riskiest lottery). HL responses are ordered in terms of
switching points, from 1 (switching to the riskier lottery B when p =.1) to 2 (switching
to the riskier lottery B when p =.2) and so forth, up to 10 (never switching to the riskier
lottery B). SOEP responses are naturally ordered from 0 (unwilling to take risks) to 10
(fully prepared to take risks). The expected sign of the correlation, therefore, is positive
between SOEP tasks, negative between EG and HL tasks, and negative between HL and
SOEP task.
Table 3.8 reports the cross-methods pairwise correlations, together with their signifi-
cance levels, at IP6 (top half) and IP7 (bottom half). As it can be seen, in both waves
the responses to the HL task with low monetary stakes are strongly and significantly pos-
itively correlated across the HL questions with high monetary stakes: the correlation is
0.684 (p < 0.001) in IP6, and 0.571 (p < 0.001) in IP7.
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Responses to the HL task, with both low and high stakes, are also significantly corre-
lated with the responses to the EG task: although the correlation is negative as expected
(subjects switching to lottery B in HL when the probability p is higher choose less risky
lotteries in the EG task), the correlation is generally modest (-0.1456, p < 0.001, and
-0.1801, p < 0.001, between responses in EG and HL choices with low stakes in IP6 and
IP7, respectively; -0.2076, p < 0.001, and -0.1873, p < 0.001, between responses in EG
and HL choices with high stakes in IP6 and IP7, respectively). The finding of a significant
but modest correlation between EG and HL measures in our UK representative sample is
generally in line with the evidence of no to weak correlations from the previous literature
(Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Crosetto and Filippin, 2015; Deck et al.,
2013; Loomes and Pogrebna, 2014).
In both IP6 and IP7, responses to the three self-reported SOEP questions are highly
and significantly correlated among them: 0.8725 and 0.8121 between SOEP-G and SOEP-
F in IP6 and IP7, respectively; 0.8642 and 0.7781 between SOEP-G and SOEP-H in IP6
and IP7, respectively; and 0.8544 and 0.7794 between SOEP-F and SOEP-H in IP6 and
IP7, respectively (all with p < 0.001). These highly significant correlations between the
various SOEP measures are in line with, or even higher than, what typically found in
the literature (Dohmen et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2015; Vieider et al., 2015a; Josef et al.,
2016): Vieider et al. (2015a), for instance, find correlations of 0.495 between SOEP-G and
SOEP-F, 0.137 between SOEP-G and SOEP-H, and 0.250 between SOEP-F and SOEP-H.
In both IP6 and IP7, the EG task is not significantly correlated with any of the
SOEP measures: all correlations are positive (as expected) but close to zero. This lack
of correlation between the EG and the SOEP measures in our UK representative sample
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is different from a significant correlation of around 0.30 found by Crosetto and Filippin
(2015).
In both waves of the survey, there is no significant correlation between SOEP-H and
any of the HL tasks. In IP7, there is also no significant correlation between the HL tasks,
on the one hand, and both the SOEP-G and the SOEP-F on the other: all correlations
are negative (as expected) but close to zero. In IP6, there is some negative significant
but weak correlation between SOEP-G and SOEP-F and the HL task but only with high
monetary stakes (-0.1054, p = 0.007, and -0.093, p = 0.017, respectively). The correlations
between the SOEP-G and SOEP-F questions and the HL task with low monetary stakes in
IP6 are negative but close to zero. This lack of correlation between the HL and the SOEP
measures in our UK representative sample is generally in line with the weak and marginally
significant correlation also found by Szrek et al. (2012) and Crosetto and Filippin (2015).
Table 3.9 reports the cross-waves pairwise correlations, together with their significance
levels, for the EG and HL tasks (top half) and the SOEP questions (bottom half) for the
subjects for which we have responses in both waves. Table 3.9 confirms that the main
results discussed above hold for the subset of subjects for which responses to the EG, HL,
and SOEP tasks can be linked across waves, namely: that the choices are significantly
and highly positively correlated among HL questions with low and high monetary stakes
(0.6825 and 0.5525 in IP6 and IP7, respectively, both with p < 0.001); and that the
responses are significantly negatively, but moderately, correlated between the EG and the
HL tasks (for the HL task with low monetary stakes, -0.1221, p = 0.0134, and -0.1828,
p < 0.001, in IP6 and IP7, respectively; for the HL task with high monetary stakes,
-0.2137, p < 0.001, and -0.1831, p < 0.001, in IP6 and IP7, respectively).
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Moreover, within-subject responses to the same EG and HL questions are significantly
and positively correlated across the two waves, but correlations are low: the IP6-IP7
correlation between cross-wave responses is 0.1731 (p < 0.001) for the EG task, 0.1882
(p < 0.001) for the HL task with low stakes, and 0.1855 (p < 0.001) for the HL task
with high stakes. Also the responses to different HL tasks across waves are generally
significantly and positively correlated, but correlations are low: the responses to the HL
questions with low (high) monetary stakes in IP6 show a correlation of 0.1625 (0.1515)
with the responses to the HL questions with high (low) monetary stakes in IP7, both with
p < 0.001.
For the subsample of subjects for which responses can be linked across IP6 and IP7,
there is strong correlation across the SOEP questions within each wave (the correlation
between SOEP-G and SOEP-F is 0.8472 for IP6 and 0.8387 for IP7; the one between
SOEP-G and SOEP-H is 0.847 for IP6 and 0.8102 for IP7; the correlation between SOEP-
F and SOEP-H is 0.8217 for IP6 and 0.8318 for IP7). Moreover, there is significant but
low correlation between the responses to the same SOEP questions in the two waves: the
IP6-IP7 correlation is 0.257 for SOEP-G (p < 0.001), 0.2483 (p < 0.001) for SOEP-F,
and 0.2459 (p < 0.001) for SOEP-H. The evidence of significant correlation of the SOEP
measures over time in our UK representative sample is in line with what found by Josef
et al. (2016) using repeated waves of the GSOEP, but is substantially lower in size: for
example, the authors find correlations in the 0.45-0.53 range for the SOEP-G, in the
0.42-0.50 range for the SOEP-F, and in the 0.38-0.45 range for the SOEP-H.
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3.6.4 The integration with background income
As mentioned, the cross validity issue has already been investigated using pools of student
subjects, but has not yet been systematically addressed using representative samples of the
population. Our design allows us to directly investigate what is the effect of considering
individual-specific levels of background income calculated on the base of the household
income data contained in the linked UKHLS.
The analysis of the integration of experimental prizes within different levels of back-
ground income conducted by Andersen et al. (2008b, 2014) suggests that, in representative
samples like ours, it is important to explicitly account for the individual heterogeneity in
the background income. Our linking design allows us to take advantage of the fact that
information about individual levels of background income can be directly accessed from
the UKHLS data.
To illustrate in greater detail the point of the integration of the experimental prizes
within individual-specific levels of background income, we first consider the EG task. Sub-
jects in the experiment are thought to integrate the prizes from the six different lotteries
within their background income, expressed in terms of daily per capita household income.
In conventional lab-based experiments with student participants the background income
is assumed to be zero for each subject, and the analysis typically characterizes a theoret-
ical threshold level of utility, for instance assuming CRRA, such that, say, lottery A is
preferred to lottery B.
In contrast, if the level of background income takes different specific values for each
subject, then it is possible to characterize a continuum of thresholds of utility levels
such that lottery A is preferred to lottery B, one threshold for each specific level of the
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background income.
For instance, if W is the level of background income, under the assumption that CRRA
characterizes the utility function of the respondents, lottery A is preferred to lottery B if:
(28 +W )1−r
1− r −
1
2
[
(24 +W )1−r
1− r +
(36 +W )1−r
1− r
]
≥ 0.
Similarly, lottery B is preferred to lottery C is if:
[
(24 +W )1−r
1− r +
(36 +W )1−r
1− r
]
−
[
(20 +W )1−r
1− r +
(44 +W )1−r
1− r
]
≥ 0.
Similar threshold inequalities can be written for each of the five pairwise comparisons
of the lotteries in the EG task. It is then possible to solve the five inequalities and to plot
the results as functions of the level of background income W , as illustrated in Figure 3·1.
As it can be seen, when subjects are thought to integrate the experimental prizes from
the lotteries with different levels of background income, the CRRA coefficient spans over
a much wider range of values compared to a typical lab-based study that assumes W = 0
for all student subjects. The figure also visually confirms a typical feature of the EG task,
namely that the range of CRRA values spanned by the EG task only includes risk aversion
and risk neutrality, and excludes by construction the case of risk seeking preferences.
In particular, in our representative sample of the UK population, after having excluded
top and bottom outliers, W takes most values within a range of daily per capita income
included between £=10 and £250. Considering that the average level of daily per capita
income in our sample is around £50, and that, as discussed above, approximately one third
of the respondents in IP6 chose lottery A in the EG task, we should expect a relatively
high level of relative risk aversion from our structural estimations of the EG experimental
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data.
Moreover, it can be clearly seen that each of the five thresholds is increasing with
the level of the background income W . Therefore, imagine that two subjects i and j in
our sample both chose lottery B. If, say, Wi = 70 and Wj = 50, then also the estimated
CRRA coefficient of subject i is higher than the coefficient of subject j, pointing to subject
i being more risk averse than j. This suggests that we should expect a positive correlation
between per capita daily income and relative risk aversion in the structural estimations of
the EG data.
A similar line of reasoning can be replicated in the case of the HL task. For instance,
consider the set of nine HL questions with low monetary stakes. Assuming again CRRA,
for each level of the background income W and of the probability p of the high lottery
prize, it is possible to characterize a continuum of threshold levels of the utility such that
a subject preferred lottery A to lottery B as:
[
p
(40 +W )1−r
1− r + (1− p)
(32 +W )1−r
1− r
]
−
[
p
(77 +W )1−r
1− r + (1− p)
(2 +W )1−r
1− r
]
≥ 0.
The corresponding continuum of threshold utility inequalities for the nine HL questions
with high monetary stakes is:
[
p
(100 +W )1−r
1− r + (1− p)
(40 +W )1−r
1− r
]
−
[
p
(180 +W )1−r
1− r + (1− p)
(2 +W )1−r
1− r
]
≥ 0.
Similarly to what was done for the EG task, it is then possible to solve the nine
threshold inequalities for the HL low monetary stakes and the nine inequalities for the HL
high monetary stakes, and then to plot the results as functions of the level of background
income W , something that is illustrated in Figures 3·2 and 3·3.
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The thresholds are to be interpreted as the lower bounds for observing subjects choos-
ing lottery A and the upper bound for observing lottery B choices: that is, given W and
p, the subjects choose lottery A if their relative risk aversion is above the threshold, and
choose lottery B if their relative risk aversion is below the threshold.
Moreover, the figures visually confirm that, unlike the EG task, the range of CRRA
values spanned by the HL task includes risk aversion, risk neutrality, but also risk seeking
preferences. The ranges of CRRA values spanned by the HL tasks with low and high mon-
etary stakes are however quite different, with the range being broader with low monetary
stakes. Both ranges, moreover, are different from the range of CRRA values spanned by
the EG task.
Furthermore, it can be seen that also the HL thresholds vary with the level of back-
ground income W . Unlike for the EG task, however, the relation between the HL thresh-
olds and W is non-monotonic: the thresholds increase with W when there is risk aversion
(r > 0) and decrease with W when there is risk seeking (r < 0). This suggests that, be-
cause of these two counterbalancing effects, the structural estimations of the HL data may
reveal no association between the estimated CRRA coefficient and the level of background
income.
The above considerations are important when assessing the cross-validity of individual
responses across the EG and the HL tasks (Section 3.6.6); when assessing the cross-validity
of individual responses across the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes (Appendix
G); when looking at the results of the structural estimations of the EG and HL data
(Section 3.6.6); and, given that the individual-specific levels of background income W can
potentially change between IP6 and IP7, also when comparing the responses to the same
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EG and HL tasks in the two waves of the survey (Section 3.6.5).
3.6.5 Temporal stability
We next look at within-subject responses at two points in time and describe the behavior
of the subsample of subjects who answered the same set of risk preferences questions in
both IP6 and IP7 at a distance of about one year between surveys.
Temporal stability of EG responses
A total of 409 subjects responded to the EG questions in both IP6 and IP7. For these
subjects, the whole set of choices in IP6 and IP7 is described in Table 3.10 where we
describe the entire distribution of IP7 choices for each of the six lotteries chosen in IP6. If
individual choices are fully stable across the two waves, one should expect the proportions
along the main diagonal to be 100%.
Out of the 409 subjects who responded to the EG questions in both IP6 and IP7, only
32.76% (134 subjects) chose the same EG lottery option in both waves. This proportion
is larger for the subjects who in IP6 preferred lottery A, the safe lottery (49.02%). The
proportion of temporally stable choices is somewhat, but not radically, higher (35.56%)
for the sub-sample of 284 respondents who made consistent choices in the HL questions
in IP6, thus excluding the subjects who switched back. The overall set of choices in IP6
and IP7 for the consistent (inconsistent) in the HL IP6 task is described in Table 3.11.
Temporal stability of HL responses
A complication for the HL task is the fact that subjects made a total of 18 choices in the
HL task, compared to a single one in the EG task. In principle, if individual choices are
fully stable across the two waves, one should expect to see, for each individual, exactly
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the same series of 18 binary choices in both IP6 and IP7. This seems realistically too
strong an assumption of stability across waves. An alternative is to look at the first point
in the sequence of choices where each subject switches from lottery A to lottery B in the
block of 9 HL questions with low monetary stakes, and in the block of 9 HL questions
with high monetary stakes. In the case of the consistent subjects, in the above sense of
subject who never switch back, this switching point is unique and directly identifies the
underlying degree of risk aversion, giving a precise measure of cross-waves stability.6
A total of 412 subjects responded to the HL questions with low monetary stakes in
both IP6 and IP7. For these subjects, the whole set of choices in IP6 and IP7 is described
in Table 3.12 where we describe the entire distribution of IP7 HL choices for each first
switching point in IP6 HL. If individual choices are fully stable across the two waves, one
should expect again the proportions along the main diagonal to be 100%.
Out of the 412 subjects who responded to the HL questions with low monetary stakes
in both IP6 and IP7, only 19.90% switched for the first time to lottery B in correspondence
of the same point in both waves. The proportion of temporally stable responses is larger
for the subjects who in IP6 chose lottery B immediately or almost immediately (22.05%
and 20.40%), or who never switched to lottery B (36.14%). Also for the HL choices with
low monetary stakes there are several cases of local movements (e.g. 20.41% of the subjects
who chose to first switch to ’are not systematic nor perfect lottery B in the second binary
choice in IP6 switched immediately to lottery B in IP7), but, from IP6 to IP7, there is
also a general tendency to switch to lottery B more often from the beginning, or to never
switch to lottery B. The proportion of temporally stable responses is higher (23.26%) for
6In the case of inconsistent subjects who switch back, clearly this switching point is just the first of
multiple switching points, but it could still be used as a tentative metrics for the stability of responses
across waves.
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the consistent subjects (in the sense of the respondents who in IP6 never switched back,
Table 3.13, Panel A), while is substantially lower (12.09%) for the subjects who did switch
back in IP6 (Table 3.13, Panel B).
Analogous results hold for the HL questions with high monetary stakes (Tables 3.14
and 3.15). Out of the 408 subjects who responded to the HL questions with low mone-
tary stakes in both IP6 and IP7, only 22.30% switched for the first time to lottery B in
correspondence of the same point in both waves.
Temporal stability of SOEP responses
A total of 359 subjects responded to the SOEP-G questions in both IP6 and IP7, while
357 subjects also responded the SOEP-F and SOEP-H questions in both waves. For these
subjects, the whole set of choices in IP6 and IP7 is described in Tables 3.16-3.18 where
we describe the entire distribution of IP7 choices for each option chosen in IP6.
Out of the 359 subjects who responded to the SOEP-G questions in both IP6 and IP7,
only 24.23% rated their willingness to take risk in general in exactly the same way in both
waves. These proportions are higher when in IP6 the subjects self-reported no willingness
to take risks (33.33%), maximum willingness to take risks (55.55%) or a willingness to
take risks of 5, the midpoint of the scale (32.81%). There is, moreover, a visible pattern
of choices around the main diagonal of the table, with evidence of local movements in
responses from IP6 to IP7. There are some visible patterns of choices at or around the
main diagonal of the table also in the responses to the SOEP-F and SOEP-H questions.
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3.6.6 Cross validity
We now look at within-subject individual responses at one point in time (IP6) and explore
how the different measures of risk preferences EG, HL, and SOEP relate to each other.
We start presenting the main within-subjects responses across each pair of risk preferences
tasks: between the EG and the SOEP tasks (3.6.6); between the HL and the SOEP tasks
(3.6.6); and between the EG and the HL tasks (3.6.6). Taking advantage of our design
linking the risk preferences measures to the UKHLS data, we next explicitly account for
the fact that the experimental prizes are integrated within individual-specific levels of
background income when looking at the cross-validity of responses between the EG and
HL tasks (3.6.6), and between the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes (Appendix
G). We then conduct a set of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables
are the responses to the SOEP questions, and the main explanatory variables are the
responses to the EG and the HL tasks (3.6.6). We finally conduct structural estimations
of risk preferences under the assumption that subjects have a CRRA utility function using
the experimental data from the EG and the HL tasks (3.6.6).
Responses across EG and SOEP tasks
Responses to the EG and the SOEP task can be directly compared for all respondents who
answered both tasks either in IP6 or in IP7. In IP6 a total of 600, 599, and 600 subjects
answered both the EG and the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively.
A total of 431 subjects answered the EG and to each SOEP question in IP7. Tables
22-24 report the whole distribution of the responses to the EG task and to the SOEP-G,
SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions in IP6 and in IP7. For each value of the self-reported
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willingness to take risk according to the SOEP question (the rows of the tables), each cell
contains the number of subjects in our sample who chose a given lottery in the EG (the
column of the tables). If there is stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity sense,
one would expect that the subjects who in the SOEP tasks (and especially in the SOEP-F
question) self-report to be unwilling to take risks are also the subjects most likely to pick
the safer lotteries in the EG task (e.g. lottery A).
As it can be seen from Table 3.19, in IP6 there is an association between lower levels
of self-reported willingness to take risk in finance (SOEP-F) and safer lottery choices in
the EG task. For instance, half of the respondents who self-reported to be unwilling to
take risks in financial matters picked lottery A as their favorite lottery in the EG task. In
IP6, however, the association of responses between the SOEP-F and the EG tasks is far
from being a perfect one. For instance, there are numerous subjects who reported little
willingness to take financial risks in the SOEP-F question but then picked risky lotteries
in the EG task even when they had the option of choosing a safe lottery. More generally,
about two thirds of the subjects who reported low levels of willingness to take financial
risks in the SOEP-F task, also chose lotteries involving some risks. Also in IP7 there is
some general but imperfect pattern associating lower levels of the SOEP-F question to the
choice of safer lotteries in the EG task (Table 3.19).
As it can be seen in Table 23, there is also an imperfect association of responses
between the SOEP-G and the EG tasks, both in IP6 and IP7.
The lack of a systematic pattern of associations with the EG task is particularly
evident in the responses to the SOEP-H task, where, in both IP6 and IP7 two thirds of
the subjects who reported willingness to take health risks between 0 and 5 chose lotteries
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involving some risks in the EG task (Table 3.21).
All in all, the analysis of the within-subject individual responses confirms what already
suggested by the lack of correlation between the EG and the SOEP measures in our UK
representative sample: the individual responses show some general patterns of associations
between the EG task and the SOEP questions, but those patterns are far from being
systematic or perfect, especially for the willingness to take risks in general and in health. It
is also worthwhile to note that, conceptually, it is difficult to ascertain how much coherence
one should expect to see between the two different measures, especially considering the
heterogeneity in individual responses and in the individual levels of background income.
Responses across HL and SOEP tasks
Responses to the SOEP questions can also be compared to responses to the HL tasks
for all respondents who answered both tasks either in IP6 or in IP7. In IP6 a total of
600, 599, and 600 subjects answered to both the HL task with low monetary stakes and
to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively. In IP6 a total of 600,
599, and 600 subjects answered both the HL task with high monetary stakes and the
SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively. In IP7 a total of 431, 430, and
430 subjects answered to both the HL tasks (with low and high monetary stakes) and to
the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively. Tables 3.22-3.24 report the
whole distribution of the responses to the HL task with low and high monetary stakes and
to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions in IP6. Tables 3.25-3.27 report the same
distributions for IP7. For each value of the self-reported willingness to take risk according
to the SOEP question (the rows of the tables), each cell contains the number of subjects
in our sample who switch for the first time to the riskier lottery B in correspondence of
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that switching point (the column of the tables), taking value between 1 (switching in the
first pairwise choice, when the probability of winning the high prize is p = 0.1) to never
switching to the riskier lottery B. If there is stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity
sense, one would expect that the subjects who in the SOEP tasks (and especially in the
SOEP-F question) self-report to be unwilling to take risks are also the subjects who switch
later to the riskier lottery B in the HL task (i.e. a very risk averse subject should switch
to lottery B when p is very high, or should never switch to lottery B).
As it can be seen from Table 3.23, in IP6 there is some association between lower levels
of self-reported willingness to take risk in finance (SOEP-F) and the switching point in the
HL tasks. For instance, 18 and 14 out of 68 respondents who self-reported to be unwilling
to take risks in financial matters never switched to lottery B in the HL tasks with low and
high monetary stakes, respectively. In IP6, however, the association of responses between
the SOEP-F and the HL tasks is not a perfect one. More generally, between half and two
thirds of the subjects who reported low willingness to take financial risks in the SOEP-F
task, also chose to switch to lottery B at a point that reveals some degree of risk-seeking
in the HL tasks. Also in IP7 there is some but imperfect association between the SOEP-F
and the HL tasks (Table 3.26). Patterns of weak association between the switching points
in the HL tasks and the self-reported risk attitudes are also observed in the responses to
the SOEP-G and SOEP-H tasks, in both IP6 (Table 3.22 and 3.24) and IP7 (Table 3.25
and 3.27).
The imperfect association between self-reported willingness to take financial risks and
switching points in the HL tasks is also observed when the analysis focuses on the sub-
sample of the 413 and 411 subjects who, in IP6, never switched back in the HL tasks with
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low and monetary stakes, respectively, or on the corresponding 258 subjects in IP7 (tables
not included but available on request). For the inconsistent subjects there is essentially
no meaningful association between the switching points in the HL tasks and the SOEP-F
or SOEP-H (tables also available on request).
In sum, the analysis of the within-subject individual responses confirms what was
already suggested by the weak correlations between the HL and the SOEP measures in
our UK representative sample: the individual responses show some patterns of associations
between the HL and the SOEP tasks, but those patterns are not systematic or perfect,
especially for the risk attitudes in general and in health.
Responses across EG and HL tasks
Responses to the HL tasks can be finally compared to responses in the EG task for all
respondents who answered both tasks either in IP6 or IP7. In IP6 a total of 655 and
654 subjects answered both the EG task and the HL task with low and high monetary
stakes, respectively. In IP7 a total of 468 subjects answered the EG task and both the
HL tasks. Table 3.28 reports the whole distribution of the responses to the EG task and
to the HL questions with low and high monetary stakes in IP6. Table 3.29 reports the
same distributions for IP7. For each value of the lottery chosen in the EG task (the rows
of the tables), each cell contains the number of subjects in our sample who switch for the
first time to the riskier lottery B in correspondence of that switching point (the column
of the tables). If there is stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity sense, one would
expect that the subjects who in the EG task chose the safer lotteries, and in particular
the riskless lottery A, are also the subjects who switch later to the riskier lottery B in the
HL task (i.e. a very risk averse subject should switch to lottery B when p is very high, or
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should never switch to lottery B).
In IP6 there is some but imperfect association between choosing safer lotteries in the
EG task and the switching points in the HL tasks. For instance, 68 and 65 out of the 230
respondents who chose the riskless lottery A in the EG task never switched to lottery B
in the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes, respectively. There are however also
numerous subjects who chose the riskless lottery A in the EG task but then switched to
the risky lottery B quite early in the HL sequence of pairwise choices. Similarly imperfect
patterns of associations of responses to the EG and HL tasks can be observed in IP7
(Table 3.29) and focusing on the consistent subjects who never switch back.
In sum, the responses in our UK representative sample do not show neither systematic
nor perfect patterns of associations between the EG and HL tasks.
Responses across EG and HL tasks accounting for individual-specific back-
ground income
Because of what was illustrated in Section 3.6.4, it is expected that in our UK represen-
tative sample the responses to the EG and HL tasks should overlap and map into each
other only imperfectly once the analysis accounts for individual heterogeneity in terms of
individual background income.
To further illustrate this point, consider for instance a respondent with a background
income of W = 60 who is answering both EG and HL questions. Imagine that she chooses
lottery A as her preferred option in the EG task. From the thresholds and Figure 3·1,
this means that her CRRA coefficient is above 10.6. Hence, if she behaves consistently
across tasks EG and HL, she is expected to never switch to lottery B in the HL tests:
when p = 0.9, in fact, the CRRA upper bound to choose lottery B in HL is 5.34 with low
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monetary stakes and 3.19 with high monetary stakes.
Imagine that she chooses lottery B in the EG task instead. This means that her CRRA
is between 3.47 and 10.6. If she behaves consistently across the EG and HL tasks, then
she is expected to switch to lottery B in the HL test with low monetary stakes either when
p = 0.7 (the thresholds are such that the CRRA coefficient is between 2.38 and 3.57), or
when p = 0.8 (the CRRA coefficient is between 3.57 and 5.34), or when p = 0.9 (the
CRRA upper bound is 5.34). Similarly, she is expected to switch to lottery B in the HL
test with high monetary only when p = 0.9 (the CRRA upper bound is 3.19).
A similar line of reasoning can be replicated for each of her possible choices in EG.
For instance, if the same subject with a background income of W = 60 chooses lottery
C in the EG task (and therefore her CRRA coefficient is between 2.11 and 3.47) and if
she behaves consistently, then she is expected to switch to lottery B in the HL test with
low monetary stakes when p = 0.6 (the CRRA coefficient is between 1.39 and 2.38) or
when p = 0.7 (the CRRA coefficient is between 2.38 and 3.57), whereas she is expected
to switch to lottery B in the HL test with high monetary stakes when p = 0.7 (the CRRA
coefficient is between 1.73 and 2.31), or p = 0.8 (the CRRA coefficient is between 2.31
and 3.19), or p = 0.9 (the CRRA upper bound is 3.19).
Therefore, it is possible to base the assessment of the cross-validity consistency issue
between the two EG and HL tests on the following line of reasoning. Consider a given
subject in our UK representative sample. Given her level of background income in the
UKHLS data, and given her choice in the EG task, in the HL task she is expected to
switch to lottery B when the probability of the high monetary prize is p = pl in the low
monetary stakes questions, and when is p = ph in the high monetary stakes questions,
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with pl and ph being probability values between 0.1 and 0.9.
The same criterion to assess the cross-validity consistency across the EG and the HL
task can be alternatively described in terms of the above defined thresholds. For instance,
consider the same subject as above, with a background income level of W = 60. In the HL
test with low monetary stakes, the CRRA thresholds below which she chooses B are -4.65
(p = 0.1), -2.37 (p = 0.2), -1.47 (p = 0.3), -0.45 (p = 0.4), 0.48 (p = 0.5), 1.39 (p = 0.6),
2.38 (p = 0.7), 3.57 (p = 0.8), and 5.34 (p = 0.9). The analogous thresholds in the EG
task for her preferring lottery A to B, lottery B to C, lottery C to D, lottery D to E, and
lottery E to F are 10.57, 3.47, 2.11, 1.53, and 0, respectively. Therefore, if that subject
switches to lottery B in the HL test when p = 0.5 or less, she should also choose lottery
F in the EG task.
Figure 3·4 presents two visual representations of the thresholds for two possible typical
subjects in our representative sample, taking into account their specific background in-
comes. For illustration purposes, the figures only consider the HL task with low monetary
stakes, where, as discussed, the CRRA thresholds are more directly comparable with the
ones in the EG task.
The subject 1 in Figure 3·4 (top panel) chooses lottery A in the EG task, and never
switches to lottery B in the HL task. The two implied ranges of CRRA values for the two
tasks overlap each other, namely in the area to the right of the threshold for p = 0.9 in the
HL task, and to the right of the threshold for lottery A versus lottery B in the EG task
(“A vs B”). Given her choices and her level of background income, therefore, subject 1
behaves consistently across the two tasks (in the cross-validity sense), and we can conclude
that, in her case, the EG and the HL risk preferences measures cross validate and map
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well into each other.
The subject 10 in Figure Figure 3·4 (bottom panel) chooses lottery B in the EG task,
and switches to lottery B in the HL task when p = 0.5 (and never switches back in the
subsequent question). The range of CRRA values implied by the EG task is thus the area
to the right of the threshold for lottery B versus lottery C and to the left of the threshold
for lottery A versus lottery B, as illustrated in the figure. On the other hand, however, the
range of CRRA values implied by the HL task is the area to the left of the threshold for
p = 0.5, as showed in the figure. Given her choices and her level of background income,
therefore, subject 10 does not behave consistently across the EG and the HL tasks (in the
cross-validity sense), and we can conclude that, in her case, the two incentive-compatible
measures of risk preferences do not cross validate and map into each other.
Building upon this, it is also possible to link the survey data on the individual levels of
background income W , and the actual choices in the EG and the HL experimental tasks
for all respondents in our UK representative sample, in order to calculate the sample
distribution of the above defined thresholds (Figure 3·5). It is useful to remind that for
the HL task, the thresholds are upper bounds of the CRRA values for the subjects who
choose lottery B at that level of the probability p of the high prize. In the EG task,
however, the thresholds are lower bounds of the CRRA values for the subjects who prefer,
say, lottery A to B. Moreover, it is worthwhile to remind that, in the EG task, any
respondent who is risk averse or risk neutral (i.e. for any CRRA value equal or above
zero) should always prefer lottery E to lottery F, because the two lotteries have exactly
the same expected value, but lottery F has a larger variance.
As it can be seen, and consistently to what observed in 3.6.4, the sample distributions
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of the thresholds visually confirm that, unlike in the EG task, the range of CRRA val-
ues spanned by the HL task includes risk aversion, risk neutrality, but also risk seeking
preferences. The ranges of CRRA values spanned by the HL tasks with low and high mon-
etary stakes are, however, quite different, with the range being broader with low monetary
stakes. Both ranges, moreover, are different from the range of CRRA values spanned by
the EG task.
The information about the sample distributions of the thresholds can also be combined
graphically. For instance, consider again the choices in the EG task and the HL task with
low monetary stakes. Consider, for illustration purposes, the sub-sample of subjects who
choose lottery B in the HL task at the various levels of the probability p of getting the high
lottery prize, and who choose lotteries A, B, C, D, or E in the EG task. Next, calculate
the upper bound of the CRRA values that is consistent with a subject choosing lottery
B in the HL task, and the lower bound of the CRRA values that is implied by choosing
lottery A, B, C, D, or E in the EG task. These two bounds can thus be directly compared
against each other as illustrated in Figure 3·6. The individual choices that are consistent
across the EG and the HL tasks in the cross-validity sense are clearly the choices in which
the upper bound of the CRRA values implied by the HL choice is above the lower bound
of the CRRA values implied by the EG choice. For instance, the subjects who choose
lottery D in the EG task and choose lottery B in the HL task when p = 0.3 do not behave
consistently in the sense that the two ranges of CRRA values are clearly incompatible:
choosing lottery D in the EG task is justified when the CRRA coefficient is greater than
2, whereas choosing lottery B in the HL task is justified when the CRRA coefficient is less
than -2, which are obviously mutually incompatible conditions. Among the subjects who
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choose lottery D in task EG, only the ones who choose lottery B in the HL task when the
probability is at least as high as p = 0.7 behave consistently: only for those subjects, in
fact, the upper bound of the CRRA values is above the lower bound. By a similar type of
reasoning, it can be seen that any subject that chooses the B lottery at some point in the
HL task and chooses the A lottery in the EG task behaves inconsistently across the two
tasks, since the upper bound for the HL task is never above the lower bound for the EG
task. As described in 3.6.1, about a third of the subjects in IP6 chose lottery A in EG.
Based on these arguments, and under the assumption of a CRRA utility function, it
is possible to classify each subject in our sample as a person who behaves consistently or
inconsistently across the EG and the HL tasks, where consistency here means that the
ranges of CRRA values implied by the EG and HL tasks overlap and map into each other
in the cross-validity sense.7
For the sake of clarity, consider only the subjects who in the HL task never switch
back to option A after they have chosen option B at some point. As mentioned above,
there are 453 subjects who never switched back in the HL questions in IP6. For those
subjects it is possible to calculate the upper bounds of the CRRA values consistent with
choosing lottery B at different levels of the probability p when the monetary stakes are
either high or low. For the subjects who never switch back, in fact, individual choices in
a subset of the HL questions can be ordered in terms of the points in which the subjects
switch to lottery B in that set of questions. For a given subject, it is then possible to test
whether the upper bound of the CRRA values implied by the point in which she switches
to lottery B in the HL questions with either low or high monetary stakes is consistent with
7This is thus different from the meaning of consistency as never switching back in the HL tasks.
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the analogous lower bound of the CRRA values implied by her choice in the EG task. This
allows to calculate the proportion of the subjects for which the responses to the subset of
the HL questions with low or high monetary stakes are consistent to their choices in the
EG task in terms of the implied ranges of CRRA values.
Table 3.30 reports this information for the low and high monetary stakes HL questions
under the assumption that each respondent in our sample has the same “background
income” level of W = 0. The cells in the table reports the number of subjects making
those choices in the EG and HL tasks. The highlighted cells in the table are the ones
where the ranges of CRRA values implied by the EG and the HL tasks overlap to each
other, so that the respondents make “consistent choices” in cross-validity terms.
Table 3.31 reports the information using the individual-specific levels of background
income calculated from the linked UKHLS data. The highlighted cells in the Table are
again the ones where the ranges of CRRA values implied by the EG and the HL tasks
overlap each other, so that the respondents make “consistent choices” in cross-validity
terms when the level of background income is assumed to be W = 0 for each respondent.
The proportions in the highlighted cells report the proportions of the respondents in the
corresponding cells of the table when W = 0 is assumed, who still make “consistent
choices” when their actual individual-specific levels of background income are taken into
account. For instance, there are only 2 subjects who switch to lottery B when p = 0.8 in
the HL questions with low monetary stakes, and who choose lottery D in the EG task.
When W = 0 is assumed to be the level of background income for all respondents, both
such subjects can be seen as making consistent choices in cross-validity terms in the EG
and HL tasks. Both subjects (100%) can still be viewed as making consistent choices in
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cross-validity terms when their actual levels of background income is considered.
Table 3.31 reports the information using the individual-specific levels of background
income calculated from the linked UKHLS data. The highlighted cells in the Table are
again the ones where the ranges of CRRA values implied by the EG and the HL tasks
overlap each other, so that the respondents make “consistent choices” in cross-validity
terms when the level of background income is assumed to be W = 0 for each respondent.
The proportions of the highlighted cells in Table 3.31 report the proportions of the respon-
dents in the corresponding cells of the Table 3.30 when W = 0 is assumed, who still make
“consistent choices” when their actual individual-specific levels of background income are
taken into account. For instance, there are only 2 subjects who switch to lottery B when
p =0.8 in the HL questions with low monetary stakes, and who choose lottery D in the EG
task. When W = 0 is assumed to be the level of background income for all respondents,
both such subjects can be seen as making consistent choices in cross-validity terms in
the EG and HL tasks (Table 3.30 ). Both subjects (100%) can still be viewed as making
consistent choices in cross-validity terms when their actual levels of background income is
considered (Table 3.31 ).
As it can be seen, in IP6 around two thirds (65.1% assuming W = 0; 64.7% using the
individual-specific levels of background income) of the subjects who never switched back
in the HL task with low monetary stakes are inconsistent in cross-validity terms, in the
sense that the CRRA values implied by their responses to the HL set of questions with
low monetary stakes are incompatible with the range of CRRA values implied by their
own responses in the EG task. Similarly, in the IP6 HL task with high monetary stakes,
more than two thirds (69.9% assuming W = 0; 66% using the individual-specific levels
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of background income) of the subjects who never switched back are inconsistent in the
sense that their CRRA values are incompatible with the range of CRRA values implied by
their responses in the EG task. These proportions are somewhat lower for the respondents
who chose to never switch to lottery B in the HL tasks (41.8% and 22.8% of the choices
in the low and monetary stakes questions, respectively). Considering the actual levels
of individual-specific levels of background income (instead of the same level of W = 0
for all respondents) lead to some differences in the conclusions in terms of cross-validity
consistency, but the differences are not substantial.
The analysis of the EG and HL responses, therefore, suggests that, once the specific
levels of background income are accounted for, at least two thirds of our respondents (the
ones who never switch back in the HL task) make inconsistent choices in cross-validity
terms, in the sense that the CRRA values implied by their responses to the HL task are
incompatible with the range of CRRA values implied by their own responses in the EG
task. A similar analysis for the responses across the HL questions with high and low
monetary stakes is developed in Appendix G and in Table G.1. As it can be seen, in IP6
around 31.6% of the subjects who never switched back in the HL task are inconsistent
in cross-validity terms, in the sense that the CRRA values implied by their responses to
the two sets of questions with low and high monetary stakes are incompatible with each
other.
Ordered probit estimations: SOEP on EG and HL tasks (and controls)
We next run a set of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are the
responses to the various SOEP questions and where the explanatory variables are the EG
and HL tasks, possibly together with a set of characteristics (defined in 3.4.4) that we also
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use in the structural estimations (3.6.6). This allows to replicate the cross-validity analysis
in a regression framework and to systematically look at the way the responses to the
different tests map into each other when the analysis controls for individual heterogeneity.
Responses to the three SOEP questions, in fact, are naturally ordered taking values
from 0 (unwilling to take risks in general, in finance, and in health) to 10 (fully prepared
to take risks in general, in finance, and in health).
Responses to the EG task are also naturally ordered, taking values from 1 (choosing
lottery A) to 6 (choosing lottery F). This specific modeling of the EG explanatory variable
assumes that the effect of going from 1 (the safe lottery A) to 2 (the mildly risky lottery
B) is the same of going from 5 (the risky lottery E) to 6 (the strongly risky lottery F).
To maximize comparability with the EG and the SOEP tasks (and in analogy to what
described above) we present responses to the HL tasks in terms of switching points from
lottery A to lottery B, taking values from 1 (switching to lottery B immediately, in the
first binary option presented when p = 0.1) to 10 (never switching to lottery B). This
specific modeling of the HL explanatory variable, therefore, assumes that the effect of
going from switching point 1 (choosing lottery B immediately when p = 0.1) to switching
point 2 (switching to lottery B when p = 0.2) is the same of going from switching point 9
(switching to lottery B when p = 0.9) to switching point 10 (never choosing lottery B).
We report the results from all subjects, and then separately for the subjects who never
switch back. All models are estimated with and without sampling weights.8
We start with the IP6 regressions where the dependent variables are the responses to
the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H tasks. The first set of regressions uses the responses
8Ordered probit estimations for cross-validity in IP7 are discussed in Appendix H, and in what follows
we focus on IP6.
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to either the EG task, or the switching point in the HL tasks with high or low monetary
stakes as the only explanatory variables.
From these estimations for IP6, reported in Tables 3.32-3.36 , it can be seen that
the EG task is significantly and positively associated with the SOEP-F willingness to
take financial risks, both when using and not using sampling weights: choosing riskier
lotteries in the EG task is associated with self-reporting higher levels of risk in finance. In
the estimations without sampling weights there are also significant positive associations
between the EG task and the SOEP-G and SOEP-H questions, although the effect for
the SOEP-G is only marginally significant when using sampling weights. The associations
between EG and SOEP tasks are statistically significant, and stronger, also when the
analysis focuses on the consistent subjects who never switch back in the HL task.
The switching point in the HL task is not significantly associated to any of the SOEP
questions when all respondents are considered. When, however, the analysis focuses on
the consistent subjects, there is a significant negative association between the switching
point in the HL task and the SOEP-F question, and a marginally significant negative
association with the SOEP-G question in the estimations without sampling weights: the
subjects who in the HL task switched to the riskier lottery B later in the sequence of the
different pairwise choices, also reported lower willingness to take risks in financial matters
and in general. There is no significant association between the HL task and the SOEP-H
health.
The next set of regressions include as explanatory variables both the responses to the
EG task and the first switching points in the HL task with high or low monetary stakes,
and is reported in Tables 3.32-3.36. The responses to the EG task are positively and
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highly significantly associated to the SOEP-F: choosing riskier lotteries in the EG task
is associated with self-reporting higher levels of risk in finance. This holds both when
using and not using sampling weights. In the regressions using sampling weights there
is also a positive and significant association between the responses to the EG task and
the SOEP-H. In general, the association between the EG and the SOEP-G task is only
marginally or not significant when using sampling weights.
There is again little association between the SOEP measures and the first switching
points in the HL task. The only exception are the first switching points in the HL task
with high monetary stakes which are negatively and highly significantly associated with
the SOEP-G.
The next set of estimations include further explanatory variables in the ordered probit
models. Three results are to be noted. First, the introduction of further explanatory
variables does not alter the key cross-measures associations described above. In particular,
even controlling for a broad range of variables and characteristics, the responses to the
EG task are positively and highly significantly associated to the SOEP-F, and the first
switching points in the HL task with high monetary stakes are negatively and highly
significantly associated with the SOEP-G.
Second, age and gender are systematically associated to responses to the SOEP tasks.
In the estimations controlling for the HL responses with both low and high monetary
stakes, older and female respondents tend to self-report significantly lower willingness to
take risks in all the SOEP questions (with the exception of the SOEP-H). This set of
results is generally in line with what documented for SOEP measures in a representative
sample of the German population by Josef et al. (2016).
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Third, there is an effect of the per-capita household income on the SOEP-H: respon-
dents with higher levels of per capita income report higher willingness to take risks in
health both when using and not using sampling weights. There is, however, no statisti-
cally significant association between respondents’ income and self-reported willingness to
take risks in general and in financial matters. This set of results is also in line with what
documented for a representative sample of the German population by Josef et al. (2016)
who also do not find any significant association of income with responses to the SOEP
questions.
For the consistent subjects who never switched back in the HL task, the responses to
the EG task is also positively and significantly associated with SOEP-G and SOEP-H.
Structural estimation
We now present ML structural estimations of the risk preferences parameters under the
assumption that EUT holds and that respondents’ utility function is a CRRA specification.
We start presenting estimations using data from the HL or the EG task. We finally consider
joint structural estimations of risk preferences where all data from both the EG and the
HL tasks are pooled together to contribute to the likelihood function, controlling for a
dummy variable EG for the responses to the EG task. All estimations are obtained using
individual-specific values of the daily background household income calculated from the
linked UKHLS survey. The structural estimations are conducted either using or not using
sampling weights.
In light of what illustrated in 3.6.4, when structurally estimating the CRRA coefficients
using, separately, the EG or the HL data, one should expect a higher estimated CRRA
coefficient from the EG data than from the HL tasks. Moreover, while the structural
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estimations using the EG data should reveal a positive correlation between the CRRA
coefficient and the level of background income W , the estimates of the HL data may
reveal no association with W .
Structural estimations using either HL or EG data We first structurally estimate
risk preferences using data from either the EG or the HL task separately. We present two
sets of estimations, using or not using sampling weights. In both sets of estimations, we
first estimate the CRRA coefficient r without controlling for any other characteristics, and
present it together with the estimated Fechner error µ(r). We then replicate the estima-
tions allowing the CRRA r to linearly depend on a vector X of characteristics, r = r0+R
′X
where r0 and R are parameters to be estimated. In the baseline model for r we include
in the vector X a dummy variable for the WEB interview mode (WEB), and, for the HL
data, also a dummy variable for the high monetary stakes questions (HighStakes). In the
extended model, we also include in the vector X a range of respondents’ characteristics
linked from the survey data, such as the size of the family (FamSize), a dummy variable
for the respondent’s gender (Female), the respondent’s age and age squared (Age, and
AgeSq, respectively), the level of respondent’s education (ALevel), and the log of the
household per capita income (PCIncome).
Results for the estimated models are reported in Tables 3.37 and 3.38 without sam-
pling weights, and with sampling weights, respectively. By comparing the two sets of
estimations, it can be seen that the estimated CRRA coefficients obtained in the two
cases are substantially similar in sign and magnitude. Subjects in our sample are clearly
risk averse using either HL or EG data. Both sets of estimations, moreover, show that the
estimated CRRA coefficient is substantially higher in the EG task than in the HL task:
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r = 5.691 versus r = 0.456 without sampling weights, and r = 5.537 versus r = 0.370 with
sampling weights. This reflects the difference in the elicitation methods between the EG
and the HL tasks. As discussed above, in fact, the range of values spanned by the EG
task only includes risk aversion and risk neutrality, and excludes by construction the case
of risk seeking preferences. Moreover, as illustrated above, in our representative sample of
respondents with heterogeneous levels of background income, the range of CRRA values
implied by the EG and HL tasks do not perfectly overlap each other. The estimations,
moreover, suggest that the estimated Fechner errors are significantly different from zero
in the HL task, implying that subjects made behavioral errors in the HL risk preferences
task. Furthermore, the structural estimations without sampling weights show that respon-
dents allocated to the WEB response mode gave significantly more risk averse answers in
the EG task than subjects allocated to the traditional F2F mode, whereas there is no
response mode effect in the HL task. In the estimations without sampling weights, more-
over, subjects from smaller households and with higher levels of daily per capita income
gave more risk averse responses in the EG task. The latter effect is also in line with what
expected from the illustration of the CRRA thresholds in Appendix G. All these effects in
the EG task, however, vanish or become marginally significant when the estimations use
sampling weights.
Structural estimations with EG and HL data We next present joint structural
estimations of risk preferences where all data from both the EG and the HL tasks are
pooled together to contribute to the likelihood function, controlling for a dummy variable
for the responses to the EG task. We present again two sets of estimations, using or
not using sampling weights. In both sets of estimations, we first estimate the CRRA
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coefficient r together with the estimated coefficients of the EG task dummy variable (EG)
and of the estimated Fechner error µ(r). We then replicate the estimations allowing the
CRRA r to linearly depend on the above vector X of characteristics, where r0 and R
are parameters to be estimated. Similarly, in these estimations we allow the Fechner
error parameter to also depend on the EG task dummy variable (EG). Moreover, in the
extended models, we allow the Fechner error parameter µ(r) to also linearly depend on a
vector W of individual characteristics, µ(r) = µ(r0) +M(r)
′W where µ(r0) and M(r) are
parameters to be estimated. In particular, we include in the vector W dummy variables
for the WEB interview mode, and for the different quartiles of the response times in those
questions (RT2 to RT4 as defined above).
Results for the estimated models are reported in Table 3.39. Comparing the two sets of
estimations without and with sampling weights, the estimated CRRA coefficients obtained
in the two cases are substantially similar in sign and magnitude. Subjects in our sample
are clearly risk averse using the data from the HL and EG task. Moreover, and consistently
with the analysis of the CRRA thresholds in Appendix G and with the separate estimations
of the HL or EG data, the estimated CRRA coefficient is significantly and substantially
higher in the EG task than in the HL task: 5.235 without sampling weights, and 5.167 with
sampling weights, with a size comparable to the analogous estimates using the EG data
only. When the estimations do not use sampling weights, there is a significant positive
association between per capita level of background income and risk aversion, in line to
what documented above.
Furthermore, both sets of estimations suggest that the estimated Fechner errors are sig-
nificantly different from zero in both tasks, implying that subjects made behavioral errors
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in the EG and HL tasks. The estimated Fechner errors, moreover, are significantly larger
in the EG task when estimations do not use sampling weights (although only marginally
significantly so while using sampling weights). Furthermore, the structural estimations
both with and without sampling weights show that respondents allocated to the WEB
response perceived more neatly the difference between the expected utilities of the lotter-
ies in the HL and EG tasks (a sort of “telescopic” effect) and thus had lower “noise” in
their choices. There is generally no significant association of the Fechner error with the
response times (except for subjects in the third quartile of the distribution of response
times).
3.6.7 External validity
We finally look at the issue of external validity of the three measures of risk preferences.
To do so, we compare associations with a range of observable individual characteristics by
running three sets of ordered probit regressions, in each of which the dependent variables
are the responses in either the EG, or the HL, or the SOEP tasks.
Responses to the three SOEP questions take values from 0 (unwilling to take risks
in general, in finance, and in health) to 10 (fully prepared to take risks in general, in
finance, and in health). Responses in the EG task take values from 1 (choosing lottery A)
to 6 (choosing lottery F). Responses to the HL tasks are presented in terms of the first
switching points from lottery A to lottery B, taking values from 1 (switching to lottery B
immediately, in the first binary option presented when p = 0.1) to 10 (never switching to
lottery B).
The explanatory variables are a set of individual behaviors from the linked UKHLS
data which may be conceptually associated to individual risk preferences. We focus, in
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particular, on health and financial behaviors.
For health behaviors, we look at the above defined dummy variables for smoking, drink-
ing, and having chronic diseases or medical conditions. These estimations are conducted
for both IP6 and IP7.
We also conduct wave-specific set of regressions taking advantage of the fact that in IP6
we have variables for the BMI, and dummy variables for eating fast food, dieting, engaging
in physical activities, and for whether the respondents are regular savers, have a privately
funded pension, or a pension co-funded by the employer, while in IP7 we have information
on the DOSPERT test for domain-specific hypothetical risk taking situations.9
As it can be seen from Table 3.40 , in IP6 the responses to the EG and the HL tasks are
not associated to any of the three health-related dummy variables for smoking, drinking,
and having chronic diseases or medical conditions. There is no significant association
between health variables and EG and HL risk preferences measures regardless of whether
or not sampling weights are used, or whether all respondents or only the consistent subjects
are considered for the estimations.
There is statistically significant association between the SOEP measures and the alco-
hol drinking status: subjects who regularly drink alcohol self-report higher willingness to
take risks in general, in health, and even in financial matters. The effect is significant and
robust also when the analysis controls for a set of other individual characteristics such as
age, gender, marital status, education, income, employment status, and interview mode,
when it focuses on the consistent subjects, and when it uses sampling weights.
When the analysis focuses only on the consistent subjects who never switched back
9All models are estimated with and without sampling weights.
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in the HL task and uses sampling weights, there is a significant association between the
SOEP-G measure and the smoking status which is robust to the introduction to further
controls: smokers self-report higher willingness to take risks in general. For these consis-
tent subjects there is also a marginally significant association between smoking status and
SOEP-F when sampling weights are not used.
We have also estimated ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are
the responses to the EG, HL, and SOEP tasks, and the explanatory variables are the
IP6-specific variable for BMI, and the dummy variables for eating fast food, dieting, and
engaging in physical activity. The results are in Table 3.41 and 3.42. As it can be seen,
the EG and HL measures for risk preferences are not statistically associated to any of
those health-related behaviors. There is also no association between the SOEP measures
and the BMI, nor between the SOEP measures and the dieting status. There is, however,
a positive and significant association between SOEP willingness to take risk measures
and eating fast food. For the SOEP-H measure, the association is highly significant even
controlling for a range of other individual characteristics.
The finding that risk preferences are significantly associated with nutritional behavior
but not with the BMI confirms the similar findings by Galizzi and Miraldo (2012) calcu-
lating the Healthy Eating Index (HEI) for a sample of UK students. Moreover, the lack of
association between smoking and risk preferences measures adds to the evidence cumulat-
ing from a number of studies that have failed to find significant correlations between risk
preferences and smoking (Yi, Chase, and Bickel, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007; Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstrm, 2010; Mitchell (1999); Galizzi and Miraldo (2012); Szrek et al. (2012);
Harrison et al. (2015)).
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The ordered probit estimations in Table 3.43, moreover, suggest that the choices in the
EG and the HL tasks are significantly associated with the decision of having a privately
funded pension: respondents with a private pension scheme make riskier choices in the
EG and the HL experimental tasks, by choosing riskier lotteries in EG, or by switching
earlier to the risky lottery B in HL. This association is significant also when the analysis
controls for the respondents’ income, as well as for a set of other characteristics such as
gender, age, marital status, and education. The EG and HL measures are not associated
with being a regular saver or having an employer-funded pension scheme. Furthermore,
none of these risk-related financial behaviors is significantly associated with the responses
to the SOEP questions, not just the willingness to take risks in general (or in health) but
even in finance (Table 3.44).
Looking at the associations with the DOSPERT test in IP7, it can be seen that the
responses to the HL task with low monetary stakes are significantly but positively associ-
ated with the self-assessed likelihood of investing speculatively: respondents who are more
likely to invest 5% of their income in a speculative stock tend to switch to lottery B later
in the series of questions, thus manifesting higher risk aversion. There is no association
between the responses to the HL tasks and any other self-assessed likelihood of engaging
in domain-specific risk-taking behavior (Tables 3.45 and 3.46).
It can also be seen that choosing a riskier lottery in the EG task is significantly and
positively associated with the self-assessed likelihood of investing 10% of the income in a
mutual fund. There is no other significant association of the EG task with domain-specific
risk-taking behavior (Table 3.47).
In contrast, there is a systematic pattern of highly significant and positive associations
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between the SOEP-G and all the domain-specific risk-taking behaviors measured by the
DOSPERT test. When all the risk-taking behaviors in the same domain are included in the
regressions together, there are significant associations between the likelihood of investing
10% of the income in a business activity or walking home alone in an unsafe area and
self-reporting higher willingness to take risks in general, even when the analysis controls
for income and other individual characteristics (Table 3.48). The same two risk-taking
behaviors are significantly and positively associated with the SOEP-F measure. More
generally, the SOEP-F measure of taking risk in finance is positively and significantly
associated with all the DOSPERT risk-taking behaviors in the financial domain, and with
most of the behaviors in the health domain (with the exception of riding a motorcycle
without a helmet, (Table 3.49). Similarly, the SOEP-H measure of taking risk in health
is positively and significantly associated with all the DOSPERT risk-taking behaviors in
the health domain (and in particular with the self-assessed likelihood of drinking heavily
in a social event), and also with some the risk-taking behaviors in the financial domain
(namely the likelihood of betting in horse races and in sports) (Table 3.50).
All in all, the mixed results from both IP6 and IP7 (Appendix I) about the links
between risk preferences measures and “risky” behaviors in health and finance confirms the
above discussed caution in concluding that systematic statistical associations exist between
experimental measures of risk preferences based on financial lotteries such as the EG and
the HL tasks, and risky behaviors in health, such as drinking, smoking, or unhealthy
eating. Both the EG and the HL tasks, however, are significantly and systematically
associated with the decision of funding a private pension scheme. Conversely, the SOEP
survey questions seem to associate with risky behaviors in health, but are not associated
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to any of the risky behaviors in finance. While there are rather limited associations
between the EG and HL measures and the DOSPERT test, the latter is significantly and
systematically associated with the SOEP questions.
The fact that different risk preferences measures can capture different aspects of risk-
taking is generally consistent with the idea that individual attitudes for risk are inherently
multi-faceted and largely domain-specific: Galizzi et al. (2016b) provide a recent review of
the evidence on the stability of risk preferences across different decision-making domains.
3.7 Conclusions
Using a nationally representative sample of respondents within the Innovation Panel of the
UKHLS, we have systematically looked at the stability and validity of the EG, HL, and
SOEP risk preferences measures along three directions: over time (temporal stability); at
a given point in time across different methods (cross validity); and in terms of the degree
to which they associate with a range of field behaviors (external validity).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that has systematically looked at all
the three validity dimensions together using a representative sample of the population and
explicitly accounting for the fact that respondents in a representative sample integrate the
experimental prizes within heterogeneous individual-specific levels of background income.
We have three main findings. First, concerning temporal stability, we find significant
but low correlations of responses to the EG, HL, and SOEP tasks across the two waves.
When presented the same EG, HL, and SOEP tasks in IP7, less than one third, less than
one fourth, and between one fourth and one fifth of the respondents, respectively, chose
the same option they chose in the previous year.
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Second, concerning cross validity, there is generally high heterogeneity in the individual
responses to the three risk preferences measures. When respondents integrate the EG or
the HL experimental prizes within heterogeneous levels of background income calculated
from the linked UKHLS data, at least two thirds of the respondents who acted coherently
in the IP6 HL task, make inconsistent choices in cross validity terms, in the sense that the
CRRA values implied by their responses to the HL task are incompatible with the range
of CRRA values implied by their own responses in the EG task. Maximum Likelihood
structural estimations of risk preferences return an estimated CRRA coefficient that is
significantly and substantially higher in the EG task than in the HL task. Furthermore,
while the responses to the EG task are positive and significantly associated to the SOEP-F,
there is little association between the SOEP measures and the HL task.
Finally, we find mixed evidence concerning the external validity of the three risk pref-
erences measures, especially considering health behaviors. In particular, none of the three
risk preferences measures is associated to the respondents’ BMI or smoking status, and
there is no, or little, association between the EG and HL tasks and a broad range of other
health-related variables. The SOEP questions seem to associate with few health behav-
iors, as well as with several hypothetical risk-taking situations in the health and finance
domains measured by the DOSPERT test. On the other hand, both the EG and the HL
tasks are highly significantly associated with the decision of having a privately funded
pension.
All in all, the evidence on the overall validity of the three risk preferences measures is
rather mixed. On the one hand, all three measures show significant test-retest correlations
across the two subsequent waves of data collection. Each of the measures, moreover, seem
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to significantly associate to some risky behavior in the field: the EG and HL measures
associate with having a private pension, while the SOEP measures associate with a range
of hypothetical risk-taking situations in health and finance.
On the other hand, although significant, the test-retest correlations are low. None
of the three risk preferences measures is associated with variables of key health policy
interest such as the respondents’ BMI or the smoking status. More generally, virtually
no risky health behavior is correlated with the EG or the HL tasks, and few of them
are correlated with the SOEP measures. Moreover, the way in which the three different
risk preferences measures correlate and map into each other is imperfect at best, espe-
cially when the analysis accounts for the fact that respondents in a representative sample
integrate experimental prizes within individual-specific levels of background income.
Caution should thus be in order when using one specific risk preferences measure to
draw conclusions about the various, inevitably multifaceted, dimensions of individual risk-
taking in different contexts, especially for representative samples of the population that,
unlike conventional student subjects, are highly heterogeneous in their levels of background
income and of other socio-economic conditions.
Of course, further research is needed to test whether similar conclusions hold for more
general models of risk preferences beyond the reference EUT case considered here, or when
risk preferences are structurally estimated jointly with time preferences or using mixtures
or Bayesian models (Harrison et al., 2009; Bruhin et al., 2010; Wakker, 2010; Conte et al.,
2011; Balcombe and Fraser, 2015; Galizzi et al., 2016a; Andersen et al., 2008b, 2014).
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Table 3.6: Choices in the EG task
Payoff Expected Standard All Subjects
Low High Return Deviation Total Fraction
1 28 28 28 0 230 35.11
2 24 36 30 8.5 64 9.77
3 20 44 32 17 120 18.32
4 16 52 34 25.5 84 12.82
5 12 60 36 33.9 53 8.09
6 2 70 36 48.1 104 15.88
Total 655
Table 3.7: Responses to SOEP Questions
General Financial Health
Choice Total Fraction Total Fraction Total Fraction
Missing 26 3.93 27 4.08 26 3.93
Unwilling 22 3.33 68 10.29 84 12.71
1 46 6.96 98 14.83 77 11.65
2 71 10.74 110 16.64 123 18.61
3 86 13.01 84 12.71 89 13.46
4 69 10.44 65 9.83 57 8.62
5 113 17.1 82 12.41 67 10.14
6 50 7.56 28 4.24 37 5.6
7 70 10.59 44 6.66 39 5.9
8 49 7.41 16 2.42 21 3.18
9 11 1.66 3 0.45 2 0.3
Fully Prepared 16 2.42 4 0.61 6 0.91
Total 629 629 628
Notes - 32 respondents were classified as inapplicable.
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Table 3.8: Cross-methods pairwise correlations in IP6 and IP7
IP6
EG Choice HL Switching Point Survey
Low Stakes High Stakes General Financial
HL Switching Point
Low Stakes -0.1456
(0.0002)
[655]
High Stakes -0.2076 0.6841
(0.000) (0.000)
[654] [654]
Survey
General 0.0237 -0.0284 -0.1054
(0.5445) (0.4669) (0.0069)
[655] [658] [655]
Financial 0.0493 -0.0425 -0.093 0.8725
(0.2078) (0.2769) (0.0173) (0.000)
[655] [658] [655] [661]
Health 0.0179 -0.0135 -0.0645 0.8642 0.8544
(0.6478) (0.7289) (0.0992) (0.000) (0.000)
[655] [658] [655] [661] [661]
IP7
EG Choice HL Switching Point Survey
Low Stakes High Stakes General Financial
HL Switching Point
Low Stakes -0.1801
(0.0001)
[468]
High Stakes -0.1873 0.5709
(0.000) (0.000)
[468] [468]
Survey
General 0.0299 -0.0137 -0.0102
(0.518) (0.7669) (0.8263)
[468] [468] [468]
Financial 0.0602 -0.0023 -0.0086 0.8121
(0.194) (0.9604) (0.8521) (0.000)
[468] [468] [468] [468]
Health 0.0317 0.0366 0.0471 0.7781 0.7794
(0.494) (0.43) (0.3097) (0.000) (0.000)
[468] [468] [468] [468] [468]
Notes - Number of observations in square brackets; p-value in brackets.
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Table 3.9: Cross-methods pairwise correlations for respondents in both
IP6 and IP7
EG Choice HL Switching Point
Lotteries IP6 IP7 IP6 IP7
Low Stakes High Stakes Low Stakes
EG Choice
IP7 0.1731
(0.0004)
[409]
HL Switching Point
IP6 Low Stakes -0.1221 -0.256
(0.0134) (0.000)
[409] [412]
IP6 High Stakes -0.2137 -0.1269 0.6825
(0.000) (0.0103) (0.000)
[408] [408] [408]
IP7 Low Stakes -0.0427 -0.1828 0.1882 0.1515
(0.3893) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0021)
[409] [413] [412] [408]
IP7 High Stakes -0.0652 -0.1831 0.1625 0.1855 0.5775
(0.1879) (0.000) (0.0009) (0.000) (0.000)
[409] [413] [412] [408] [413]
General Financial Health
Survey IP6 IP7 IP6 IP7 IP6
General IP7 0.257
(0.000)
[413]
Financial IP6 0.2007
(0.000)
[413]
Financial IP7 0.2036 0.2483
(0.000) (0.000)
[413] [413]
Health IP6 0.1841 0.1644
(0.000) (0.000)
[413] [413]
Health IP7 0.1944 0.1928 0.2459
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[413] [413] [413]
Notes - Number of observations in square brackets; p-value in brackets (no clustering).
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Figure 3·1: Relative risk aversion thresholds by respondents income, EG
Figure 3·2: Relative risk aversion thresholds by respondents income, HL
low stakes
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Figure 3·3: Relative risk aversion thresholds by respondents income, HL
high stakes
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Table 3.10: Responses to the EG tasks in IP6 and IP7 (n=409)
IP7
IP6 A B C D E F Total
A 75 11 30 7 10 20 153
B 13 9 6 2 1 1 32
C 20 9 24 10 11 4 78
D 9 7 12 10 7 6 51
E 10 2 7 4 6 4 33
F 20 4 11 11 6 10 62
Total 147 42 90 44 41 45 409
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Table 3.11: Responses to the EG tasks in IP6 and IP7 (n=409) - IP6 HL
Consistency
HL IP6 Consistent
IP7
IP6 A B C D E F Total
A 60 8 24 4 9 11 116
B 9 6 2 1 0 1 19
C 15 9 19 8 5 3 59
D 5 5 6 5 3 3 27
E 6 1 4 3 4 4 22
F 16 3 6 7 3 7 42
Total 111 32 61 28 24 29 285
HL IP6 Inconsistent
IP7
IP6 A B C D E F Total
A 15 3 6 3 1 9 37
B 4 3 4 1 1 0 13
C 5 0 5 2 6 1 19
D 4 2 6 5 4 3 24
E 4 1 3 1 2 0 11
F 4 1 5 4 3 3 20
Total 36 10 29 16 17 16 124
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Table 3.12: Switching points in the HL task with low monetary stakes in
IP6 and IP7 (n=412)
HL IP6 All respondents
IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 15 10 9 4 4 7 1 1 5 12 68
2 10 10 8 3 6 1 5 2 0 4 49
3 6 9 2 2 4 2 0 1 2 8 36
4 4 5 2 6 8 2 2 4 1 2 36
5 5 8 2 4 6 3 1 3 2 4 38
6 7 3 1 5 7 4 1 5 1 2 36
7 1 4 1 2 3 4 6 5 4 3 33
8 1 1 0 2 0 0 3 2 2 4 15
9 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 18
Never 15 9 7 2 6 5 2 4 3 30 83
Total 66 62 33 32 46 30 23 29 21 70 412
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Table 3.13: Switching points in the HL task with low monetary stakes in
IP6 and IP7, by consistency in IP6 HL task
HL IP6 Consistent (never switch back)
Panel A IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 13 7 9 4 4 6 0 1 5 12 61
2 2 1 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 9
3 0 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 10
4 3 0 2 5 6 2 1 4 1 2 26
5 3 5 2 3 5 1 0 3 2 3 27
6 4 2 1 4 7 4 1 4 0 1 28
7 1 2 1 2 3 3 6 5 2 2 27
8 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 2 1 10
9 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 11
Never 13 9 6 2 6 5 2 4 3 29 79
Total 41 29 25 24 37 21 15 25 18 53 288
HL IP6 Inconsistent (switch back)
Panel B IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 7
2 8 9 5 3 4 1 5 2 0 3 40
3 6 7 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 7 26
4 1 5 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 10
5 2 3 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 11
6 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
7 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 6
8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
9 1 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 7
Never 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Total 25 33 8 8 9 9 8 4 3 17 124
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Table 3.14: Switching points in the HL task with high monetary stakes in
IP6 and IP7 (n=408)
HL IP6 All respondents
IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 27 13 6 4 9 4 4 3 0 18 88
2 6 6 10 3 3 3 1 0 1 8 41
3 2 2 4 3 0 2 0 1 1 6 21
4 7 3 2 4 6 3 3 1 3 1 33
5 12 6 4 8 13 6 6 3 1 6 65
6 6 4 1 4 6 4 5 1 0 1 32
7 5 0 3 3 3 5 2 0 2 5 28
8 1 3 0 2 1 2 3 2 0 4 18
9 3 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 9
Never 16 3 4 2 4 3 5 5 3 28 73
Total 85 40 34 34 47 32 29 17 12 78 408
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Table 3.15: Switching points in the HL task with high monetary stakes in
IP6 and IP7, by consistency in IP6 HL task
HL IP6 Consistent (never switch back)
Panel A IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 22 13 4 4 9 4 3 2 0 16 77
2 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 7
3 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 7
4 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 0 2 0 15
5 4 4 4 7 9 5 4 2 1 5 45
6 4 1 1 3 6 4 5 1 0 1 26
7 5 0 0 3 2 4 2 0 2 4 22
8 1 2 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 4 14
9 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 6
Never 13 3 4 2 3 2 5 4 3 26 65
Total 55 25 17 26 35 22 23 12 10 59 284
HL IP6 Inconsistent (switch back)
Panel B IP7
IP6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 7
2 8 9 5 3 4 1 5 2 0 3 40
3 6 7 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 7 26
4 1 5 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 10
5 2 3 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 11
6 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
7 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 6
8 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 5
9 1 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 7
Never 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Total 25 33 8 8 9 9 8 4 3 17 124
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Table 3.16: Responses to SOEP-G in IP6 and IP7 (n=359)
All respondents
IP7
General Risk 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 3 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 9
1 5 4 7 1 2 4 0 0 0 2 0 25
2 5 11 12 3 3 4 2 4 4 0 0 48
3 2 4 12 7 4 12 3 3 3 0 0 50
4 1 1 8 4 5 11 7 3 0 0 1 41
5 2 3 8 9 4 21 5 6 3 0 3 64
6 0 1 1 7 3 6 4 8 1 0 1 32
7 0 1 2 4 2 5 2 17 7 2 1 43
8 0 1 2 3 2 2 2 4 8 6 1 31
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 1 1 7
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 9
Total 18 27 55 39 25 66 28 46 30 12 13 359
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Table 3.17: Responses to SOEP-F in IP6 and IP7 (n=357)
All respondents
IP7
Financial Risk 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 16 9 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 34
1 18 17 7 4 2 4 1 0 1 1 0 55
2 15 18 16 7 3 7 2 1 1 0 1 71
3 5 8 14 9 8 7 3 1 2 0 0 57
4 4 3 8 5 0 8 4 2 0 0 1 35
5 5 4 9 3 6 12 4 2 2 0 0 47
6 1 0 3 1 0 7 4 2 0 0 0 18
7 0 0 1 5 2 6 5 3 2 1 0 25
8 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 10
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Total 65 59 62 35 21 54 26 13 12 3 7 357
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Table 3.18: Responses to SOEP-H in IP6 and IP7 (n=357)
All respondents
IP7
Health Risk 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 24 9 8 2 0 3 1 0 0 1 2 50
1 10 18 10 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 46
2 20 7 20 9 5 6 1 3 2 0 0 73
3 6 9 9 11 4 5 4 0 3 1 2 54
4 4 1 12 3 2 7 1 2 1 0 1 34
5 4 5 6 7 4 7 0 4 3 0 0 40
6 2 2 2 1 1 4 3 2 1 0 1 19
7 0 3 4 3 1 5 1 3 1 3 1 25
8 1 1 3 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 1 12
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 4
Total 71 55 74 39 18 41 14 14 17 6 8 357
168
T
a
b
le
3
.1
9
:
R
es
p
on
se
s
ac
ro
ss
th
e
E
G
an
d
th
e
S
O
E
P
-F
ta
sk
s
in
IP
6
an
d
IP
7
E
G
C
h
o
ic
e
S
O
E
P
-F
IP
6
IP
7
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
R
is
k
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
0
3
4
7
10
7
3
7
68
27
7
18
15
2
12
81
1
3
5
6
19
15
9
13
97
21
14
15
3
10
7
70
2
4
2
1
6
18
12
8
14
11
0
29
5
16
4
11
11
76
3
3
0
7
17
13
5
12
84
16
3
5
4
5
3
36
4
2
7
1
10
7
5
14
64
9
2
7
2
1
1
22
5
2
5
1
4
15
9
6
13
82
25
5
18
13
7
4
72
6
4
1
5
9
4
4
27
11
5
6
4
3
2
31
7
8
6
13
6
2
9
44
4
1
4
2
3
4
18
8
6
1
2
0
3
4
16
4
0
6
1
0
2
13
9
0
0
1
1
0
1
3
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
1
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
4
3
1
0
0
3
1
8
T
ot
al
2
1
1
5
9
11
2
79
45
93
59
9
14
9
43
96
48
46
48
43
0
169
T
a
b
le
3
.2
0
:
R
es
p
on
se
s
ac
ro
ss
th
e
E
G
an
d
th
e
S
O
E
P
-G
ta
sk
s
in
IP
6
an
d
IP
7
E
G
C
h
o
ic
e
S
O
E
P
-G
IP
6
IP
7
G
en
er
a
l
R
is
k
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
0
1
1
3
3
2
1
2
22
8
4
3
4
0
2
21
1
2
2
3
7
3
3
8
46
8
4
8
2
3
5
30
2
2
4
1
1
10
12
7
7
71
28
6
12
7
8
11
72
3
3
3
6
17
11
7
11
85
15
2
7
4
7
8
43
4
2
2
8
15
8
4
12
69
9
3
9
5
3
2
31
5
3
9
9
19
18
11
16
11
2
29
5
27
9
7
8
85
6
1
9
5
9
6
3
8
50
11
7
4
6
5
1
34
7
1
9
9
14
9
4
14
69
21
5
12
4
6
4
52
8
1
3
3
11
8
4
10
49
14
5
7
3
2
4
35
9
4
0
4
0
1
2
11
3
0
6
1
2
1
13
10
5
2
3
2
1
3
16
4
2
1
3
3
2
15
T
o
ta
l
21
1
5
9
11
2
79
46
93
60
0
15
0
43
96
48
46
48
43
1
170
T
a
b
le
3
.2
1
:
R
es
p
on
se
s
ac
ro
ss
th
e
E
G
an
d
th
e
S
O
E
P
-H
ta
sk
s
in
IP
6
an
d
IP
7
E
G
C
h
o
ic
e
S
O
E
P
-H
IP
6
IP
7
H
ea
lt
h
R
is
k
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
A
B
C
D
E
F
T
ot
al
0
32
11
17
11
3
10
84
28
9
21
10
7
12
87
1
31
5
13
6
10
12
77
24
6
11
8
6
6
61
2
51
14
17
19
6
16
12
3
28
12
19
13
10
16
98
3
29
8
13
14
10
14
88
18
3
12
3
7
3
46
4
21
5
13
8
3
7
57
7
3
6
4
1
0
21
5
22
2
10
9
7
16
66
20
5
14
1
5
7
52
6
7
5
7
4
3
11
37
6
1
3
2
2
0
14
7
9
4
14
6
4
2
39
7
3
2
2
3
0
17
8
8
2
5
1
0
5
21
6
0
4
3
2
2
17
9
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
4
0
3
0
1
0
8
1
0
0
3
3
0
0
0
6
1
1
1
2
2
2
9
T
ot
al
2
11
59
11
2
79
46
93
60
0
14
9
43
96
48
46
48
43
0
171
Table 3.22: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-G tasks in IP6
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-G Low Stakes
General Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 4 4 2 1 0 2 1 3 0 5 22
1 5 9 2 3 6 3 2 0 1 15 46
2 10 8 7 6 8 8 3 2 1 18 71
3 13 4 13 12 14 2 6 1 3 18 86
4 13 12 3 5 6 4 5 1 5 15 69
5 20 19 9 9 10 11 6 2 1 26 113
6 8 5 5 2 7 4 5 4 2 8 50
7 14 7 7 4 6 5 5 4 3 14 69
8 11 3 4 6 6 4 1 3 4 7 49
9 4 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 2 11
10 5 2 0 2 0 2 1 0 2 2 16
Total 107 73 53 50 64 45 38 20 22 130 602
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-G High Stakes
General Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 4 6 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 6 22
1 8 5 6 1 6 2 3 1 0 14 46
2 12 5 3 5 8 7 4 2 2 23 71
3 16 8 4 6 20 6 4 0 5 16 85
4 22 6 1 3 6 7 1 7 1 15 69
5 31 14 6 8 16 9 5 2 1 19 111
6 7 6 2 9 4 4 4 5 3 6 50
7 14 3 4 8 15 7 4 1 2 12 70
8 17 5 5 3 4 2 8 1 0 4 49
9 4 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 11
10 7 4 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 16
Total 142 64 31 45 83 48 34 21 15 117 600
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Table 3.23: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-F tasks in IP6
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-F Low Stakes
Financial Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 12 11 4 5 5 4 4 4 1 18 68
1 12 12 13 6 11 6 6 2 3 27 98
2 21 14 6 10 11 7 4 5 4 28 110
3 18 9 7 8 7 13 6 1 1 14 84
4 10 10 9 8 6 1 3 2 2 14 65
5 10 10 4 6 11 5 11 3 5 17 82
6 4 3 5 2 5 3 0 0 0 5 27
7 10 2 3 5 5 5 3 1 5 5 44
8 6 0 2 0 3 0 1 2 0 2 16
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
10 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Total 107 73 53 50 64 44 38 20 22 130 601
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-F High Stakes
Financial Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 18 15 0 4 12 2 2 1 0 14 68
1 14 10 7 7 11 10 4 3 4 27 97
2 23 6 6 8 17 9 7 4 2 28 110
3 21 6 7 4 14 5 3 5 3 16 84
4 18 7 1 7 5 9 2 1 3 11 64
5 19 14 4 6 9 9 2 5 0 14 82
6 6 2 3 4 5 1 2 1 1 2 27
7 11 3 3 3 7 3 9 0 2 3 44
8 8 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 0 2 16
9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
10 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Total 142 64 31 45 83 48 33 21 15 117 599
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Table 3.24: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-H tasks in IP6
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-H Low Stakes
Health Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 15 14 6 6 11 7 6 4 2 13 84
1 12 8 9 8 8 4 4 2 1 21 77
2 18 16 11 8 13 11 8 4 5 29 123
3 18 13 3 6 7 13 6 1 2 19 88
4 9 4 6 6 8 3 4 2 2 13 57
5 14 9 4 8 5 1 3 3 3 17 67
6 4 4 6 2 6 3 3 2 2 5 37
7 6 2 7 1 5 2 4 2 3 7 39
8 8 2 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 21
9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
10 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 6
Total 107 73 53 50 64 45 38 20 22 129 601
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-H High Stakes
Health Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 19 17 2 7 14 9 2 2 1 11 84
1 15 7 7 5 7 7 5 2 3 19 77
2 27 4 5 11 20 10 3 8 2 33 123
3 22 8 7 1 11 7 9 3 5 16 89
4 14 5 1 2 11 7 3 1 2 11 57
5 19 10 3 7 3 3 4 2 1 13 65
6 6 6 3 6 6 3 3 0 0 4 37
7 8 4 1 4 9 1 5 1 0 6 39
8 9 2 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 3 21
9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
10 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 6
Total 142 64 31 45 83 48 34 21 15 117 600
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Table 3.25: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-G tasks in IP7
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-G Low Stakes
General Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 3 1 0 1 2 3 0 2 2 7 21
1 7 4 1 4 2 2 2 3 1 4 30
2 15 9 8 5 10 1 4 5 5 10 72
3 4 10 5 8 3 4 0 3 1 5 43
4 4 5 2 1 6 2 3 1 0 7 31
5 17 14 8 3 6 8 5 4 3 17 85
6 3 6 1 2 6 5 4 2 1 4 34
7 7 9 2 4 11 1 3 2 6 7 52
8 5 3 4 4 1 5 3 2 2 6 35
9 3 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 2 13
10 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 15
Total 70 65 36 34 49 32 25 26 22 72 431
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-G High Stakes
General Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 2 4 2 0 2 0 2 1 1 7 21
1 8 1 2 3 4 1 6 1 2 2 30
2 16 8 8 8 9 3 4 4 0 12 72
3 5 8 6 2 7 5 3 1 1 5 43
4 6 2 2 2 3 5 2 1 1 7 31
5 24 11 7 3 7 3 4 2 3 21 85
6 7 3 2 4 3 7 2 2 0 4 34
7 12 5 1 8 7 6 4 0 3 6 52
8 7 2 4 4 2 3 1 5 1 6 35
9 3 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 4 13
10 3 3 2 0 3 0 0 0 1 3 15
Total 93 47 37 34 49 34 29 17 14 77 431
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Table 3.26: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-F tasks in IP7
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-F Low Stakes
Financial Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 18 10 9 7 6 5 1 4 4 17 81
1 13 16 5 4 6 3 5 5 2 11 70
2 13 4 7 6 14 6 5 6 5 10 76
3 4 5 3 8 5 3 2 0 0 6 36
4 1 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 1 2 22
5 11 13 6 3 7 4 3 4 4 17 72
6 0 8 1 2 3 3 3 2 5 4 31
7 2 4 1 0 3 2 3 2 0 1 18
8 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 13
9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
10 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 8
Total 70 65 36 34 49 32 25 26 22 71 430
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-F High Stakes
Financial Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 24 7 10 3 8 1 6 2 3 17 81
1 15 8 3 5 9 8 7 3 3 9 70
2 15 8 7 8 10 5 4 7 3 9 76
3 3 4 6 4 5 2 3 2 0 7 36
4 5 0 0 3 4 5 2 0 0 3 22
5 16 9 7 3 3 7 4 2 1 20 72
6 6 7 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 5 31
7 3 1 1 2 4 4 1 0 1 1 18
8 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 2 3 13
9 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
10 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 8
Total 93 47 37 34 49 34 29 17 14 76 430
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Table 3.27: Responses across the HL and the SOEP-H tasks in IP7
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-H Low Stakes
Health Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 19 15 5 8 11 6 3 3 2 15 87
1 15 10 7 1 6 5 2 3 4 8 61
2 11 13 8 8 16 6 9 8 6 13 98
3 5 6 6 8 1 4 4 1 1 10 46
4 1 5 0 1 3 2 1 3 1 4 21
5 11 7 5 3 5 3 2 1 3 12 52
6 0 2 1 0 3 2 2 1 1 2 14
7 2 2 1 2 2 3 0 3 1 1 17
8 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 17
9 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 8
10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 9
Total 70 65 36 34 49 32 25 26 22 71 430
HL - First Switching Point
SOEP-H High Stakes
Health Risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 20 9 14 5 11 2 6 0 4 16 87
1 15 8 3 7 11 3 4 1 0 9 61
2 22 9 6 7 11 13 6 9 2 13 98
3 9 5 5 5 2 5 4 1 1 9 46
4 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 0 4 21
5 17 7 4 2 2 2 2 3 0 13 52
6 0 1 3 0 3 4 0 0 0 3 14
7 2 1 0 2 4 1 3 1 0 3 17
8 2 2 0 4 2 2 0 0 4 1 17
9 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 8
10 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 9
Total 93 47 37 34 49 34 29 17 14 76 430
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Table 3.28: Responses across the EG and the HL tasks in IP6
HL - First Switching Point
Low Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 47 23 18 15 19 15 11 6 8 68 230
2 4 14 6 6 6 4 4 4 5 11 64
3 12 10 7 17 11 11 12 4 8 28 120
4 12 17 11 5 11 6 8 3 3 8 84
5 7 3 8 5 10 6 4 1 0 9 53
6 34 13 5 9 12 9 4 4 0 14 104
Total 116 80 55 57 69 51 43 22 24 138 655
HL - First Switching Point
High Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 61 17 3 13 24 16 16 8 7 65 230
1 7 7 4 8 8 7 1 7 3 12 64
2 19 11 6 7 20 14 11 4 2 26 120
3 16 12 7 8 18 6 3 4 1 8 83
4 9 8 2 5 10 2 7 1 2 7 53
5 41 14 10 9 10 5 2 1 3 9 104
Total 153 69 32 50 90 50 40 25 18 127 654
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Table 3.29: Responses across the EG and the HL tasks in IP7
HL - First Switching Point
Low Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 30 21 12 8 20 13 3 12 8 40 167
2 2 11 2 2 6 7 5 4 5 4 48
3 17 8 9 8 8 7 13 8 4 19 101
4 5 14 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 11 52
5 4 9 9 6 8 1 2 1 3 3 46
6 17 9 4 9 5 3 2 2 0 3 54
Total 75 72 40 37 51 35 26 29 23 80 468
HL - First Switching Point
High Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 38 13 17 8 17 9 8 6 6 45 167
1 8 9 5 3 5 4 5 5 0 4 48
2 14 10 8 8 9 10 11 3 7 21 101
3 8 6 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 12 52
4 7 8 3 8 8 4 1 4 1 2 46
5 26 7 2 4 8 4 0 1 0 2 54
Total 101 53 40 36 52 35 30 20 15 86 468
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Figure 3·4: Distributions of individual thresholds and decisions, EG
180
Figure 3·5: Individual thresholds and Decisions, EG
181
Figure 3·6: Consistency between EG and HL - comparison
182
Table 3.30: Number of subjects with consistent CRRA ranges in EG and
the HL tasks in IP6 with W = 0
HL - First Switching Point
Low Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
1 47 5 6 10 16 11 9 6 6 68 184
2 4 1 3 4 4 3 4 4 5 11 43
3 12 1 1 13 9 9 9 3 7 28 92
4 12 3 3 4 9 4 6 2 3 8 54
5 7 0 4 2 8 4 4 1 0 9 39
6 34 3 0 8 9 8 3 2 0 14 81
Total 116 13 17 41 55 39 35 18 21 138 493
HL - First Switching Point
High Stakes
EG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Never Total
0 61 3 1 11 20 14 13 7 4 65 199
1 7 0 1 4 7 6 1 7 3 12 48
2 19 3 3 5 17 13 11 4 2 26 103
3 16 2 2 4 14 5 3 2 1 9 58
4 9 3 1 3 9 1 5 1 1 7 40
5 41 3 4 4 9 5 2 0 3 9 80
Total 153 14 12 31 76 44 35 21 14 128 528
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Table 3.32: Cross-validity ordered probit estimations (IP6)
All, no weights
General Financial Health General Financial Health
Switching Point -0.015 -0.022 -0.0019
(0.013) (0.013)* (0.013)
EG Choice 0.054 0.085 0.044
(0.023)** (0.023)*** (0.022)**
Observations 602 601 601 600 599 600
Consistent, no weights
General Financial Health General Financial Health
Switching Point -0.035 -0.043 -0.018
(0.015)** (0.015)*** (0.015)
EG Choice 0.077 0.11 0.057
(0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.026)**
Observations 414 413 413 412 411 412
All, weights
General Financial Health General Financial Health
Switching Point -0.016 -0.015 0.016
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
EG Choice 0.048 0.076 0.051
(0.027)* (0.027)*** (0.025)**
Observations 515 514 514 513 512 513
Consistent, weights
General Financial Health General Financial Health
Switching Point -0.038 -0.034 -0.0039
(0.017)** (0.018)* (0.016)
EG Choice 0.073 0.090 0.072
(0.031)** (0.031)*** (0.029)**
Observations 358 357 357 356 355 356
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.39: Joint structural estimations of EG and HL with/without sam-
pling weights
(2) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12)
HL EG
Variables Plain Treat Covariates Plain Treat Covariates
RRA
EG 5.235 5.628 4.995 5.168 5.803 5.347
(0.593)*** (0.726) (0.671) (0.894) (1.156)*** (1.468)***
Web -0.088 -0.141 -0.156 -0.353
(0.294) (0.323) (0.328) (0.405)
£10+£20 0.089 0.209 0.333 0.387
(0.351) (0.361) (0.395) (0.401)
£30 -0.041 0.025 0.115 0.254
(0.354) (0.347) (0.357) (0.382)
FamSize -0.092 -0.151
(0.122) (0.143)
Female 0.215 0.193
(0.275) (0.341)
Age 0.441 0.356
(0.475) (0.621)
AgeSq -0.051 -0.056
(0.049) (0.065)
ALevel -0.320 -0.288
(0.273) (0.330)
PerCapIncome 0.667 0.507
(0.268)** (0.428)
Constant 0.456 0.498 -2.334 0.370 0.334 -1.169
(0.137)*** (0.219) (1.533) (0.168)** (0.274) (1.969)
LNmuRA
EG 1.693 1.641 1.560 2.007 2.008 2.0237
(0.669)** (0.610)*** (0.561) (1.037)* (1.017)* (1.0421)*
Web -0.4343 -0.624 -0.554 -0.726
-0.1353 (0.165) (0.159)*** (0.210)
RT2 -0.0939 -0.253 -0.014 -0.194
(0.1434) (0.191) (0.136) (0.197)
RT3 -0.2334 -0.419 -0.139 -0.350
(0.1523) (0.208) (0.162) (0.220)
RT4 -0.1083 -0.347 -0.061 -0.295
(0.1839) (0.234) (0.149) (0.242)
Constant -0.977 -0.701 -0.482 -0.985 -0.731 -0.493
(0.063) (0.122)*** (0.212) (0.084)*** (0.132)*** (0.249)**
Observations 12,248 12,248 12,248 12,248 12,248 12,248
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.05, **** p < 0.01. £30 stands for
£30 Incentive, and £10+£20 for £10+£20 Incentive. PerCapIncome is Per capita income.
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Table 3.41: External validity estimations in IP6, other health behaviors -
HL and EG
All
HL EG
Low Stakes High Stakes
BMI 0.015 0.021 0.012 0.015 -0.0072 -0.011
(0.010) (0.012)* (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Fast Food 0.019 0.023 0.098 0.13 -0.046 -0.058
(0.097) (0.11) (0.097) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
No Diet 0.072 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.049 -0.063
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
No Sports 0.046 0.065 0.016 0.0087 -0.13 -0.12
(0.099) (0.11) (0.099) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Controls x x x
Observations 475 440 474 439 474 439
Consistent
HL EG
Low Stakes High Stakes
BMI 0.026 0.028 0.020 0.020 -0.019 -0.025
(0.013)* (0.016)* (0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015)
Fast Food 0.030 0.080 0.12 0.19 -0.044 -0.083
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15)
No Diet 0.17 0.26 0.073 0.17 0.061 -0.051
(0.13) (0.14)* (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)
No Sports 0.046 0.037 0.067 0.029 -0.048 -0.025
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Controls x x x
Observations 331 307 330 306 330 306
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls include:
Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education, Income (ln), Employment Status and Interview mode.
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Table 3.42: External validity estimations in IP6, other health behaviors -
SOEP
All
SOEP
General Financial Health General Financial Health
BMI -0.020 -0.012 -0.013 -0.019 -0.014 -0.020
(0.011)* (0.011) (0.0099) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)*
Fast Food 0.35 0.23 0.28 0.18 0.10 0.31
(0.093)*** (0.094)** (0.095)*** (0.11)* (0.11) (0.11)***
No Diet -0.14 -0.11 -0.088 -0.19 -0.17 -0.17
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
No Sports -0.19 -0.20 -0.24 -0.10 -0.048 -0.16
(0.098)** (0.098)** (0.097)** (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Controls x x x
Observations 475 475 474 440 440 439
Consistent
SOEP
General Financial Health General Financial Health
BMI -0.020 -0.012 -0.022 -0.020 -0.011 -0.027
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)* (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)*
Fast Food 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.086 0.18
(0.11)*** (0.11)** (0.11)* (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
No Diet -0.051 -0.070 -0.064 -0.14 -0.13 -0.10
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
No Sports -0.25 -0.13 -0.22 -0.15 0.017 -0.13
(0.12)** (0.12) (0.12)* (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Controls x x x
Observations 331 331 330 307 307 306
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls include:
Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education, Income (ln), Employment Status and Interview mode.
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Table 3.43: External validity estimations in IP6, Financial Domain - HL
and EG
All
HL EG
Low Stakes High Stakes
RegularSaver -0.002 0.003 -0.068 -0.069 0.081 0.052
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 290 290 290 290 290 290
EmployerPension 0.11 0.11 -0.025 -0.023 -0.28 -0.30
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)*
PersonalPension -0.28 -0.27 -0.44 -0.51 0.40 0.42
(0.21) (0.21) (0.17)** (0.18)*** (0.21)* (0.22)*
Observations 200 200 199 199 200 200
Controls x x x
Consistent
HL EG
Low Stakes High Stakes
RegularSaver 0.033 0.021 0.003 0.005 0.046 0.020
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
EmployerPension -0.039 -0.050 -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23)
PersonalPension -0.41 -0.40 -0.63 -0.68 0.59 0.62
(0.21)* (0.22)* (0.20)*** (0.21)*** (0.24)** (0.27)*
Observations 139 139 138 138 139 139
Controls x x x
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls include:
Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education, Income (ln), Employment Status and Interview mode.
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Table 3.44: External validity estimations in IP6, Financial Domain -
SOEP
All
SOEP
General Financial Health General Financial Health
RegularSaver -0.083 0.048 0.14 -0.043 0.11 0.14
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272
EmployerPension -0.15 0.14 -0.22 -0.11 0.16 -0.20
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
PersonalPension 0.016 0.24 -0.031 0.038 0.23 -0.040
(0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24)
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192
Controls x x x
Consistent
SOEP
General Financial Health General Financial Health
RegularSaver -0.16 0.006 0.14 -0.18 -0.008 0.11
(0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
Observations 184 184 184 184 184 184
EmployerPension -0.22 0.029 -0.31 -0.13 0.092 -0.25
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
PersonalPension 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.37 0.29
(0.19) (0.24)* (0.24) (0.21) (0.25) (0.26)
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
Controls x x x
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Controls include:
Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education, Income (ln), Employment Status and Interview mode.
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Appendix A
Innovation Panel Wave 6 field
procedures and treatments
The sampling of the IP is as follows. Within each of the eleven GORs (with Wales and
Scotland each counted as a single region), sectors were sorted in order of the percentage of
“household heads” (defined as the “household reference persons” responsible for owning
or renting, or who are otherwise responsible for the accommodation) classified as National
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) categories 1 (“Higher managerial, ad-
ministrative and professional occupations”) and 2 (“Lower managerial, administrative and
professional occupations”), and then divided into three approximately equal-sized bands,
thus creating 33 strata. Within each of those strata, sectors were then sorted in order of
population density. Treating the list of sectors as a single ordered list, a sample of 120
sectors was selected systematically with probability proportional to address count. Using
a fixed interval and a random start, 23 addresses were selected systematically from each
sampled sector, making a total sample of 2,760 addresses from 120 sectors. The IP sample
design is thus described by the sampling stratum, the PSUs, and the design weights. In
the estimations we make use of the survey weights to adjust for differential nonresponse
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and to generalize results to the UK population (see Section 3.4).
The final stage of sampling was carried out in the field by the interviewers. For each
sampled address, the interviewer identified the sample persons. All persons resident in the
sample address at the time the interviewer collected the household grid information for
Wave 1 were defined as sample members. A refinement of this procedure was applied at
the small number of addresses that contained multiple dwellings or households, primarily
to constrain interviewer workloads: if more than three dwellings were found at an address,
or more than three households were found to be resident at a sampled dwelling, three were
selected at random for inclusion using a Kish grid procedure.
All household members aged 16 years or older were eligible for interview. As with the
main Understanding Society survey, all persons resident at the address in Wave 1, including
children, were defined as “original sample members” (OSM) to be followed throughout the
life of the study. In IP Waves 4 and 7, additional 960 and 1,560 new addresses, respectively,
were added as “refreshment samples” (8 and 13 in each of the 120 PSUs, respectively).
The IP5 sample had two components: the original sample members (OSMs) that were
at their fifth wave of data collection, and the members of the Wave 4 refreshment sample,
at their second wave. In Wave 5, households in both samples (n=1,575) were randomly as-
signed within PSUs to one of two treatment groups: face-to-face (F2F) interview, (n=532,
about a third of the sample, of which 168 from the refreshment sample), and web-mode
(WEB) interview, (n=1,043, about two-thirds of the sample, of which 315 from the re-
freshment sample). Because randomization was implemented across PSUs, each sampling
point contained a mix of households in each treatment group. Randomization was at a
household level: all adult members (aged 16 or above) within the household received the
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same experimental treatment and any split-off households retained the same experimental
allocation from the previous household. As a result, in Wave 5 a total of n=1,293 IP
respondents were randomly allocated to the WEB group (n=856 OSMs and n=437 from
the refreshment sample) and n=702 to the F2F group (n=459 OSMs and n=243 from the
refreshment sample).
Wave 6 replicated this random allocation with households receiving the same experi-
mental treatment as in IP5. As a result, in IP6 a total of n=1,337 IP respondents were
randomly allocated to the WEB group (n=910 OSMs and n=427 from the refreshment
sample) and n=686 to the F2F group (n=446 OSMs and n=240 from the refreshment
sample).
The same original random allocation of households to WEB versus F2F treatments
was also carried over in Wave 7. In IP7 a total of n=1,126 IP respondents were randomly
allocated to the WEB group (n=773 OSMs and n=353 from the refreshment sample) and
n=554 to the F2F group (n=364 OSMs and n=190 from the refreshment sample).
Waves 6 and 7 differed from IP5, however, in that it incorporated a “mop-up” of
uncompleted households at the end of the standard fieldwork (see more below).
The F2F group involved standard Understanding Society procedures: each adult mem-
ber was sent an advance letter with the same unconditional incentive (£10), after which
interviewers called to attempt computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) interviews.
In each household one adult member was asked to complete the household grid, which
collects information on who is currently living in the household. Typically the household
grid has a question to identify who is responsible for paying utility bills in the household.
This person or their spouse/partner could then complete the household question-
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naire. The household questionnaire is relatively short (around 10 minutes) and collects
household-level information such as housing tenure, rent/mortgage payments, expendi-
tures, utility bills, household consumer durables, and some measures of material depriva-
tion. All household adult members were then asked for an individual interview and to
complete a self-completion questionnaire, which was randomly allocated to be either a
computer-assisted self-interview (CASI) or a paper questionnaire booklet. Young people
aged 10-15 were administered a paper self-completion questionnaire.
Fieldwork procedures for the WEB treatment were as follows: all adult members were
sent an advance letter with a financial incentive, inviting them to take part to the web
interview. The value of the incentives was also subject to some experimental random
allocation. Households in the WEB group were randomly allocated in equal proportions
to either an unconditional £10 incentive (WEB10); or an unconditional £30 incentive
(WEB30); or, finally, an unconditional £10 incentive, plus extra £20 conditional on full-
household completion by web in a two-weeks “web-only” allotted time (WEB10+20).
The advance letter included the URL and a unique user ID which was to be entered
on the welcome online screen. A version of the letter was additionally sent by email
to all adult members for whom an email address was available. For members who, in
previous waves, had indicated that they did not use internet regularly for personal use,
the letter said they would also have the opportunity to do the survey with an interviewer.
Up to the three email reminders were sent at 3-day intervals. Adult members who had
not completed the web interview after the two weeks were sent a reminder by post and
interviewers started visiting them to carry out CAPI interviews. This was the two-week
“web-only” period in which households allocated to the WEB10+20 group could qualify
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for the additional £20 incentive.
The first household member to log on to complete the web survey was asked to complete
the household grid. In the web mode the household grid also had a question to identify
who was responsible for paying bills in the household. This person or their spouse/partner
could then complete the online household questionnaire.
In general, the adult web questionnaire was substantially based on the CAPI version
with some appropriate adaptations, such as incorporating interviewer instructions into
question wording, and making “help” screens more respondent-friendly. The web survey
was not suitable for completion using a smart phone or any other small mobile device.
If a smart phone was used to access the log-on page, the respondent was automatically
directed to a page requesting that they log on from a computer.
The WEB survey remained open throughout all the standard F2F fieldwork period.
Interviewers informed household members in the WEB group that the interview would be
closed approximately one week before the end of the fieldwork. In Waves 6 and 7 (but
not Wave 5) households who had not been surveyed at the end of the standard fieldwork
period, and were not adamant refusals, were contacted again in a “mop-up” stage of
fieldwork.
The type of “mop-up” contact was different across groups. The F2F group was con-
tacted to offer a web interview during the mop-up stage. All individuals were sent a letter
including the URL of the web and their unique user ID which was to be entered on the
welcome online screen. A version of the letter was additionally sent by email to the adult
members for whom an email address was available. Several days later, a telephone inter-
viewer contacted all those respondents for whom phone number was known in order to
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remind them of the web questionnaire, and to administer a telephone interview if possible.
In the WEB group, the “mop-up” contact was made by telephone. The telephone
interviewer reminded the household member that they could participate on the web, but
that was also able to administer the interview by telephone (CATI). Cases for which a
telephone number was not known were not contacted again at the mop-up stage.
Appendix B
Allocation to the risk preferences
module
This initial random allocation of households eligible to the risk preferences experimental
module across the two interview modes changed because of the above described two-weeks
“web-only” period and the related “mop-up” procedure (See Table 3.1). In particular,
during that period, 228 of the 528 households originally allocated to the WEB mode (43.2%
of the original WEB eligible households) opted for the F2F mode. In the “mop-up” session,
further 11 of the 528 households originally allocated to the WEB mode (2.08% of the
original WEB eligible households) had a telephone interview. Because the experimental
module was impossible to administer in the CATI mode, these 11 subjects therefore lost
eligibility for the experimental module. The same happened to 3 of the 280 households
initially allocated to the F2F mode (1.07% of the original F2F eligible households), who
also had a CATI interview in the “mop-up” session, and therefore lost eligibility for the
experimental module. There were also 6 of the 280 households initially allocated to the
F2F mode (2.14% of the original F2F eligible households) who in the “mop-up” session
ended up completing a web interview instead.
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As a result, at the end of the two-week “web-only” period and of the “mop-up” sessions,
there were n=794 households potentially eligible for the experimental module (the original
808, minus the 14 interviewed in the CATI mode): n=499 of them were in the F2F
interview mode (62.85% of the total), and n=295 in the WEB mode (37.15% of the total).
In each household eligible for the experimental module, one adult respondent in the
household was then randomly selected with a Kish grid of enumerated adults. The random
selection was done to ensure a fair representation of both spouses and, more generally, of
all adults in the household. Only one adult respondent thus answered the risk preferences
questions in each household.
Appendix C
Preamble to risk preferences
module
To guarantee clarity and transparency of the procedure, and to ensure that subjects un-
derstood the consequences of their choices, the risk (and time) preferences module started
with the following instructions preamble:
“We will ask you a set of very brief questions. At the end you will have the
chance to win an amount of money. In each question, you will be presented
with a choice. There are two sets of questions. First, you will be asked to
decide between different amounts of money that you could potentially receive
at different points in time. In the second set questions you will be asked to
decide between types of lottery games that you might prefer to play. In all
these questions, there is no right or wrong answer. We are interested in what
you genuinely prefer.”
At the end of this preamble, respondents were also explicitly asked whether they
intended to continue with the experimental task, or whether they preferred to refuse to
take part in it. A similar outside option was presented again at the end of the time risk
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preferences block and before the risk preferences questions (e.g. some respondents may
not be willing to play lottery gambles for personal or religious reasons).
To guarantee that subjects understood the experimental procedure and were fully
aware of the consequences of their choices, the above instructions preamble further ex-
plained:
“Once you have made all your choices, you could receive a payment. Ten
percent of respondents will be randomly selected to win. There are 91 questions
in this section of the interview in total. If you are selected to receive the
payment, one of the 91 questions will be selected at random, and your payment
will be calculated based on your answer to that question. The highest amount
that you could win is £250. If you are selected to receive the payment, the
payment will be arranged at the end of the interview.”
Appendix D
Randomized payments
administration
Randomized payments were administered by mean of an ad hoc computerized script that
was implemented in both F2F and WEB response modes. In the script, a screen of
instructions reminded subjects that they had “1 in 10 chance to receive a payment.” It
further explained that “If you are selected to receive the payment, one of the 91 questions
that you just answered will be selected at random, and the payment will be calculated
based on your answer to that question.”
A screen shot then simulated a roll of a ten-faced die to see whether the respondent
was actually selected to receive the monetary payment for real. If not, a screen with a
“Sorry, you have not been selected to receive the payment” message appeared, and the
participant moved on to the final questionnaire, described above. If so, a screen with
a “Congratulation, you have been selected to receive the payment” appeared with the
further explanation that “Let’s now see which question will be selected to calculate the
payment. A number between 1 and 91 will be selected at random to choose the question
for your payment.” Another screen shot followed that simulated a random draw of a ball
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from an urn containing 91 numbered balls, one for each risk and time preferences task.
The sequence of the next screens then depended on the type of experimental questions
that was randomly extracted. If one of the binary lottery questions was randomly selected
(balls numbered 73 to 90), a screen appeared explaining that the question corresponding to
that number was selected, and reporting the whole wording of the selected question. The
screen also reported which lottery was actually chosen by the respondent. A subsequent
screen simulated a roll of a ten-faced die to see which outcome was selected within the
preferred lottery. Another subsequent screen then summarized what was the outcome of
the preferred lottery and that, at the end of the interview, the professional interviewer
would give the respondent a voucher for the corresponding amount. The procedure was
analogous in case the multiple-option risk preferences test was selected (ball numbered 91),
with the only difference that the summary screen after the die-roll summarized whether
the low or high outcome had occurred with the corresponding payment.
Appendix E
Structural estimation
We start illustrating the ML structural estimation approach by Andersen et al. (2008b,
2014) considering the HL task. In the HL task, each of the considered lotteries has
two possible monetary outcomes Mj , j = 1, 2 with probabilities p(Mj) induced by the
experimenter. Under EUT, the expected utility (EU) for lottery i = A,B is
EUi =
∑
j=1,2
[p(Mj)× U(W +Mj)]
where W is the above mentioned level of individual background consumption.
We use the simple stochastic specification by Holt et al. (2002), allowing for behavioral
Fechner errors in the sense of Hey and Orme (1994), that is as trembles where a subject,
say, wants to choose lottery A but mistakenly selects lottery B. We also adopt the con-
textual utility behavioral error specification of Wilcox (2011) to allow mistakes from the
perspective of the deterministic EUT model. Starting from the above EU for each lottery
pair calculated for candidate estimates of the parameters of the utility function U(.), as a
result of the incorporation of the behavioral errors, the index ratio
∆EU =
EUA−EUB
ν
µ
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is calculated, where EUA refers to Option A and EUB to Option B; is a normalizing
contextual term defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in that lottery pair minus
the minimum utility over all prizes in that lottery pair (so that the index ration falls within
the closed unit interval [0,1]); and is the Fechner noise parameter used to allow some errors
from the perspective of the deterministic EUT model. As µ→ 0 this specification collapses
to the deterministic choice EUT model where the choice is strictly determined by the EU
of the two lotteries, while as µ → ∞ , ∆EU → 0 and the choice essentially becomes
random.
The latent index ∆EU is then linked to observed choices using a logistic cumulative
probability distribution function Λ(∆EU) , so that Prob(choose lottery A) = Λ(∆EU).
The Fechner error term basically flattens this logistic link function as µ→∞ . Thus the
likelihood of the series of lottery choices, conditional on the EUT and CRRA specifica-
tions being true, depends on r, µ , and the observed choices. Since in our experimental
tasks subjects could not express indifference between the two options, the conditional
log-likelihood for a generic individual taking part in the experiment is
lnLRP (r, µ; y, ω,X) =
∑
i
[(ln Λ(∆EU)|yi = 1) + (ln(1− Λ(∆EU))|yi = −1)]
wheres yi = 1(yi = −1) denotes the choice of Option B (A) lottery in risk preferences
task i. We allow the CRRA parameter r to possibly be a linear function of a vector
X of individual characteristics, r = r0 + R
′X where r0 and R are (scalar and vector)
parameters to be estimated. If no individual characteristics are included in the model,
what is estimated is r = r0 which is the CRRA parameter estimated at the sample level
without taking into account observed individual heterogeneity. These expressions can then
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be maximized using standard numerical methods. Every estimate of r includes a standard
error which reflects the uncertainty about the true value of r. The estimations account for
clustering at the individual level by adjusting the standard errors for the fact that each
respondent made multiple choices across the risk preferences questions.
The same logic described above is readily extended to the EG task, with the main
differences being that the EG task requires respondents to compare six, rather than two,
binary lotteries, and that there is only one of such decisions to be made in the EG task.
In both the EG and the HL tasks, in our structural estimations we take advantage of
our unique survey linkage strategy where we can access within-subjects levels of household
income. In particular, we calculate individual-specific values of the background consump-
tion W for each of the respondents based on the information on the daily per-capita gross
income contained in the Understanding Society survey, and we assume that the exper-
imental income from the risk preferences questions is integrated with daily background
consumption in one day. Galizzi et al. (2016a) look at the effect of systematically varying
the levels of time horizons over which the experimental prizes are integrated within the
daily background consumption.
Appendix F
Responses in IP7 and across IP6
and IP7
Responses in IP7
Also in IP7 our sample of respondents provided heterogeneous responses in the EG task.
More than a third of the 468 subjects who answered the EG task in IP7 (n=167, 35.68%
of the respondents) chose certain lottery A in EG. The riskiest lottery F was chosen only
by 54 subjects, 11.54% of the total. A total of 101 respondents (21.58%) chose lottery C.
Also in IP7 there is wide heterogeneity in the responses to the HL task as well. First,
a total of 188 subjects out of 468 (40.17% of the IP7 sample, compared to 31.01% in IP6)
made at least one inconsistent choice in the sense of switching back (32.47% and 23.5% in
the low and high stakes questions). There is a core group of 74 respondents, who made at
least one inconsistent choice in both the low and the high monetary stakes HL questions.
Less than a fifth of the respondents never chose the safer lottery A: 17.09% with low
monetary stakes and 18.38% with high stakes. A roughly equal proportion of subjects
always chose the safer lottery A in all series of choices (16.03% and 21.58% with low and
high stakes, respectively).
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Responses across IP6 and IP7
For 413 respondents we are able to link data across the IP6 and IP7 waves. This sub-sample
of IP6 subjects provided responses in the IP6 EG task that were partly different from the
responses of the overall IP6 sample. In particular, while more than a third of those 413
subjects (36.32% of the respondents) chose the certain lottery A, in EG (compared to
35.11% of the whole IP6 sample), only 10.99% of them (compared to 15.88% of the whole
IP6 sample) chose the riskiest lottery F. A total of 91 from those respondents (22.03%)
chose lottery C (compared to 18.32% of the whole IP6 sample).
A total of 125 of those subjects (30.43% of the total) made at least one inconsistent
choice when answering HL questions in IP6 (in the sense that they switched back), in
line with the analogous proportion in the whole IP6 sample (31.01%). In particular, when
answering HL questions with low monetary stakes, 23.49% of the sample made inconsistent
choices, while 18.16% behaved as switchers with high monetary stakes. There is a core
group of 48 respondents, who made at least one inconsistent choice in both the low and
the high monetary stakes HL questions.
Less than a fifth of the respondents who answered HL questions in both IP6 and IP7
never chose the safer lottery A in IP (16.95% with low monetary stakes, 19.13% with high
stakes). A roughly equal proportion of subjects always chose the safer lottery A in all
series of choices in IP6 (15.98% and 20.82% with low and high stakes, respectively). The
overall distribution of IP6 responses to the HL questions for the subjects who answered
the HL questions in both IP6 and IP7 is thus fairly comparable with the corresponding
distribution for the whole IP6 sample, except for the smaller proportions on the polar
cases of no or all lottery A choices.
Appendix G
Responses across the HL tasks
with low and high monetary stakes
accounting for individual-specific
levels of background income
Here we focus on the HL task only, by comparing the responses of the subjects in the
two sets of HL questions for low and high monetary stakes. A first examination can be
conducted at the level of the raw responses to the two sub-sets of HL questions, without
taking into consideration the heterogeneity of respondents in terms of daily background
income. As for IP6, Figure G·1 suggests that, when looking at the subset of consistent
subjects only, the choices of subjects in the block of questions with low monetary stakes
seem fairly consistent with their own choices in the block of questions with high monetary
stakes. This is the case both when the choices in the two blocks of questions are compared
in terms of switching points, and when they are plotted in terms of underlying Sharpe
values. A wide proportion of the subjects who never switch in the low stakes HL questions
also never switch in the high stakes HL questions. Similarly, a large proportion of the
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subjects who switch immediately to B in the low stakes HL questions switch immediately
to B also in the high stakes HL questions too. The same pattern is documented for
responses to the two sets of HL questions in IP7.
Furthermore, it is possible to replicate the same type of analysis conducted in 6.6.4
about the cross-validity between the responses to the EG and the HL task but for the
responses to the HL questions with low or high monetary stakes. Again, for illustration
purposes, consider the sub-sample of respondents who, in the HL task with low monetary
stakes, choose lottery B when p = 0.5, and who in the HL task with high monetary stakes
choose lottery B at different values of the probability p of winning the high prizes. It is
then possible to calculate the upper bound of the CRRA values that is consistent with a
subject choosing lottery B when p = 0.5 if the monetary stakes are low, and at different
levels of the probability p if the monetary stakes are high. Figure 14 shows one typical
case for such upper bounds in our sample. As it can be seen, for this specific subject the
upper bound of the CRRA values for the HL test with low monetary stakes is substantially
higher than the analogous upper bound for the HL test with high monetary stakes (around
4.5 compared to around 3). Similar pictures can be drawn for each subject in our sample.
This is a confirmation that, in our HL tests, respondents need to be less risk averse in
the high monetary stakes questions than in the low stakes questions to switch to lottery
B. This aspect of the HL tasks should be kept into consideration when comparing the
responses across the two HL sets of questions.
Imagine now to only consider the subjects who in the HL task never switch back to
option A after they have chosen option B at some point. As mentioned above, there
are 453 subjects who never switched back in the HL questions in IP6. Based on what
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discussed above, given the level of background income of each respondent, it is possible
to calculate the upper bounds of the CRRA values consistent with choosing lottery B at
different levels of the probability p when the monetary stakes are high or low. For the
subjects who never switch back, in fact, individual choices in a sub-set of the HL questions
can be ordered in terms of the points in which the subjects switch to lottery B in that
set of questions. It is then possible to test whether the upper bound of the CRRA values
implied by the point in which a subject switches to lottery B in the questions with low
monetary stakes is consistent with the analogous upper bound of the CRRA values when
the monetary stakes are high. This allows us to calculate the proportion of subjects for
which the responses to the two sets of the HL questions with low or high monetary stakes
are consistent with each other in terms of their implied CRRA values. Table G.1 reports
this information.
As it can be seen, in IP6 around 31.6% of the subjects who never switched back in
the HL task are inconsistent in cross-validity terms, in the sense that the CRRA values
implied by their responses to the two sets of questions with low and high monetary stakes
are incompatible with each other. This proportion is somewhat lower for the respondents
who choose to switch to lottery B in the first pairwise choice, when p = 0.1 (15.3% and
6.8% of the choices in the low and monetary stakes questions, respectively), or who choose
to never switch to lottery B (4.7% and 19.4% of the choices in the low and monetary stakes
questions, respectively), and somewhat higher for the respondents who choose to switch
to lottery B in the last pairwise choice, when p = 0.9 (84.6% and 93.3% of the choices in
the low and monetary stakes questions, respectively).
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Figure G·1: Consistency of choice across low and high stakes HL questions
for consistent subjects.
Figure G·2: CRRA upper bounds for low and high stakes HL
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Appendix H
Cross validity ordered probit
estimations in IP7
The first set of regressions for IP7, that use the responses to either the EG task, or the
switching point in the HL task as the only explanatory variable, show a different picture
from the ones for IP6. In particular, there is no significant association between the EG and
the HL tasks, on the one hand, and the SOEP questions, on the other. The associations
are never statistically significant using and not using sampling weights, nor focusing on
consistent subjects. Also the sign of the estimated coefficients are often different from one
would expect on the base of what was found in IP6.
A further set of regressions includes as explanatory variables both the responses to
the EG task and the first switching points in the HL task with high or low monetary
stakes, and is available upon request. In a nutshell, when all subjects are considered in
the estimations, in IP7 there is no statistically significant association between the self-
reported willingness to take risks in the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions on the
one hand, and the responses to the EG and the HL tasks on the other. This is the case
when using or not using sampling weights.
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Estimations in IP7, however, confirm the already documented associations between
willingness to take risks and respondents’ gender and age: consistently with what observed
in IP6 and in the German SOEP, female and older subjects tend to self-report lower
willingness to take risks in all SOEP questions. It should be noted that in IP7 women
report lower willingness to take risks in health too. Unlike in IP6, in IP7 there is no
association between household per capita income and willingness to take risks, while self-
employed subjects tend to report less willingness to take risks in health. All these results
hold true both when using and not using sampling weights.
It is again of interest to focus on the subset of consistent subjects who did not switch
back to lottery A in the HL task (results available on request). For these subjects the first
switching point in the HL task is associated to a range of CRRA values. The estimations
for these subjects in IP7 confirm the above associations between gender, age, and self-
employment status and self-reported attitudes. The estimations, moreover, show that for
these subjects the first switching points in the HL tasks are negatively and significantly
associated with self-reported willingness to take risks in health (SOEP-H).
Alike for IP6, the results are substantially the same as just discussed when the re-
sponses to the EG task are included in the ordered probit regressions as two distinct
dummy variables taking value 1 when the subjects picked lottery A or lottery F, instead
of one discrete variable taking value from 1 (lottery A) to 6 (lottery F): there is no statis-
tically significant associations between the SOEP questions and the dummy variable for
choosing the safe lottery A in the EG task (results available on request).
Appendix I
External validity estimations in
IP7
Also in IP7 the responses to the EG task are not associated to any of the health-related
variables for smoking, drinking, or having chronic diseases. There is no significant associ-
ation between health variables and EG risk preferences measures regardless of whether or
not sampling weights are use, or whether all respondents or only the consistent subjects
are considered for the estimations. Moreover, when sampling weights are used, there is
also no significant association between health behaviors and the HL measures. In the
regressions without sampling weights, the alcohol drinking status is associated with the
responses to the HL task, but only with low monetary stakes.
In IP7 there is also a significant association between SOEP-H and the smoking status,
both when using and not using sampling weights: subjects who self-reported higher will-
ingness to take risks in health are more likely to be smokers. This significant association
holds for all respondents considered together as well as for the subsample of consistent
subjects who never switched back in the HL tasks when sampling weights are used. The
estimations for IP7 do not replicate the finding of significant associations between smok-
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ing status and the SOEP-G measure, nor between the SOEP questions and the alcohol
drinking behavior.
We have also estimated ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are
the responses to the EG, HL, and SOEP tasks, and the explanatory variables are the IP7-
specific DOSPERT items. The results are available on request. There is no significant
association between the HL tasks and the DOSPERT questions. The only exception is
the item on investing 5% of the annual income in a speculative stock which is significantly
associated with the switching point in the HL task with low monetary stakes, but the
estimated coefficient is small and positive. There is also little association of the DOSPERT
questions with the EG task. The only exception is the item on investing 10% of the annual
income in a mutual fund which is positively and significantly associated with the lottery
choice in the EG task. The evidence of little or no correlation between the DOSPERT
test and the EG and HL tasks is similar to the weak correlations found by Reynaud and
Couture (2012); Deck et al. (2013); Crosetto and Filippin (2015); Deck et al. (2014).
In contrast, the SOEP measures are significantly associated with a broad range of
items in the DOSPERT test. The SOEP-G, in particular, is positively and significantly
associated with all the 12 DOSPERT items. The same pattern of systematic associations
is found for the SOEP-F, with the exception of the item on riding a motorcycle without a
helmet. Also the SOEP-H question is generally associated with the DOSPERT items with
the exceptions of the finance-related items on investing 10% and 5% of the annual income
in a mutual fund or in a speculative stock, respectively. The associations of the SOEP
questions with the item on walking home alone in an unsafe area (and also on investing
10% of the annual income in a business venture for the SOEP-G and SOEP-F questions)
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are also robust to the introduction of a broad range of control variables. The significant
correlation between the SOEP and the DOSPERT measures is in line with what found by
Crosetto and Filippin (2015) in a student sample.
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